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Both the second century and the modern age are suspicious of the message and influence 
of Christianity within their respective cultures; the culture of religious pluralism and the 
prevailing civil religions of each time period suggest that tools used by the early Church 
fathers may prove useful in a modern context. In this thesis I will examine the extent to 
which the second century apologists are able to inform and assist the modern apologetic 
project. The second century apologists demonstrated a keen ability to navigate cultural 
norms and, in many cases, work within the ambient philosophical discourse of their time 
in order to produce a defense of the Christian message in terms understandable to an 
outside audience. Translating forward their ability to work within the cultural context of 
their time via language amenable to their audience sheds new light on potentially useful 
methods for modern apologists. 
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Apologetics in the modern age presents a definitively unique set of challenges. In 
addition to the more upfront task of defending the Church and the Gospel from being 
deconstructed, abused, or otherwise misunderstood, the linguistic and cultural tools 
available in the present pluralist era, dominated by philosophical liberalism, are perhaps 
tools which at first feel unwieldy. Furthermore, the rhetoric of legitimate authority seems 
to no longer rest in institutions and traditions, but in a general popular sovereignty and in 
individual conscience. While not intrinsically bad things in their own right, these 
complications to the apologetic task are certainly challenges worth examining, and when 
one takes the time to examine the underlying demands which these challenges place upon 
the apologist, a hopeful point of comparison emerges from within the earliest stages of 
the Christian Tradition.  
The earliest apologists for the Church contended with a world which seems to 
bear noteworthy similarity to our own. The general structure of the Roman Empire all but 
necessitated a plural society, within which various religious and cultural groups moved, 
operated, and debated often in the interest of preserving their own legacies and heritage. 
The ambient Hellenistic philosophy of the time was something which placed importance 
on a specific and refined rhetorical and argumentative style in order for a given school to 
solidify itself as a legitimate presence within the body as a whole. This philosophy also, 
to some extent, pre-set the terminology and the methodology which would lend the 
greatest credibility to a given sect, and in doing so required a certain level of cultural 
literacy on the part of those looking to break into the conversation. The concentration of 
authority was more institutional than it perhaps is now, but similarly to the present day, 




the situation could change quickly depending on the perceptions and opinions of those 
who wielded that authority. Perhaps most strikingly though, the outside perception upon 
the then-nascent Church was one of suspicion, thinking of these newly minted Christians 
as somehow a threat to the things held sacred by the general ethos and culture of the 
Roman Empire. These generalized aspects seem to point us in a direction which suggests 
that an examination of the second century apologists might be able to inform the needs of 
the present-day Church, and sculpt a methodology for apologetics in the 21st century. 
In the course of this thesis, I propose to look to the past in order to better inform 
the present. My aim is to investigate the apologetic works of three specific second 
century apologists, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Athenagoras, and determine the extent 
to which these early Church Fathers might be able to inform and meet the apologetic 
needs of the present-day Church. Ultimately through this investigation, I hope to provide 
some answer to the question of how the Church can bring the Gospel to a world which is, 
while perhaps not necessarily hostile to it in the same way the Roman Empire was 
towards the early Church, is nevertheless still a world which is still certainly skeptical of 
the Church, of evangelism, and of organized religion at large. In broader and slightly less 
verbose language, I propose to investigate whether the defenses made for Christianity in 
its infancy in some way help to establish and defend the place of the Church in the 
(post)modern era. Methodologically, in investigating this question I will be utilizing a 
mix of textual analysis, coupled with sociological and historical lenses in order to gauge 
how the voices of ancient Christianity can inform the Church today.  
The first chapter will attempt to deal on a sociological level and a historical level 
with both ancient and modern sources. This chapter will provide both a detailed literature 




review coupled with a contextualization of cultural and rhetorical norms for each 
respective time period. The aim in doing so is to provide the foundational work necessary 
for a detailed understanding of the situation facing both the ancient apologists and the 
state of affairs governing modern Christian apologetics; this process will provide the 
framework for the analyses to follow in the subsequent chapters. Specifically in this 
chapter, I will highlight significant points of congruency between the ancient and modern 
eras, most notably the cultural and political situation of religion in both time periods, the 
presence of a general religious pluralism, and the semi-permeability of participation in 
various religious traditions. The investigation of these elements and their presence in both 
eras helps underline the logic that it is therefore possible and valuable to lift the ideas, 
insights, and wisdom of the ancient sources and place them in the modern period because 
the cultural conditions are similar enough to merit such treatment of the texts.  
At the same time though, it is crucial to also appropriately identify and discuss 
key areas of difference between the two epochs, differences which may be obvious as 
well as ones which may require a more nuanced and subtle understanding of the forces at 
play. Not least of these aspects demanding analysis is the manner of qualification applied 
to religious groups in order to identify them as tolerable and legitimate public voices. 
This discussion necessarily continues into a discussion of the secular nature of the present 
world, especially in light of the ancient world’s lack of any such distinction between 
religious and non-religious territory. These differences create situations where the second 
century context has difficulty relating meaningfully, but in the end, as this thesis will 
show, these differences do not undo or cripple the apologists’ ability to address the 
modern context. By the conclusion of this chapter, the reader should have a nuanced 




understanding of the relevant cultural contexts thus enabling a greater discussion of these 
elements in the subsequent chapters.  
The second chapter focuses almost exclusively on the writings of the apologists 
themselves, and is divided into two parts. In the first section, the primary focus will be on 
a direct and critical reading of the apologetic works, coupled with analysis of how their 
apologetic devices and rhetoric sought to deal with the challenges of their time. Of 
special importance in this section are the notions of establishing the legitimacy of 
Christianity as participant in an ancient and ancestral tradition, the shifting methods and 
content of rhetoric for different audiences, and the placation of the socio-political 
concerns of the imperial establishment. Each of these themes represents an area of critical 
concern for the efficacy and acceptance of the apologetic language in its time and which 
therefore raises questions of its similarity (or not) with the context of modern 
Christianity. By analyzing the rhetoric and methodology inherent in the apologists’ 
treatment of these themes, this section will present forms of apology ready for 
interrogation in the modern context. 
The second section of this chapter will hone in on the way in which each 
individual apologist worked to address how the theology and practice of the new 
Christian religion could or should interact with the philosophical norms of their day. This 
interaction is in many ways a corollary from the themes explored in the previous section 
and to some extent represents a more detailed exploration of how the apologists sought to 
legitimize the Christian message to a ‘secular’ audience, that is one which exists outside 
the Church and one which may not claim the same theological and philosophical 
foundations as the Church. However, this discussion also goes beyond a simple 




commentary and beyond viewing the extent to which the interaction between Christianity 
and the philosophical discussions of the day as a solely rhetorical tactic. Rather this 
second section serves to demonstrate the implications inherent in each apologist’s attempt 
to deal with ambient philosophy and to offer a generalized spectrum for how these 
attempts might be treated. Ultimately this discussion also helps to point us in the 
direction of the third chapter which will interrogate the extent to which these lessons and 
tactics carry over into the world of the present day Church. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, the contextualized elements from chapters one 
and two are brought to bear on the thesis question itself in an effort to determine how and 
to what extent the second century apologists can speak to the present day. Thus, the third 
chapter is largely one of dialogue between the situations of ancient and modern 
apologetics. In this chapter, we first examine the philosophical and metaphysical 
underpinnings of modern society and what has come to distinguish the distinctly secular 
world from the religious one. The differentiations elucidated in chapter one are brought 
forward in the light of our chapter two analysis of the apologists; these differentiations 
then narrow down the terrain upon which we might allow the second century examples to 
play out. This process does involve some tracing of themes back through history, which 
may seem slightly tangential at first, but is in the service of ultimately illustrating the 
genealogy of the fundamental assumptions which define how many modern Western 
individuals view the world. Key in this chapter as well is a discussion of the extent to 
which the apologetic task should or should not give linguistic or philosophical ground to 
the culture at large; this is in many ways an attempt to address a key aspect of apologetics 




in any time period: the extent to which the apologetic process should make Christianity 
palatable and unthreatening to an audience unfamiliar with it.  
Finally, with the terrain so outlined, the third chapter of this thesis delves into the 
manners of speech, the questions of modernity, and the examples set forward by the 
second century apologists to spell out an apologetic method for the present informed by 
the lessons and struggles of the past. This section blends the voices of the previous 
chapters together in order to articulate both the implications of the ancient voices on the 
present state of affairs, and the concerns or questions we are left with requiring further 
discussion and answering. Here we will continue to revisit many of the voices presented 
in the first chapter which helped to contextualize the situation, enhance the discourse, and 
attempt to present the fullest possible picture (within the scope of this project) of the 
possible directions for the Church1 in the 21st century. 
As part of the conclusion to this project, I will combine the final points and 
directions of my investigation into the relationship between ancient and modern 
apologetics with a brief discussion concerning areas of study and expansion which result 
from the conclusions of the final chapter. Admittedly this thesis requires a narrowed field 
of view in order to treat with the content in a deep enough manner; by process of doing 
this, it touches more tangentially on some subject matter which would likely merit more 
investigation and thought than the present discussion is able to afford it. Thus in the 
                                                          
1 It is worth observing that what comprised the ekklesia in the time of the early apologists and what we 
see as the Church in the present day has undergone considerable change in the 1,800 years in between. 
As much as possible throughout this thesis, I will attempt to clarify when necessary whether the use term 
Church refers to the institutional Church, the Church as the people of God, etc. This also reflects that 
there may be an inescapable difference between the modern use and understanding of the word and 
what the likes of Justin, Tertullian, or Athenagoras may have understood it to mean. 




conclusion provided a discussion of the implications of the conclusions reached in 
chapter three, identify certain areas for academic expansion based on the ideas inherent to 
my thesis, and bring to a close the ideas and directions spelled out by our analysis of the 
second century apologists. 
The topic I have broached with my thesis question is one of significance to the 
present day Church, which seems at time to struggle with presenting itself and presenting 
the Gospel to the present day world. With a need to reassert the legitimacy and the radical 
nature of the message of Jesus Christ to a culture which seems to have trouble embracing 
it, the apologetics of the present day might be wise to take all the help the great tradition 
of the Church is able to muster. The writings and rhetoric of the second century certainly 
seem an amply fertile place for such an investigation and it is to starting that investigation 
that we now turn. 
 
  




Chapter One: Contextualization of the Question and Areas of Study 
The initial task for this project is a contextualization of both the Roman imperial 
context and, as will be argued, the modern Western ‘imperial’ context. This 
contextualization will indicate areas where congruency might exist, and therefore ground 
the process of direct dialogue between ancient and modern sources. However, in 
identifying areas of similarity one must not forget the obvious: that the 21st century is 
markedly different from the second century. Therefore when appropriate in the course of 
identifying similarities, this thesis will also indicate areas of marked difference from the 
cultural and historical context of the past. It is also worth mentioning at this juncture that 
the aim of the thesis is only to demonstrate congruency and similarity, rather than a strict 
one-to-one equality between the general time periods in question. 
Overall this contextualization will be subdivided into three major parts. The first 
part will be an examination of the ancient historical context and Christianity’s place and 
movements within it. In this section we will explore an in-depth discussion of the ancient 
culture out of which Christianity emerged and several factors affecting the content, 
rhetoric and theology of the apologetic fathers. The overall goal of contextualizing these 
aspects of the apologetic argument is to establish what facets of the prevailing culture 
were of specific interest to the apologetic fathers. This section will lend itself towards an 
understanding of the various cultural elements at play in the Roman Empire, what 
expectations they created for the Roman subject, and what consequences befell those who 
existed outside these norms. This section also helps to situate elements which will be 
discussed at greater length in chapter two, specifically concerning how Christian 
apologists at once employed and yet disavowed themselves of various elements of this 




culture in an effort to appear familiarly Roman while at the same time holding fast to 
foundationally novel aspects of Christianity. Paula Fredriksen’s work regarding the 
relationship between early Christianity and the Roman Empire will serve as a central 
trunk to our narrative logic, while also allowing us to branch into the work of scholars 
like Robert Beck concerning the religious market economy of the Roman Empire, as well 
as Martin Goodman’s and W.H.C. Frend’s discussions concerning the debate on first 
century (Jewish) missionaries. 
 The next section will make use of a range of scholars, including the likes of 
Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and Timothy Shah in the interest of discussing areas 
where I believe there is considerable congruity between the world of the second century 
and that of today. Connections will be drawn between themes and practices seemingly 
prevalent in both the modern age and the Roman period. This section will also examine 
what modern elements might be representative or evocative of cultish gods, and the 
inherent difficulties in challenging those elements. This section will serve as foundational 
for the discussion to come in the third chapter analysis of the apologists’ relevancy to the 
modern world as it seeks to identify specific aspects of the modern culture which modern 
Christians and apologists must contend with. In identifying these aspects we similarly 
identify places where the rhetoric, style, and theology of the second century apologist 
might have enough of an intellectual and cultural beachhead to push into our time period 
and advise the efforts of present day apologists.  
The final section will introduce the philosophical elements at play in the present 
discussion and identify some of the perceived consequences voiced by significant figures 
in the field. These elements and their consequences will serve to lead us into our chapter 




two examination of the apologists and will likewise be revisited in the third chapter 
analysis as well. The crux of our discussion at this point will center on the present day 
apologetic argument between Alasdair MacIntyre’s Benedict Option and the so called 
Dominic Option articulated by C.C. Pecknold. In addition to these two scholars, this third 
section will also bring in voices such as Tim Muldoon and Pope Francis as figures who 
seek out the applicability of the aforementioned apologetic options. This discussion will 
identify the underpinning assumptions and logic prevalent in the world as it exists today 
and how these elements challenge and complicate Christian apologetics. This will be 
particularly evident with respect to any attempt to draw similarities between the 21st and 
the second centuries given the markedly different philosophical atmospheres of these 
respective time periods. Yet at the same time, this section will also provide a grounding 
for understanding how the prevailing philosophical and moral currents can affect and 
influence the apologetic project. 
 
Section 1.1 – The Historical Context of the Second Century 
Having so introduced the topics of this chapter, let us now turn to the initial task 
of historical contextualization of the ancient world. Paula Fredriksen’s chapter 
“Christians in the Roman Empire in the first Three Centuries C.E.,” in her contribution to 
David Potter’s A Companion to the Roman Empire, is particularly striking in its portrayal 
of the intricacy of connection between religion and daily life. It is perhaps telling and 
informative that in the first few paragraphs of her chapter, Fredriksen points out in that 
this permeation of religion and its ubiquity in the life of the person is something which a 
modern Western individual might have difficulty fully realizing. She caricatures the 




modern Westerner as one who, typically, has a somewhat detached notion of religion, 
thinking of it as “something largely personal or private, a question first of all of beliefs” 
and who also has a somewhat detached notion of God and religion, thinking of it as a 
‘personal identity’ or “as a unique, transcendent, somewhat isolated metaphysical point,”2 
In this we clearly see a distinction between then and now of religion’s once ubiquitous 
status reigned in and given over to something done individually or privately rather than as 
a communal act undertaken by the whole of a given populace. This observation is a 
crucial one and, again, is one which characterizes the modern and postmodern eras 
Fredriksen’s overall task in her chapter is threefold: (1) the context of religious 
worship in the Roman period, along with its implications for the state; (2) the social 
upheaval caused by the renunciation of one’s ancestral gods; and (3) the tense 
relationship concerning the Jewish roots of Christian communities as they apply to 
conversion, theology, and customs. We will examine each of these points in order to flesh 
out the setting for the early Christian apologists and to outline points of possible 
congruency in our own time. Though this is only a subsection of the overall conversation 
with a focus towards similarities between the modern context and the Roman period, it 
will serve as a place to start the discussion. Additionally, as mentioned in the above 
chapter introduction, these points will also draw additional scholars in the field into the 
discussion, brought in for the purpose of better understanding the motivations behind and 
consequences of a religious ethos such as we will see Fredriksen articulate. 
                                                          
2 Paula Fredriksen, “Christians in the Roman Empire in the First Three Centuries C.E.,” in A Companion to 
the Roman Empire, ed. David S. Potter (Chichester, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 589. 




With respect to the first point, concerning the role and implications of religion in 
the Roman Empire, Fredriksen notes the prevalence and consequences of a largely 
polytheistic worldview. By her reckoning, even “monotheists were polytheists. It was 
their behavior, not their beliefs, that distinguished these groups from others.”3 
Fredriksen’s defining of polytheism via behavioral methods rather than by belief alone is 
something worth considering, and it provides her with room to look at the situation in a 
broader capacity. The fact that most communities living under Roman hegemony had 
gods or cults tied to their own land and culture meant that religious difference looked 
much different than we might imagine it today. The question, Fredriksen notes, was how 
to deal respectfully with the other gods, rather than a question of which gods were right 
or wrong, real or fictitious.  The religious expectation in the time of the empire was that 
each person should honor the gods of their ancestors, and that one’s allegiance to those 
particular gods was first and foremost; one could honor the god of another cult (for 
example Mithras or Dionysus), but the understanding was that “this openness to other 
cults in principle did not loosen the ties of obligation and respect that bound people, first 
of all, to their own gods.”4 This seems to establish a kind of religious culture that is on 
some levels semi-permeable, wherein there exists a certain degree of religious flexibility 
in the overall religious marketplace, so long as existing obligations are properly honored. 
Building onto this notion, Fredriksen also points out the Hellenistic influence on 
the Roman Empire had expanded religion to have a civic aspect. Ranging from public 
holiday celebrations, to government functions, to entertainment events, the urban people 
                                                          
3 Fredriksen, 590. 
4 Fredriksen, 592. 




living under the empire engaged in activities which today we would certainly see as 
secular or neutral,5 but at the time were religiously charged events honoring the gods of 
the city or the cult of Rome itself. For defining both ancestral and civic religious 
devotion, Fredriksen offers the following rationale: “Citizens and residents displayed 
their respect to the heavenly patrons of their city, thereby ensuring continued divine 
favor;”6 Fredriksen offers the term pax deorum as the descriptor of the peace achieved by 
man through proper honoring of the gods. Whatever individual devotions or covenants 
one might have with a god, the religious institutions in the Roman Empire were social 
bonds through which one supported the continued peace and prosperity of one’s 
community and of the empire as a whole. As a result, participation in these cults was in 
many cases a matter of duty to one’s local community and to what we might 
anachronistically call the nation-state.  
Roger Beck’s work on the religious market of the Roman Empire, in his article so 
named, can help us to nuance and better understand the outline Fredriksen provides. 
While, the primary aim of Beck’s article is to critique Rodney Stark’s models of religious 
economy expressed in The Rise of Christianity, many of Beck’s observations and claims 
ring true even outside of an analysis of Stark. The primary thrust of Beck’s argument is 
that Roman paganism existed as “an altogether more formidable and complex thing”7 
concerned with the public good (pax deorum) and pervasively involved with the life of 
                                                          
5 See Tertullian, Apology, trans. Thomas B. Falls (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948), Chs. 15 & 38 for 
examples of acknowledgements to this effect from Christian apologetic sources. 
6 Fredricksen, 592. 
7 Roger Beck, “The Religious Market of the Roman Empire: Rodney Stark and Christianity’s Pagan 
Competition” in Religious Rivalries in the Early Roman Empire and the Rise of Christianity, ed. Leif Vaage 
(Wilfred Laurier University Press: 2006) 236. 




the polis community and empire-at-large,8 and which was also accessible non-exclusively 
with respect to other cults.9 Indeed, these concepts are very much in sync with what we 
have previously seen in Paula Fredriksen’s work, but Beck’s analysis nuances the 
application of these themes with respect to the rise of Christianity.  
Perhaps the most significant point argued by Beck is his application of the 
elements of Greco-Roman religion leading him to a conclusion that is not explicitly 
found in Fredriksen, though one might be able to intuit something like it from her work. 
Beck first outlines what he considers to be a central tenet of Stark’s religious economy, 
namely that paganism was too ‘diversified’ in a sense and produced its religious goods 
individually and privately; this then was supplanted by the communal and collectively 
produced religious goods offered by new movements like Christianity. Against Stark’s 
religious economic model, Beck claims that “pagan firms were similar, if finally less 
effective, competitors in the market; they too, put collective goods on offer, though in 
most cases their product lines were more limited than Christianity’s.”10 The criticism 
offered here is that Stark’s model does not allow for a collective nature or the forging of 
communal bonds, but according to Beck, the Greco-Roman religion depends upon such 
collective products. 
Beck emphasizes and re-emphasizes this throughout his article, citing instances 
found in the Mithras cults11 but also within the mainstream Greco-Roman religion. 
Indeed, the previously cited elements of the cult religion, elements shown to be congruent 
                                                          
8 Beck, 242. 
9 Beck, 235 & 238. 
10 Beck, 237. 
11 Beck, 240. 




to Fredriksen’s insights, are elements which lend themselves to the formation of 
collective religious goods and communal bonds. The very nature of the pax deorum 
accord in many ways forces a collective nature into the functionality of the religion. Beck 
outlines that it is “the apparatus of temples, priesthoods, festivals, sacrifice, etc., by 
which the gods are served as they require, and by so doing renew the pax deorum,”12 and 
further, that by the production of these goods and services, those who can fund them 
honor the gods by doing so and those who do not have such funds are also able to honor 
the gods by enjoying the “free ride” of attending and participating in them.13 Thus, we 
find in the Greco-Roman religion, a markedly sturdy foundation for communal life, albeit 
a communal life with different focuses and mechanics than what Christianity seemed to 
aim for. It is also a communal life which Beck, even with his criticism of Stark, still 
admits is ultimately weaker than the Christian capability to produce its own types of 
collective religious goods and communal bonding and commitment. 
With this focus on the communal nature of Greco-Roman religion so emphasized, 
as well as its close relationship to the overall good of the community, it seems 
appropriate to now shift into the second discussion point of Fredriksen’s chapter: the 
perceived social upheaval caused by the rejection of one’s ancestral gods. As our 
investigation into Fredriksen’s work has already mentioned, the social end to which 
religious practice moved was the prosperity and peace of the city and empire. And as 
Beck’s analysis has demonstrated, this peace and prosperity was produced via a very 
specific engine of religiously produced communal goods. It is against this bulwark of the 
                                                          
12 Beck, 250. 
13 Beck, 248. 




community, at least through Roman eyes, that Christianity acts as an element of 
destruction and atheism. The Christian insistence that one who converts would give up all 
their pagan practices and ties, confused the mind of the typical Roman, who saw “the 
Christians [as] still members of their own [nation], with the standing obligations to the 
gods of their [nation], who were the gods of the majority.”14 
Jörg Ulrich likewise recognizes the general sense of confusion that outsiders to 
the Christian faith had towards the upstart religion. The nature of the struggle, according 
to Ulrich, stems from the way in which “Roman society was characterized by a striking 
religious pluralism. However, with the appearance of Christianity, it was confronted by a 
phenomenon which distinguished itself from other religions by raising the claim of 
absoluteness.”15 Ulrich continues to argue that this absolutist claim to Truth propagated 
by Christians made Christianity’s integration into the religious fabric of the empire more-
or-less an impossibility. He cites the criticisms of those like Celsus and Caecilius as 
evidence that the pagan mindset was ill equipped to comprehend the soteriological 
message of nascent Christianity, and that it was unacceptable for any religious group to 
assert its mythos as an absolute by which all people must judge their lives and actions.  
Yet obviously by the doctrines of Christian thought (what we might call a 
monotheism of both belief and practice), the same people had to give up such ties to 
other gods, religious movements, and claims to truth. With this disavowal of the religious 
status-quo, came the risk of upsetting the pax deorum, breaking the bonds which many 
                                                          
14 Fredriksen, 601. 
15 Jörg Ulrich, “Apologists and Apologetics in the Second Century,” in Early Christianity in the Context of 
Antiquity: In Defence of Christianity, ed. David Brakke, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich (Frankfurt: 
Peter Lang Edition, 2014), 2. 




believed at the time kept them safe and prosperous in their endeavors. This was an 
obviously steep social cost for a Christian convert to pay, but not only in the sense that 
one might be outwardly persecuted or criticized for it. As mentioned previously, many of 
the activities of life, from a plebian trip to the athletic competitions to certain patrician 
governmental functions all were tinged with honors to the pagan gods. This created quite 
a minefield for the early Christians in negotiating an economy and system of life that was 
permeated by what was doctrinally taboo for a faithful believer, putting them into what 
Fredriksen calls “a social and religious no man’s land.”16 
The final discussion point in Fredriksen’s chapter to be treated here deals with the 
complicated relationship between Christianity and its Jewish roots. Fredriksen notes that 
some of the issues which caused problems between Romans and Christians are nominally 
present in Judaism; again, most notable among them is the monotheistic aspect, requiring 
the renunciation of allegiance to any other deity. I call this problem nominal for two 
reasons. First of all, Fredriksen points out that there were many gentiles who were 
interested in reading the Jewish Scripture and participating in communal activities. 
Again, for the gentiles the membrane of religious practice is at least semi-permeable and 
participation in the rites and rituals of another deity (again, such as those of the mystery 
cults), or attendance at the religious gatherings of more culturally bound religions such as 
the Jews, posed no real problem so long as one’s ancestral deities were properly honored. 
Fredriksen notes of these interested gentiles that “these sympathetic gentiles were neither 
asked nor encouraged to convert to Judaism as a condition for joining this new movement 
                                                          
16 Fredriksen, 597. 




forming within the penumbra of the synagogue.”17 This makes the problem of 
monotheism for pagans interested in Judaism really a nominal issue; they didn’t need to 
practice or believe as the Jews did, nor were they encouraged to. One then notices here a 
stark contrast between the Jewish non-proselytizing and the Christian missionary efforts.  
As a brief aside here, it is important to have perhaps a little firmer grasp concept 
of early Common Era Jewish proselytization. At present, consensus seems divided on 
whether or not such a phenomenon was present in the Jewish communities in and outside 
of traditionally Jewish lands. W.H.C. Frend operates under the assumption that such 
missionary efforts were indeed going on, suggesting proselytization was part of the 
Jewish context within the Diaspora.18 Frend argues that these efforts stressed tension 
between the Jews and their gentile neighbors, and that the Jewish populace found most of 
its protection under the imperial recognition of Judaism as religio licita19 in recognition 
of their practice “of the customs of their forefathers.”20 These privileges continued even 
after the Jewish War of 66-73, though perhaps with increased mistrust and tension. 
However, more recent scholars like Martin Goodman call the assumptions of 
intentional and widespread Jewish mission into question. Treating the entirety of 
Goodman’s argument here is a larger and different task than what this present thesis 
allows for; suffice to say with respect to this topic that Goodman’s point, more than 
Frend’s, serves to underline the significance of what Fredriksen has likewise put forward. 
The thrust of Goodman’s argument is that “the role of the Jews was simply passively to 
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bear witness through their existence and piety”21 and that “the initiative [in conversion]… 
came from the would-be converts, not the converter.”22 This gels with our earlier 
treatment of Ulrich as well, as any absolutist soteriological claims made by the Jews 
would likely have resulted in the same ire that ultimately came the way of the Christians, 
yet there is surprisingly little evidence of this if it were indeed the case. While the 
situation certainly seems to demonstrate room in the Jewish tradition for interested 
parties, both Goodman and Fredriksen agree that by and large, the Jewish community did 
not seek to win converts in a traditional sense, but were willing to share with interested 
parties the teachings of the Jewish tradition. Ultimately, as Fredriksen puts it “gentiles 
would be included as gentiles,”23 and this seems to preclude any need to bring the 
gentiles into the Jewish cultural and religious fold. This stands against the growing 
Christian movement where there indeed seemed a great deal of emphasis placed upon the 
invitation and proselytization of new members into an absolutist belief structure 
ultimately at odds with many of the things held dear in the Roman Empire. 
Returning to our main line of reasoning, the second reason I call any potential 
issues with the demands of Judaism nominal is that Fredriksen points out that there were 
social allowances in place to deal with the circumstance of a pagan choosing to embrace 
Judaism and forsaking their previous gods, though again they seem largely unencouraged 
by the Jews to do so. One might be pressed to ask why Judaism, for allowing such things 
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at all, wasn’t pressed as some kind of corrupting influence24 or a detriment to the state in 
a way even close to the persecution suffered by Christians. The answer, again, seems to 
come from the notion that the Jews were not actively missionizing for the intent of 
conversion. There did exist what Goodman calls Jewish apologetic or educational 
mission,25 but it seems more for the purpose of passing on the knowledge and wisdom of 
the tradition rather than to invite people into the community as adherents to the faith. 
However the answer also seems to come, perhaps even more so than the previous point, 
from what Fredriksen phrases thusly: “The ancient pagans by and large were prepared to 
respect Jewish religious difference, and even to make social allowances for it, precisely 
because of Judaism’s ethnicity and antiquity.”26  
It is in these two words, ethnicity27 and antiquity, that we find an avenue for 
religious tolerance and respectability in the Roman Empire. Recall from Frend’s 
contribution earlier, that Jews were granted various protections and privileges in light “of 
the customs of their forefathers;” Frend here is citing from the Roman governor 
Dolabella, among others of the Roman colonial governments which indicate the 
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deference to both the Jewish religious traditions, and the traditional (that is, since 161. 
B.C.E.28) Roman recognition thereof. The relative tolerance for Judaism seems to exist as 
a result of adherence to norms of its day, including a demonstrably old tradition inherent 
to the way of life of the Jewish people; a Jewish people notably defined more and more 
not as a religious sect, but as an ethnic nation.  
At this point we seem fit to conclude that relative antiquity and distinct ethnic 
origins seem to play a key role in securing a ‘pass’ for Judaism where Christianity did not 
have one. Likewise, the lack of a missionary effort in advancing any absolutist claims 
also seemed to keep Judaism legally safer than its offshoot. Fredriksen suggests that this 
cultural understanding might have been a factor in the push from some of the early 
apostles towards converts being adopted into Judaism fully; a conjecture certainly, 
though not an unreasonable one. Yet with the acceptance of gentiles as gentiles into the 
Jesus movement, and the dismissal of circumcision along with most Torah practices, 
Christianity seemed hampered to connect itself to the ancient traditions of Judaism, 
moving it further into a socio-religious no-man’s-land. And adding onto this state of 
affairs, the Jesus movement saw a variety of ethnicities converting, from Palestine to 
Greece to Rome itself. This left the young movement without any claim to a common 
ethnic religiosity, and seemed to forfeit claiming refuge in the ethnic legacy which 
allowed Judaism a certain level of respectability and leeway. Though as we will see in the 
second chapter, just because it was difficult for Christianity to ride the legal coattails 
afforded to Judaism, does not mean that the apologists gave up the effort to do so.  
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Section 1.2 -- Congruencies and Differences between the Ancient and Modern Context 
 
Having so treated with the context of the ancient socio-religious milieu, we must 
remember that an important part of this contextualization process is establishing the 
relative congruency of the ancient and modern imperial contexts, contexts which 
backdrop the apologetic needs facing the Church both then and now. This necessitates 
obviously, some establishment of the general topography of the development of modern 
religion as well. This should be done not only viewing religion as a discrete entity within 
society, but also of how the role and perception of religion by society has developed and 
changed since the time of the second century. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to examine directly the origin and effect of every change in the 1,800 years between these 
time periods, we will attempt to identify some key points which have affected the 
relationship of a modern individual to a religion. Fundamentally, this also includes the 
very concept of conceiving of an individual who has a relationship to a religion.  
It is to these ends that we will, in a sense, trace religion’s role and place 
backwards through history starting from the present day. First, we will utilize the 
statistical examinations and survey work of figures like Christian Smith and Melinda 
Lundquist Denton in the US, and Reginald Bibby in Canada to examine the nature of 
religious adherence and practice in the modern West. By process of examining their data, 
our analysis will lead us in the direction of scholars such as Gregory Baum and Tim 
Muldoon who have attempted to make sense of the ways in which modern (Catholic) 
Christians have related their faith to the world at large. It is then from this point that we 
will be lead towards an examination of the underlying philosophy, both civil and 
religious, that underpins the modern (post-Enlightenment) approach to religion, religious 




practice, and religious mission. Jürgen Habermas’ reflections on the method of discourse 
available in the modern public sphere will also be coupled with Timothy Shah’s and 
Charles Taylor’s use of Enlightenment thinkers like Grotius, Descartes and Locke, and 
how such thinkers ultimately founded the hermeneutical lenses through which modern 
Westerners see the world. With these things established, we will return to the present 
time to briefly survey the modern apologetic context, specifically as it relates to the so 
called ‘Benedict Option’ put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre and the corresponding 
‘Dominic Option’ as articulated by C.C. Pecknold. As one last piece of introduction to 
this section, it is also worth noting here and reiterating that this aim of this chapter is 
contextualization, synopsis, and a precis of the current goings on in the sphere of modern 
religion in general and modern (Catholic) Christianity in particular. To this end we will 
look at distinct areas of similarity and difference between the ancient and modern worlds. 
More in-depth analysis of apologetic strategies and plausible directions via a 
compare/contrast methodology will come in the third chapter where our aim will be to 
explicitly examine how the second century might be able to speak to the present.  
There was, of course, a time not long ago where the predictions of many scholars 
eminent in discussing the studies of sociology, psychology, and phenomenological 
religion believed that religion itself was something humanity was gradually growing out 
of and would soon have no need for. Yet, while the claim that religion is suffering an 
inevitable decline and ultimately will disappear seems have been made erroneously by 
the likes of figures like Weber, Durkheim, and perhaps most prominently Nietzsche,29 
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there is little doubt that religion’s form has changed drastically in the time leading up to 
these men, and continued to change from their time to the present. The work of Christian 
Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton and the National Survey of Youth and Religion 
studying teenagers in the United States has indicated that “The majority of teens (60 
percent) say they believe that many religions may be true.”30 Likewise, the studies of 
Reginald Bibby have found that more than half of Canadians were willing, or at least not 
hostile to the notion of deeper religious involvement and attendance with a faith 
community they found valuable.31 These figures bear with them a double edged 
interpretation that must be considered.  
On the one hand these responses suggest that indeed more than half of the 
Americans and Canadians who participated in these studies are at least open to both the 
concept of religion and commitment to a religious institution. This again goes to show 
that religion in the modern age, confronted with largely secular societies, is certainly not 
ready to be buried and dismissed quite yet. To this end, the predictions of the 
secularization thesis have not borne out. Yet at the same time, these same statistics have 
been gathered and reported because of a need on the part institutional religion to 
understand the shifting needs and thought processes of the people whom they serve. One 
might also cite here as examples Quebec’s Dumont Report32 which Gregory Baum views 
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as acknowledging “that the Church could no longer speak for the whole of Quebec, that it 
had become one public voice among others”, as well as the Larochelle Report33 years 
later in the same province, which likewise sought to re-evaluate the place of the Catholic 
Church in a secular Quebec.  
In analyzing these pieces of information, one can extrapolate that in the present-
day context, it is hard for a modern person to, in a sense, conceive of a world that is not, 
bizarrely, ‘polytheist’. I use this term loosely because, while it would be foolish to use 
that term in its strictest sense, it would be likewise foolish not to recognize the significant 
presence of the various competing worldviews, faiths, and belief structures, theistic or 
not, which exist concurrently in the life of the average Western individual. Smith and 
Denton’s research points toward a generation of youths (now young adults), who seemed 
to feel a kind of permeability of religious practice not unlike that which existed in the 
second century. It is not hard to conceive of, for example, a modern individual who is 
practicing Catholic, but might also engage in Buddhist meditation, attends yoga classes, 
while also participating in the bris and bar mitzvah of a Jewish friend. While this 
individual may be an adherent only to the Catholic faith, we see a situation in the above 
scenario which certainly suggests participation in or at the religious practices of other 
traditions; in this way it is not unlike the religious context of the Roman period where a 
gentile might come to learn in a Jewish synagogue after having offered sacrifice to the 
imperial cult and city gods. The religious tolerance brought about and influenced by 
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enlightenment figures such as Grotius and Locke34 has enabled a rebirth of a culture 
wherein religious difference can exist, outright and (relatively) peaceably. 
This is, I suspect, where we might call forward the Fredriksen quote previously 
cited. Recall that part of her premise in analyzing early Christianity was the prevailing 
notion that even monotheists were polytheists via their behavior rather than their beliefs. 
We find in the modern era a resurfacing of the practice, for better or worse, of religious 
permeability, with once again, the distinction between monotheist and poly‘theist’ being 
one of action. In this environment the primary interfaith issue once again becomes how to 
deal respectfully with other gods (and their subsequent traditions), rather than identifying 
their objective reality or not. The result, then as now, likewise seems very much the 
same, though admittedly reached via different roads. We find a kind of religious market, 
in which ideas and beliefs and, in some cases, whole faiths and Churches sink or swim by 
their ability to succeed in such an environment.  
Such a characterization of the present-day religious context can likewise be found 
in the works of several scholars who have spent time investigating the development of the 
religious experience in the modern day. Tim Muldoon’s observation rings true when he 
states that “To be blunt, consumerism has convinced us that spirituality is another 
commodity. In a way, consumerism has even created a market for spirituality.”35 
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(mostly) liberal and pacifistic religious plurality is the legacy of the formulations these thinkers devised. 
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Muldoon argues in this statement and throughout Seeds of Hope, that the religious 
context pervasive amongst many younger persons (likely of the same or similar 
generation to those studied by Smith and Denton given the relative publication dates of 
these two texts) is grounded by what the religion is capable of producing in terms of its 
message and actions as well as its self-presentation (or what we might also call its 
relative marketability). However, Muldoon is also astute in his observation that the 
Catholic Church is struggling to, as one might colloquially put it, put butts-in-pews, 
citing polls from CNN/USA Today that 95% of Americans believe in God but that 
percentage is not at all reflective attendance at worship. Muldoon is left to conclude that 
in the modern individualistic ethos, “Spirituality is easier than religion, because it 
exempts us from the difficulties of communion and conversion,”36 and we might then 
conclude from Muldoon that the communal nature of religion and the perceived 
commitment it requires are in some sense seen as drawbacks for modern individuals 
shopping for a religious experience that suits the needs of the day. 
Our previous analysis of Beck may also prove useful understanding this context, 
as even if Beck has demonstrated that Stark’s client/firm model of religion is problematic 
if applied to the classical context, it seems fit to connect it to the modern one. The 
individuation of the religious consumer seems appropriately suited to a present day 
religious context, and Beck observes that this is in part because of Christianity “which 
brought the mentality of radical personal choice and religious self-definition into being, 
so that Stark’s paradigm of religious behavior in due course becomes germane.”37 It 
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seems then, that in some ways, Christianity has had a hand in producing the religious 
climate it now contests with, having in its infancy developed a system by which the 
individual and the individual’s self-definition were conceived of in remarkably different 
ways from the Greco-Roman context, even if the method of producing religious products 
was arguably similar to those of the divine cults. 
In some sense, if we extrapolate from Muldoon, Beck and Fredriksen together, we 
might infer from this a key similarity and a key difference between the two time periods 
in question. On the one hand Muldoon and Fredriksen denote a religious milieu with a 
semi-permeable membrane, and each of these scholars recognizes religion as a pluralistic 
enterprise38 in their respective time periods. However Beck and Muldoon suggest that 
many people today seem interested in the client/firm relationship with religion. For Beck, 
coming again out of Stark, this is religion as a client/firm relationship, evidenced as 
turning to religion in specific times for specific needs. Muldoon on the other hand 
phrases things differently, though with much the same result, articulating a ‘consumerist 
religion’ where religious symbols become objects divorced from their original meaning.39 
The difference here is essentially that while both eras exist in an age of religious 
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pluralism, the modern iteration is one focused more on consumerism whereas in the 
second century it was a tool which sought stability in the empire. Or phrased differently, 
there exists a culture of religious pluralism today which is positively enabling of religious 
client/firm constructions, rather than in the second century where such a condition was 
possible in some cases, but ultimately not the religious end for the society at large. 
In having made this claim in reference to the modern age, I would like to further 
expand on what I mean by utilizing the terms of client/firm in relation to modern society 
as opposed to ancient culture. In some cases, people may find it more expedient to 
embrace their inherited faith tradition at specific moments in their lives (such as 
weddings and funerals) or in other times of distress, celebration, or lifetime milestones. 
This phenomenon leads to what many, including Gregory Baum,40 refer to as a religion 
that is more cultural than pietistic, such as one who is culturally Catholic or Jewish rather 
than observantly so. Further, we may also come to find that Beck’s insight into the 
significance of voluntary associations, sometimes explicitly religious and sometimes less 
so,41 seems to parallel the significance of institutions like the modern Freemasons or 
Rotarians; it is noteworthy that while some of these bodies exist with explicitly religious 
backing, others focus on this less so. Such a perspective may inform us to some extent 
why there is a reticence towards adopting the communal costs of joining wholly into a 
particular religious group, given the availability of communal quasi-religious products 
through such alternative organizations. In brief then, and given the above discussion, it 
does not seem overly radical to suggest that the religious environment created by Western 
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liberalism has in many ways borrowed from religious practices that existed in some form 
in second century Rome. 
While the preceding exploration of the development of the modern religious 
context may at time have flirted with the tangential, I also believe that it shows the 
complications inherent in the present day Church’s position. The ‘tight vs. loose’ state 
regulation envisaged by Stark42 has developed decidedly for the ‘loose’, and such a 
situation, while certainly, and even necessarily, tenable, also creates some considerable 
difficulties for the Church. These difficulties seem to run the gamut from cultural ones, to 
philosophical, to economic, to name only a few. Also, as Roger Beck observed of the 
Roman Empire, and as we might likewise do with respect to our own time, the state is 
active in the marketplace,43 peddling oftentimes in favor of whichever ‘theism,’ religious 
or otherwise, enables the community to prosper. This then offers us space to briefly 
mention and discuss here another key difference between the modern age and the second 
century: the general lack of a religiously invested and monarchical power structure.  
This point may be on some levels an obvious one, and one which might seem 
trivial at a first glance, but which ultimately proves to have farther reaching consequences 
than one might first consider. It is worth noting that in the modern West, the culture as a 
whole does not have an overarching monarch or oligarchic body that can be appealed to. 
As we will later expand on in chapter two, the addressees of Christian apologies to 
pagans were either emperors, or in some cases the Senate as a whole; the important thing 
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to take away from this is that no such body or figure exists in the modern age. There does 
not seem to be any singular court which one could appeal to in order to be heard in the 
same way as the second century apologists were able to do. While certainly scholars, like 
Jörg Ulrich,44 have argued that in some cases the apologies were more open letters than 
specifically addressed documents, it is still worthwhile to note that the modern mode of 
discourse does not have a congruent addressee to which apologies might appeal. The 
public sphere and the diffusion of power is in most cases simply too diffuse to allow for 
this concept to translate over. Instead, one could argue the approach has become more a 
matter of submitting an idea into the public forum via one of any number of media 
channels, and fostering it from there. This notion of how and where one might, with 
legitimacy, insert an idea into the public sphere, and do so in a manner which finds root 
in modern people, directs us towards a brief discussion of how the public sphere of today 
operates and what expectations exist for religious institutions operating within the sphere.  
Given this context, let us extend our examination of the present-day state of 
affairs a little longer, and in so doing examine the extent to which the institutions of 
power extant in the modern day endeavor to affect and succeed in affecting the ambient 
religious tone of our society. In addressing this notion at this stage of our 
contextualization, comparisons between the ancient and modern context will be made 
when it is meet to do so, identifying differences and similarities when appropriate. This 
work will continue to prepare us for the work of chapter three in analyzing to what extent 
the tools of the ancient apologists can speak to the modern Church.  
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Thomas Harrison examines the geopolitical and historical aspect of how the 
ancient might inform the modern by attempting to answer the question “can an 
understanding of ancient imperialism cast light on contemporary experience?”45 Though 
he calls the notion that America is the modern day successor to Rome a cliché, Harrison’s 
arguments seem to indicate that it is a cliché with merit rather than being simply a tired 
observation. Harrison argues for “the influential position that ancient history has had on 
US policy,”46 citing examples such as the ‘shock and awe tactics’ of the Iraq War as a 
(sloppy) attempt at mirroring Roman showcasing of military might, and also for the 
benevolent hegemony as a front for self-interest.47 In Harrison’s account here, we find a 
number of different tools which prove useful in our contextualization process. In the first 
place, Harrison’s thesis itself provides fertile ground for analysis of another key 
difference between the ancient culture and the modern: the relative relationships both eras 
have with things of antiquity and things that are new. 
We have already seen from Fredriksen that the ancients were a culture prepared to 
defer greatly to a given sect if it could demonstrate a certain amount of antiquity. 
Likewise, Harrison’s thesis mentioned in the previous paragraph seems to suggest that 
there is a modern tendency which attempts to connect events in the present to respectable 
figures or societies from the past. However, the work of Eric Hobsbawm suggests that in 
many cases, novelties attempt to somehow participate in the historical continuities and 
traditions out of which they spring. His observation is significant in that it denotes a 
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tension prevalent in the modern age between a liberation from vestiges of a “medieval” 
past, but at the same time a desire to preserve continuity with it. He uses the language of 
grafting novel elements onto old ones, or the idea of adapting old traditions to new 
forms,48 but maintains that “novelty is no less novel for being able to dress up easily as 
antiquity.”49 This statement is quite telling in as much as it balances that aforementioned 
tension, acknowledging the novelty of various practices, beliefs and institutions as extant, 
even in the midst of adhering them to more ancient traditions. If his insights are correct, 
Hobsbawm suggests that even when “ancient materials [are] used to construct invented 
traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes,”50 it is, in many cases, a use that 
superficially reimagines a link for convenience. This not to say that there is no continuity 
between past and present structures, but rather that the simple presence of a perceived 
continuity may be only an intellectual costume. 
From this reading of Hobsbawm, I would suggest that his application of novelty 
vis-à-vis tradition clarifies the social sphere entered into by the apologist. The desire for 
novelty is present, even though it might be superficially suggesting continuity with a 
much older tradition. Hobsbawm suggests that these patterns of novelty arose when “the 
nineteenth-century liberal ideology of social change systematically failed to provide for 
the social and authority ties taken for granted in earlier societies, and created voids which 
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might have to be filled by invented practices.”51 In other words, the practices newly 
developed come in some part from the inability of the modern order to account for social 
stabilizers which were at in place in the past. To this we might also suggest the converse 
that it likewise comes from a failure of those older structures to fully adapt to the newer 
ideologies and changes. As a result of these processes, the development of various 
novelties serves as a way to spackle over aspects of life which do not fully cohere 
together, and over time runs the risk of becoming something of an end in itself, or at least 
as a measure which possesses its own authority rather than sharing it with other factors. 
This relationship between novelty and antiquity is therefore a complex one, but it 
seems one which bends more in the direction of novelty rather than antiquity. In 
clarifying this stance, I do wish to point out that several fields have identified a human 
tendency to yearn for the way life was in the past, from psychology’s ‘rosy 
retrospection’52 to postcolonialism’s conception of a diasporic people longing for the 
mythical homeland.53 However, the specific bias I am referring to in acknowledging 
Roman bias for antiquity is a prioritization or preference granted to a given institution or 
belief because of its age and longevity and a corollary suspicion of newer ideas and 
structures. It seems that the modern world does not suffer from such a compunction, or 
rather that it suffers in the opposite direction; the modern era is suspicious of traditional 
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institutions which stretch back more than a few hundred years, while alternately 
demonstrating a preference for things seen as new, ‘progressive,’ or otherwise modern. 
There are a number of places one could turn to in order to support this claim. In a 
colloquial sense, there have been some suggestions that the Church is seen as ‘outdated’ 
or somehow inherently backwards in their thinking. This is the application that we see in 
Muldoon when he cites ‘objections’ to the Church, saying “the Church is out of touch; it 
is a medieval construct with antiquated sensibilities and byzantine practices.”54 We could 
also turn to the issue from an ecclesiastical standpoint and find some evidence for such a 
claim as well from no less than St. John XXIII’s application of aggiornamento—or 
updating—to the Church via Vatican II. While one does not wish to proof-text or 
extrapolate more from a singular term than it was originally designed to carry, it is also 
important to note that such a term does seem to legitimately carry with it a sense of need 
for update, and thus a connotation that some aspects of the Church did/do not meet the 
needs and standards of a modern Catholic.  
Lastly as a continuation of sourcing this claim, I would like to bring in a source 
framed more as pop-theology rather than the same from a more strictly scholarly 
background, I would offer sections of C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters, and 
specifically that found in Letter 25. Much of the whole of the letter is framed in the 
context of dealing with human beings who experience things within the bounds of time 
and as such the infernal exploitation of the balance between the opposing poles of “Same 
Old Thing” and that of a dynamic world filled with (potential for) change. Screwtape 
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culminates his advice on temptation via distorting these rhythms by saying “For the 
descriptive adjective ‘unchanged’ we have substituted the emotional adjective 
‘stagnant.’”55 This passage of Screwtape outlines and communicates the notion of a 
disordered need for novelty even in works whose audience is not strictly scholars and 
clergy, but rather for the inquisitive lay person. Lewis, St. John XXIII, and Muldoon all 
suggest through their language that the modern individual is a creature who values 
novelty, perhaps much more so than they value antiquity. We may then extrapolate that 
the modern individual is, in a sense, tugged into an infatuation that seems to run opposite 
to the second century, preferring newer currents of thought, prevalent at the moment, and 
sometimes ignoring or disparaging sources which do not have such novelty to them.56 
With this point made, let us briefly return to Harrison’s discussion of the links 
between modernity and antiquity, specifically here as regards the potential for ‘civic 
gods’ in the modern age. Leaning on Edward Said, Harrison claims that “empire was 
founded on broader education/ideological foundations”57 and borrowing from Tom 
Holland’s history of the Persian wars, Harrison makes another claim for both ancient and 
modern empires that “we see a model for the way in which empires tend to project their 
values as universal.”58 Certainly we can see this in the American grand narrative’s 
invocation of the ideals of freedom,59 and one might also add democracy as a corollary to 
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this. It bears examining at this point to what extent these concepts, and possibly others, 
have been situated as the de facto gods of the age, demanding a kind of obligatory 
devotion in a way not unlike the Roman cults discussed in Fredriksen.  
The ‘gods’ of the rational (liberal) agent and of the market, are in some sense 
birthed as twins in the early period of modernity. Jürgen Habermas observes that 
“Connected with the conception of…constitutional law is another more general one: the 
emergence through differentiation of an economy controlled through market mechanisms 
from the premodern orders of political domination.”60 For Habermas, it seems that the 
rational agent which of necessity must undergird a society based in constitutional law, is 
also part of the progenitor of the emergent capitalist marketplace, a marketplace now 
rooted at the heart of Western democratic society. Indeed, Habermas makes observations 
which might well be seen as the work of Grotius run to its natural ends, stating “Citizens 
in [a democratic society] share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective 
choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate insofar 
as they establish a framework for free public deliberation;”61 Habermas’ belief is that, as 
members of a society based in liberalism and the rational agent, that we deem legitimate 
those institutions which allow for the public to reason the various merits of any given 
idea or policy. As such, there is an implicit expectation that legitimacy arises from the 
will of the people rather than through any other source. 
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The belief that the rational agent is the arbiter of legitimacy presupposes that all 
persons have access to the public discourse as well as the means to participate in it, but 
this presupposition may not be true in all cases. Habermas notes that in some cases, the 
media62 does not allow for debate, not because it silences one side over another, but 
because the debate is never brought to the public in the first place.63 This leads to “a 
political public sphere characterized by at least two cross-cutting processes: the 
communicative generation of legitimate power on one hand, and the manipulative 
deployment of media power to procure mass loyalty, consumer demand, and 
‘compliance’ with systemic imperatives on the other.”64 Habermas’ insight here gets at 
the crux of a significant problem of modernity: a society founded on legitimacy by debate 
and consent is at the same time given to a form of media unprecedented in history and 
able to project a message monolithically, as if consensus had already been achieved, and 
thus sidestepping any possibility that it might be questioned.  
Through the means mentioned above, it then seems that the force of the rational 
agent can be made to serve the market, and the market in turn creates an atmosphere of 
pietistic compliance for the rational agent to adhere to, allowing for public devotion to 
the civil religion. And it is with these two ‘gods’, the individual rational agent and the 
market, that present day religion must inevitably tangle in order to garner a place in the 
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public sphere. We can underline this distinction between the modern civic religion and 
that of Christian religion if we resort to the language we had earlier seen from Fredriksen. 
It is to these cultural, or ethnically Western ‘gods’ of modernity one has the first 
obligation, though there is no restriction on having others besides, such as devotion to 
Jesus Christ. It seem that the rational agent and the market are certainly not exclusivist, 
but at the same time they, and the culture they abide in, demand first service, even at the 
expense of whatever other devotions one has in life. 
It is in a realization of this nature, that the modern age has a plurality of belief but 
with an expectation of a specific primacy within those beliefs, that in some ways re-
places Christianity in the position it occupied in the second century and which may well 
suggest that the apologetics of that time would be able to find a place in a modern day 
discourse. The Christian doctrine of the present day still holds to an absolute claim to 
truth and continues to mold its adherents towards living a life based on that of Christ. In 
this sense, Christians of today continue to come into conflict with the structures of the 
world in service to the ‘gods’ of the era. As a result of encountering these structures, 
there exists a need not unlike that of the second century, to establish a dialogue, and 
however absolute the claims of the Christian faith may be, to likewise be open to deep 
conversation and more than a little institutional change.  
Yet perhaps one of the best measures of comparison is an examination of the 
present state of the civic religion. Fredriksen’s observation regarding the pax deorum 
may be seen in Polybius’ Histories as he claims: 
The most important difference for the better which the Roman commonwealth 
appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs. For I conceive that what in 




other nations is looked upon as a reproach, I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, 
is the very thing which keeps the Roman commonwealth together.65  
 
Since Polybius spells out fairly clearly that Roman success can be attributed to their 
proper respect for the gods, so one must ask if there is a comparable ideology or 
superstructure which represents a modern point of comparison. Certainly one could be 
tempted to hold up the aforementioned gods of liberty and democracy, as Harrison does, 
or perhaps follow Habermas and defer to the rational agent and the market.  As we have 
seen, arguments can and have been made for each position. We have seen Harrison 
previously articulate the former stance and he is not alone in his observations. However 
other scholars we will now turn to, such as Timothy Shah and Charles Taylor, also have 
similarly investigated and expounded on the notion of the development, or even 
transferal, of the civic religion from one which is theologically based to one which is 
rooted in individual rationality. The nature of this change, understanding it, where it came 
from, and where it has the potential to go, is an important aspect of the contextualization 
process in this chapter, and in the following treatment we will gain a sense of just how 
fundamentally these changes affected and continue to affect the world we live in today. 
Shah leans heavily on analyzing Hugo Grotius and the manner in which he 
worked to reconcile the various Christian factions of post-Reformation Europe. Shah says 
of Grotius’ efforts that they “sought to do nothing less than to give Christianity a new 
center of gravity, replacing dogma and creed with a morality oriented towards social 
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peace.”66 Shah’s argument stems from the idea that Grotius’ aim was not to reconcile the 
tenets of Catholicism and the varying forms of Protestantism, but rather to set up a 
structure where the commonalities were focused on, and social harmony emphasized. 
While few people could argue against this goal, it is likewise important to recognize the 
fundamental shift in perception that this structure precipitated. This served to recreate 
Christianity as a kind of code of ethics and morality, as opposed to a dogmatic system of 
belief. In doing this, Grotius starts the modern West down the Kantian path of bracketing 
that which does not fit this system, but rather allowing it only as the purview of private 
individuals rather than that of the community as a whole. 
Taylor traces this line of thinking back even further than Shah, arguing that seeds 
of Western liberalism exist in the Cartesian notion of the rational agent. He says of such 
an agent that “The disengaged disciplined stance to self and society has become part of 
the essential defining repertory of the modern identity.”67 This is the imagined figure to 
which Grotius appeals, hoping that the rational agent will understand that the need for 
social cohesion despite religious difference is a heavier weight on the balance than any 
creed or discussion of who is damned or not. However Taylor also points out that this 
rational agent comes into existence in the zeitgeist of the culture at a considerable price. 
Taylor observes that “the disengaged stance also leads to the drawing of boundaries and a 
withdrawal from certain modes of intimacy,”68 and the implications for such a bounding 
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off are significant. The boundaries drawn by this philosophy are ones which, to borrow 
the cliché, make islands of men, trafficking interaction only across constructed bridges, 
created with the cooperation and consent of other islanders. The result is a rejection of 
communal or even interpersonal intimacy; however, it might be counterpointed that the 
desire for such modes of intimacy, is a partial impetus for the continued existence and 
growth of religious devotion and practice.69 
In creating a brief point of connection between this era and that of early 
Christianity, we might see this rational agent as something which is a tenet of the civic 
religion, if not a ‘god’ itself within it. Turning back to Fredriksen, she makes the clear 
case that religion in antiquity was an inherently collective affair. She observes that 
“Ancient religion was intrinsically communal and public: performance-indexed piety.”70 
Likewise, Taylor puts the rational agent within the context of the communal obligation, 
stating that “This is the persona we project towards other, and [others] towards us, and in 
this mutual projection we help each other to see ourselves as having attained this rational 
distance, and hence help each other to live up to this exalted ideal.”71 The implication 
here is that religion and specifically civil religion is a public act with a public element; 
whereas in antiquity it was a communal project of worship and festivals and the like, in 
the present day, the civil religion has an inherent aspect of bounding one person off from 
another, done so with mutual support, so that each individual might best act as a rational 
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agent unto him/herself, and thereby make their choices through their own processes. 
Paradoxically, the communal nature of people seems warded off by the community itself. 
Additionally, an equally convincing and prevalent civic religion is observed by 
Tim Muldoon, who states: “People live in a world governed by market forces. They 
understand that they must compete on every level, and that they are measured by their 
market power.”72 Muldoon’s observation on the pervasiveness of market forces, 
characterizing them as present at every level is, at the same time, highlighted by his 
insight that the pervasiveness inspires action, which he defines by calling it competition. 
If we align such an observation with Fredriksen’s characterization of ancient religion as 
action-focused and customary, or to reuse her language, as “intrinsically communal and 
public: performance-indexed piety,”73 one might be hard pressed to find a more pervasive 
modern civic religion than that of capitalism and the market. 
 
Section 1.3 – The Present State of Apologetics and its Vocabulary  
With the conclusion of this examination we come to a state of fully crossing the 
bridge from the ancient world to examine the modern context. This section, in like 
manner with the previous ones, investigate modern voices like Pope Francis, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, and C.C. Pecknold, with a similar eye to establish a modern understanding of 
the place and movement of Christianity. Further exploration of Tim Muldoon’s inquiry 
into communication of the Gospel in a postmodern era will also be incorporated as a 
barometer of both the modern religious milieu and the efficacy of current practices. By 
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examining all these voices, we will explore the present-day discussion with respect to 
what the Church can and should be doing; the lens here, as it was in the former part, will 
be with an eye towards apologetic writing as expressed in content, rhetoric, and theology. 
By mixing all of these voices together, both ancient and modern, the initial phase of the 
thesis hopes to find common cultural, political, economic, and religious ground between 
the second century and the 21st century.  
Part of the apologetic debate regarding the role of the Church in the present day is 
characterized in what has been termed the “Benedict Option” and the “Dominic Option.” 
Both take their names from the titular saint and in a sense attempt to carry on the 
perceived vision of Church each saint embodied. The Benedict Option, as per St. 
Benedict, seems to advocate for a kind of cloistering movement, a retreat out of the world 
so as not to become corrupted by it. The term was coined out of Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
book on moral philosophy, After Virtue, which MacIntyre concludes saying: 
A crucial turning point in that earlier history occurred when men and women of 
good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium and 
ceased to identify the continuation of civility and moral community with the 
maintains of that imperium.  What they set themselves to achieve instead… was 
the construction of new forms of community within which the moral life could be 
sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of 
barbarism and darkness… We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another—
doubtless very different—St. Benedict.74 
 
MacIntyre’s outline here describes a community retreating from the dying imperium in 
which it finds itself in order to form a new community which will preserve morality for 
posterity; in more ecclesial language, this presents the Church as a monastery, cloistered 
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off away from the world and distinctly separate from it. That is not to say totally without 
contact (indeed such a thing would seem impossible practically, and antithetical to the 
Great Commission75 doctrinally), but certainly setting up the Church perhaps a more 
monkish and discrete entity than it exists as today. It is a withdrawal from the culture 
wars mentality and a seemingly equal withdrawal from the role of ‘Church as conscience’ 
in favor of establishing a guard around morality to protect it from barbarian meddling. 
In contrast to such a proposal, C.C. Pecknold has argued for what Michael W. 
Hannon76 has termed the Dominic Option. Again, leaning on the legacy of the titular 
saint, the Dominic Option flows outward towards the world and filters in through it. 
Pecknold describes it as “a plausible image of a ‘contrast society’ that is very much 
engaged with the world—an evangelistic witness which is joyful, intellectually serious, 
expansive, and charitable.”77 It is Pecknold who describes the Benedict Option as one 
associated with withdrawal, whereas one might characterize Pecknold’s Dominic Option 
as one of engagement which seeks to be transformative of the imperium rather than 
excusing oneself from it.  
Indeed, one individual who can be rather distinctly construed as favoring the 
Dominic Option is the present head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis. In 
Evangelii Gaudium, Pope Francis devotes considerable space (the entirety of the first 
chapter!) to the Church’s missionary role, and the inherent notion of being ‘sent out,’ of 
                                                          
75 Matthew 28:19-20. 
76 Michael W. Hannon, “The Dominic Option,” First Things, Jul 15, 2013, http://www.firstthings.com/ 
blogs/firstthoughts/2013/07/the-dominic-option. 
77 C.C. Pecknold, “The Dominican Option,” First Things, Oct 6, 2014, http://www.firstthings.com/web-
exclusives/2014/10/the-dominican-option 




going out into the world rather than retreating from it. Francis describes the demands of 
the Gospel as “[inviting] us to respond to the God of love who saves us, to see God in 
others, and to go forth from ourselves to seek the good of others.”78 Francis states clearly 
that the goal of modern Christianity should be one of engagement rather than withdrawal. 
In fact he goes on to offer perhaps a more damning indictment of any ecclesiastical 
retreat when he states: “I prefer a Church which is bruised, hurting and dirty because it 
has been out on the streets, rather than a Church which is unhealthy from being confined 
and from clinging to its own security.”79 Francis here not only encourages an advance 
into the world, where one risks the corrupting dirt and wounds of engagement, but he also 
characterizes the attempt to cling to an internal security as ‘unhealthy.’ While certainly 
Francis, as do Hannon and Pecknold, has no problem with the individual being 
consecrated with religious vows to an individual Benedictine community, he seems as 
certainly opposed to the notion that such a path should be chosen for the whole Church. 
Finally, as almost a brief addendum on the preceding conversation, I would like to 
mention here that this contextualization process, and the process of analysis operating 
within the thesis as a whole, will be enriched with a borrowing of terminology from 
(postcolonial subaltern studies, specifically the notion of subalternity and that of the 
hybrid.  In the following chapter these terms will aid in our understanding of the in-
between space inhabited by the second century apologists and the relative place of the 
Church at the time; as a result of this analysis, the third chapter will investigate if such 
terms as applied vis-à-vis the second century are still applicable in the modern context. 
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Therefore, in the interest of being able to deploy these terms directly in the coming 
chapters, some small discussion here seems appropriate to define them and outline the 
greater function they will serve. 
The postcolonial subaltern, coined in this sense by Ranajit Guha and notably 
expanded on by Gayatri Spivak is used in order to denote “the many different peoples 
who did not compromise the colonial elite. These might include the lesser rural gentry, 
impoverished landlords, rich peasants, and upper-middle-class peasants.”80 While it is 
fairly easy to see how the Christian Church in the time of those like Tertullian and Justin 
Martyr was a patchwork of subaltern groups from the various echelons of Roman society, 
it will behoove the analyses in subsequent chapters to see how, or indeed if, the defensive 
subaltern mindset at work in the writings of the early fathers has any effect on the 
direction of thinking and practice in the present day Church. In the chapter immediately 
following, we will undertake an examination of this nature and investigate if subalternity 
expressed in this fashion is something which the second century apologists express. 
Furthermore in the third chapter, a section of our analysis will also investigate if the 
Church can and/or does see itself still as a subaltern entity in the world, and should this 
prove to be the case, what consequences this might have for the apologetic mission. 
The postcolonial hybrid is something certainly related to the subaltern but which 
meets with the challenges of a given social and political station in a way that is not true of 
all subalterns. Viewed through the writings of those like Ronald Charles, and through 
him Homi Bhabha, the hybrid represents a borrowing from two (or more) different 
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backgrounds and work as a potential go between for the respective groups they occupy. 
Bhabha defines it as “a subject that inhabits the rim of an ‘in-between’ reality,”81 and 
Charles builds on this, taking the hybrid notion towards the early Christian context of 
Paul’s writings and missionary work. Charles calls the task of the early Christians one of 
being able “to manage living between [their] socioreligious ideals and [their] social 
realities.”82 The task of this vocabulary is similar to that of the use of subalternity. It 
again seems easy to apply such a term to the second century apologists to be discussed, 
all of whom were converts to the faith rather than born into it, and we will investigate if 
and how this kind of in-between reality is visible in their work. Likewise, in the third 
chapter we will investigate if the term hybrid is applicable to the modern Church and 
current methods of apologetics, and based on that investigation, what consequences may 
well ensue for the apologetic mission as a whole. 
The work of postcolonial studies, with respect to notions such as subaltern and 
hybridity, seems particularly helpful for addressing and examining the context of early 
Christianity under the Roman Empire; though as we will see, in some ways the 
government structures of the Roman Empire were not the only force which asserted their 
power on the nascent Christian movement. Postcolonial studies will, however, be only a 
small facet within the overall process. The aim of this initial mention of it is to establish 
points of compatibility and similarity between the ancient and modern contexts. The 
overall objective in using this lens will be to contextualize Christianity in the ancient 
world as one couched in imperial trappings and investigate how Christianity sought not 
                                                          
81 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Rutledge Classics, 2004), 19. 
82 Charles, 45. 




only to survive in such a context, but also to somehow communicate with the ruling 
hegemony while being relegated to a subaltern ‘Other’ status. The implication of this 
analysis contrasts points where Christianity might justly claim that status, and where such 
a claim no longer holds up to scrutiny in the context of the modern age. 
The contextualization process in this chapter has attempted to lay a foundation 
upon which the following chapters intend to build. The norms which govern the modern 
age and the ancient world are significant factors which will ultimately shape the tools and 
rhetoric used by the apologists operating within such a context. While there exists a great 
deal of similarity between the ancient and the modern eras, such as fundamental religious 
pluralism and suspicion of the Church, there are also significant differences to be aware 
of. The establishment of a discretely secular society rooted in individual conscience and 
rational agency is a matter of significant importance with respect to how religious entities 
can relate to the world at large. While the underlying assumptions of such a philosophy 
are certainly different from anything we might expect to find in the second century, there 
is a great deal of merit in attempting to look at the apologetic fathers’ efforts to deal with 
the ambient philosophy of their own era. With the question of what constitutes useful 
legitimizing rhetoric in a plural society, and the question of how to deal appropriately 
with the common philosophical and social norms of the day, we now turn our 
investigation to analyzing directly the works of the second century apologists. 
 
  




Chapter Two: Analysis of Apologetic Works 
This second chapter of the thesis will look into the early apologetic works 
directly. Justin Martyr and Tertullian will act as our prominent figures in this respect, 
though supplemented at time with input from their relative, though less prolific, 
contemporary, Athenagoras of Athens. The process of examination will first investigate 
directly the content each author chose to incorporate into his apologetic works as well as 
what probable rationale prompted its inclusion. Indeed for many of these Fathers, the 
rationale of why the apology itself is being undertaken at all is quite simple: to gainsay a 
given attack on Christianity by the Roman establishment or by one or another Christian 
group ultimately deemed heretical.1 However, by examining both the specific content, 
included or omitted, as well as the rhetoric utilized to discuss that same content, one can 
gain a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the apologetic argument and the 
specific defense and/or critique being mounted. We will also employ some shades of 
subaltern analysis in this chapter, examining the apologists as, at least in their own minds, 
writing as subaltern theologians within the imperial context.  
The second phase of examination will look specifically at how these apologetic 
Fathers viewed, employed and otherwise dealt with the prevailing philosophical trends of 
their day. Living in a culture steeped in the Greco-Roman philosophies, the apologists 
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would have likely found entirely escaping such modes of thought to be an impossible 
task. Scholars such as C. J. de Vogel have delved into Justin’s relationship with his 
professed philosophical heritage, and Eric Osborn, and Pap Levente have debated and 
analyzed Tertullian’s approach to philosophy and Christianity. By investigating the 
points where the Fathers draw on philosophical terms, the points where they distance 
themselves from such terms, and the subtlety (or not) they use in walking this fine line, 
one can also gain an understanding of how primary voices in second century Christianity 
sought to deal with the thought and teachings of the ‘secular’2 world they inhabited. This 
second phase of the chapter will also serve to transition us into the final chapter, wherein 
we will analyze how the voices of these apologists might likewise speak to a modern 
context beset by similar, though not identical, challenges. 
 
Section 2.1 – Argument from Antiquity and Ethnicity 
In our chapter one discussion of Fredriksen’s work, it was demonstrated that some 
monotheistic religions in the Roman Empire, such as Judaism, received religious and 
cultural allowance from the Romans because of traditional antiquity and ethnic 
importance. For the sake of finding some protection under such cultural allowances, we 
find arguments professing Christianity’s possession of these traits within the context of 
                                                          
2 My use of secular here, and largely throughout the rest of this chapter will be admittedly anachronistic. I 
am of course using the term in its modern sense of being outside the bounds of religious rule or otherwise 
unconnected with a religious perspective. Obviously as we have already seen from texts like Fredriksen 
and the apologists themselves, very little in the world of antiquity was disconnected in such a way. I am 
simply using the term to denote currents of thought which come from outside the burgeoning Church; 
some coming from state sources, or philosophical schools or even just cultural modes of living. It is in this 
sense that I would argue that secular is appropriate in that it is disconnected from the particular form of 
religion addressed by this thesis. For the purposes of clarity though, I intend to put quotations around the 
word in each instance of its use with this meaning. 




apologetic arguments. Indeed, both Justin and Tertullian3 take pains in order to establish 
Christianity as having ancient ties, doing so through an appeal to the antiquity of the 
prophetic Old Testament writings. Tertullian asks and answers his own question on this 
point, inquiring “Which of your poets, which of your philosophers have not drank from 
the fountain of the prophets?” and then replying “It is from these sacred sources likewise 
that your philosophers have refreshed their thirsty, inquisitive spirits.”4 Tertullian’s 
statements have a twofold implication. First of all, they establish the temporal primacy of 
the prophetic texts, given that the Greco-Roman philosophers draw from them, therefore 
implying that the prophetic texts must have been written first. However, this also seems 
to imply, as will become important in the second phase of this chapter, that the prophets 
not only have a temporal claim to primacy but also one towards metaphysical primacy as 
well. Tertullian’s words suggest that it is the prophetic scriptures, not philosophical texts 
and treatises, which refresh a spirit thirsting after the truth. 
Justin of a similar mind with respect to his attempts to establish antiquity. He 
makes the claim that Plato’s statement ‘To him who chooses belongs the guilt, but in God 
there is no guilt,’ comes from Plato’s reading of Moses; Justin goes on to say that, 
“Moses is more ancient than all the Greek authors and everything the philosophers and 
                                                          
3 The omission of Athenagoras here is simply due to the fact that Athenagoras devotes very little if any 
real space in his Embassy for the Christians to any discussion of the antiquity of Christianity. His purview 
rests more in establishing Christian truths while being supported by figures from pagan antiquity. As we 
will see, Athenagoras is much more interested in pointing out the inconsistences between what the 
Roman priests call ‘gods’ and what their premier philosophers have called God. In this context there is 
room to argue that Athenagoras, rather than leaning on the ancient heritage of Christianity, instead 
argues for the relative newness of the Greco-Roman religious practices. If this case is made, a 
consequential result might be that the Romans do not have grounds for criticizing Christianity based on its 
recent birth; such a conjecture though is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
4 Tertullian, Apology, trans. Thomas B. Falls (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948), Ch. 47. 




poets said in speaking about the immortality of the soul, or retribution after death, or 
speculation on celestial matters, or other similar doctrines, they took from the prophets as 
the source of information.”5 Indeed, Justin devotes the whole of chapters 59 and 60 of his 
1 Apology to the linking of Plato and Mosaic thought, yet with the insistence on the 
temporal primacy of Moses and on the notion that Plato did not fully or accurately 
understand what he was borrowing from Moses and the prophets. Note as well that this 
also has the implication of Moses’ metaphysical primacy as well, as Justin asserts that 
Plato borrows ideas directly from Moses’ writings. 
It is prudent to point out that Tertullian and Justin offer no real proof that the 
scholars of Greece were in any way linked to the prophets (that is to say some kind of 
narrative or claim that Plato or Homer travelled to Jerusalem and studied under the Jews, 
or vice versa). The real argument being made by both Justin and Tertullian is a temporal 
link rather than what we might today call a causal one. Tertullian offers the following 
claim to the antiquity of Moses:  
If you happen to have heard of a certain Moses, I speak first of him: he is as far 
back as the Argive Inachus; by nearly four hundred years… he precedes Danaus, 
your most ancient name, while he antedates by a millennium the death of Priam. I 
might affirm, too, that he is five hundred years earlier than Homer, and have 
supporters of that view.6 
 
                                                          
5 Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, trans. Thomas B. Falls (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948), Ch. 44. 
6 Tertullian, Apology, Ch. 19; one conversant in the mythology of ancient Rome might note that of the 
names mentioned by Tertullian, only Homer is one for whom any date can be produced with any remote 
reliability. Inachus, Danaus, and Priam all featuring more in the tales of myths and gods rather than in 
more exact histories. Even using central events in classical histories, such as the Trojan War or the Persian 
invasion of Greece by Xerxes I, to make some guess at a timeline, one sees that the classical historians 
have a wide berth of dating for such events; again we must consider that Tertullian is not attempting to 
make and argument for fact or precision of dates, but rather one for antiquity with his point being that 
Moses’ life occurred before the lives of these other figures venerated by the Greco-Roman consciousness. 




Notice in this that Tertullian himself acknowledges that the precise dating of Moses may 
vary by his inclusion of the phrase “have supporters of that view,” suggesting that there 
are varying contemporary schools of thought as to the dating of the life of Moses; 
however his main point comes across clearly: Moses predates many of the figures of 
antiquity which the Romans hold as part of their lineage and history. And with this claim 
comes the corollary that if this figure of the Christian religion predates those who were 
seminal in the founding and strengthening of the Roman way of life, then Christianity 
must also have as much of a claim, if not indeed more of one, to its respectability, 
prestige and most of all, its unmolested existence as a religion. 
 Justin’s claim is even more laconic in how it presents itself and plays even more 
fast and loose with the points of reference he uses for the purposes of dating. Justin’s 
‘proof’ is simply that “Moses then, who was the first of the Prophets…”7 Justin centers 
on the temporal primacy of Moses among the prophets, and pairs this with the notion that 
the prophets who foretold the coming of Jesus were “first 5000 years before [the birth of 
Christ], and again 3000, then 2000, then 1000, and yet again 800; for in the succession of 
generations prophets after prophets arose.”8 Justin, unlike Tertullian, gives no historical 
events or specific figures to underline his claim, and admittedly, his content in this 
section comes off as more of a proclamation rather than an attempt to convince the 
skeptical; however the meat of his argument is the same as Tertullian: the prophets are 
much older than the earliest ancestral figures in the Greco-Roman tradition, and therefore 
the Christian religion must be respected on the grounds of the antiquity of its heritage. 
                                                          
7 Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, Ch. 32. 
8 Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, Ch. 31. 




We should note here that this thesis makes no attempt to prove the veracity of the 
claims made by Justin and Tertullian, as such proofs are beyond the scope of the present 
inquiry. Furthermore, any such proofs regarding the factuality of Justin and Tertullian’s 
claims on antiquity are, in both this thesis and in the respective apologies, ultimately 
irrelevant to the more significant point at hand: the investigation of why, in the minds of 
these two defenders of the faith, such an effort is made to define Christianity as 
participant in an ancient tradition. The answer seems to stem from Christianity’s attempt 
to fulfill its need to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Roman establishment. The best 
hope of a nascent movement in the Roman period, especially one which threatened to 
upset the social order as it existed at the time, was to find refuge in the innate Roman 
respect for antiquity. Indeed, this seems to be an example of what we might call today 
“second century politics of legitimization,” working within the narrative grooves created 
by the ways in which Romans anchored their imagination, philosophy and history. 
As I showed in my earlier engagement of Fredriksen, a key factor in why Judaism 
was able to operate as it did within the Roman Empire was due in no small part to Roman 
respect for its nationality and antiquity. The Romans were willing to accept Jewish 
practices and traditions because of their age and their role in the heritage of that particular 
group of people. What we see here in Justin and Tertullian is their attempt to benefit from 
the religious roots of Christianity and claim asylum within the Roman tolerance of Jewish 
belief and antiquity. Practically and politically speaking, the pains taken by both of these 
apologists are an attempt at self-preservation via the claim that Christianity should be 
respected as the fulfillment of an ancient tradition going back centuries, rather than 
perceived as a suspect class of what might have been thought of as a “new age” religion. 




However in the Roman context, it was not only the age of a given belief that 
allowed for its toleration, but likewise that it was part of the cultural practice of that 
nation or tribe. In other words, the ethnicity of religion carries a weight similar to its age. 
At this point then, one could move down one of two ways of thinking. Potentially, one 
could suggest that there exists what we might call the path of apologetic ignorance and/or 
apathy. In accepting this method of thinking we assume that Justin and Tertullian either 
did not know the rationale behind their culture well enough to see the need to defend 
Christianity in this way, or they simply felt their argument from antiquity was sufficient 
and did not care about tending to the side of the argument dealing with heritage. 
However, given that both men were not only of the educated class of people, but also 
were both converts from a Greco-Roman lifestyle, this hypothesis seems unlikely to find 
any real traction; it seems reasonable to surmise that during their pre-conversion lives 
both Justin and Tertullian participated in and understood the implicit social understanding 
regarding the various theistic and civil cults of their time. 
The alternate option, and the one which we will pursue, demands a reading of 
some of the lengthier parts of their respective apologies in a way that highlights the 
multifaceted nature of the argumentation and deals with some of the theological claims of 
Justin and Tertullian more subtly rather than taking them at face value. The challenge 
faced by both men is to claim a common ethnicity for Christians, yet to argue so from a 
racial or cultural perspective would be impossible. By their own admission, there is a 
recognition of the heterogeneous cultural nature of the Christian Church throughout the 
Roman Empire. Justin frequently mentions the presence of the Church and spreading of 




the Christian message, often using the phrase “among [all] the nations”9 in his own 
original writing as well as in his scriptural citations. Likewise Tertullian claims that “we 
have filled every place among you— cities, islands, fortresses, towns, market-places, the 
very camp, tribes, companies, palace, senate, forum,”10 contrasting it with the image of a 
single great people of one national identity, such as the Parthians. We can feel confident 
in the assertion that both apologists knew that arguing for what we might call a 
‘homogenous nationalism’ within Christianity is something that would not bear up to 
scrutiny, yet within their arguments there is an implicit argument for unity of ethnicity 
folded in amidst their rhetoric. 
Both apologists devote considerable time and space arguing against the existence 
of the various polytheistic entities, and arguing instead in favor of the Christian 
monotheistic belief. On a surface level this seems a fairly straightforward argument in 
order to defend one of Christianity’s main tenets against the claims made by those in the 
Roman establishment, and certainly there is nothing at all wrong, theologically or 
historically with such an understanding of their arguments. Furthermore the dispute in 
question also appears to be largely theological in nature, and again, it would be hard to 
gainsay such an interpretation. However, with the hypothesis in mind that Justin and 
Tertullian know they must make some kind of argument for the ethnic unity of 
                                                          
9 Justin makes use of this phrase or a variation on it no fewer than 10 times without the course of his 
argument in 1 Apology. His use, as mentioned in the main body of the text, is both in use of scriptural 
passages he employs to demonstrate that through Christ the many nations of the world will come to 
know God, as well as some uses of the phrase in his own analysis and argument. My argument here is that 
Justin’s relatively prolific use of the phrase is reflective of his understanding of Christianity as a multi-
national or multi-cultural project, rather than one such as Judaism, with a very distinct cultural heritage 
and homeland in the worldly sense. 
10 Tertullian, Apology, Ch. 37 




Christianity, viewing these claims as solely centering on doctrinal or theological 
argument becomes only a partial understanding of the apologists’ words. By investigating 
these statements with an eye towards their ethnic implications we can peer under the 
theological surface to come to a fuller understanding of what is being defined. 
Justin and Tertullian both make the claim that God is the creator of the world and 
of all people inhabiting it;11 at the same time, both devote considerable space in their 
arguments not only refuting charges of atheism because of Christianity’s rejection of 
pagan gods, but also in asserting that there is only the one God, with pagan gods being 
either at best non-existent or else demons preying on human ignorance and weakness. 
The logic of this argument provides the ethnic unity that the apologists need to claim 
what they feel is the respect the Christian movement deserves. For Justin and Tertullian, 
there is but one God who created and oversees the lives of all people, and then by virtue 
of that shared Creator, all people who profess a belief in that God are actually of the same 
ethnicity, whatever geographic or cultural accidents might make it appear otherwise. The 
logic to this argument is that just as all people of a particular city or nation worship the 
local gods and that formulates part of their heritage and identity, so the Christians in 
worshipping their God participate in the same ethnicity, even if they may not share the 
same culture or customs. Indeed, one could even go further to claim that for Justin and 
Tertullian, there is no ethnicity at all as all are products of the same Creator. It is in 
Christianity one that accepts the truth of such a claim, and subsequently realizes that 
there is only one God and that the various human subdivisions like ethnicity are 
                                                          
11 See Justin’s 1 Apology Ch. 59; 2 Apology Ch. 4; and Tertullian’s Apology Ch. 17. 




ultimately illusory.12 This may also explain the mindset which allowed Justin and 
Tertullian to, in the eyes of outsider Romans, break their ancestral ties and embrace 
Christianity; it may be reflective of Justin and Tertullian’s ability to recapitulate the 
concept of their cultural self in the greater vision of the Kingdom of God, though 
admittedly such assertions are conjecture rather than definitively provable. 
Again, I feel it is important here to emphasize that this thesis does not make any 
sort of statement on the factual nature of the assertions made by Justin and Tertullian. 
Rather, I am proposing a reading of their text which highlights and appreciates the 
interplay between their apologetics and their cultural norms. This awareness of their 
ability to alternately work within or rebel against the prevailing modes of thought 
affecting their world and culture assists in discerning the extent to which such apologists 
can inform apologetic approaches and methodologies today. The importance of the point 
previously discussed is that Justin and Tertullian both attempt to give Christianity the 
grounding it needs both in terms of its ancestral longevity as well as making a claim for a 
common ethnicity despite the various cultures of its adherents. This grounding would 
then serve to negate the suspicions placed upon what would be seen by many as a new 
cult, and instead afford it a place with the other forms of religious practice which were 
respected and tolerated within the context of the Roman Empire. 
 
 
                                                          
12 One might be inclined to find strains of Galatians 3:28 running throughout this mode of thinking, and it 
is not without reason to suggest a genealogy for the idea which is birthed from this idea in Pauline 
theology. If nothing else, Paul’s rhetoric provides precedent in the tradition for the possibility of these 
apologists thinking in the way I have described. 




Section 2.2 – Appeals to Authority 
A large part of the apologetic effort, however, was not only shrinking the grounds 
by which Christianity was delegitimized, but also offering what the apologists hoped was 
a kind of palatable middle ground from which they could build. Appeals to the authority 
of figures like Plato, Homer, Pythagoras, Socrates and that of other philosophical schools 
accepted by the Romans, tried to link something that appeared suspect to the Romans 
(Christians) to forms they could both understand and respect as legitimate (philosophical 
authorities). This process for the apologists is fundamentally linked to the rhetoric of 
what the Romans consider to be acceptable and legitimate forms of practice and 
discourse. One could argue that because of this, there is a sublimation of the radical 
nature of first-century Christianity in favor of second-century self-preservation. 
Christianity’s legitimization is supported by, and to some degree hangs on, the 
apologists’ ability to speak in the language of the imperial hegemony and through the 
mouths of the respected intelligentsia in order to gain access to the public forum and 
articulate the Christian position to their particular audience. We might set this notion over 
and against Christianity being able to speak on its own terms, whatever that might look 
like, given that Christian language from its inception, even from the language of the 
Gospels and epistles, is written using the prevailing language and pomp of the empire. 
Leif Vaage recognizes this in his chapter entitled “Why Christianity Succeeded 
(in) the Roman Empire,” and makes a keen observation that in some ways the language 
used by the early Christians in a rebellious or subversive sense, prolongs the viability of 
such language and sets Christianity up as a natural successor to the Roman Imperium. He 
argues that “precisely because [Christian] language of opposition was derived from the 




discourse of empire, the long term legacy of such speech could hardly be anything other 
than a recurrence of the same.”13 Vaage’s point here is well made and is worth 
consideration, as his suggestion that the language used by a group, even in done in 
rebellion, risks the carrying forward of those same elements. While Vaage recognizes to 
some extent the necessity of Christianity “’talking the talk’ of Rome,”14 he also sees that 
talk as creating the promise of Christianity’s eventual role as a political force. To some 
extent, we might call this a kind of victory in as much as it certainly implies and eventual 
legitimization of Christianity via its linguistic ability; but at the same time, the question 
hangs overhead, and will be discussed in greater detail in the third chapter, of whether or 
not Christianity really had a chance to speak in any other language, or if the Gospel was 
somehow subsumed into larger philosophical and political forms of thought. 
Suffice it to say for our present focus at least, that the language of early 
Christianity (and for our purposes, the language of the apologists) in many ways was 
required to speak with a contemporary vernacular. The early Christian apologists, in an 
effort to present the case of Christianity to their respective audiences and to gainsay the 
rival (and ultimately) heretical voices of their times, necessarily spoke in line with the 
vernacular of their audience. This only stands to reason, as if one wishes to communicate 
to a particular demographic, one would necessarily have to speak in a way understood by 
such an audience and address the issues or concerns of that same audience. To this end 
Justin when speaking with Trypho in the Dialogue he says, “But, since I know that all 
                                                          
13 Leif Vaage “Why Christianity Succeeded (in) the Roman Empire” in Religious Rivalries in the Early Roman 
Empire and the Rise of Christianity, ed. Leif Vaage (Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 278 
14 Vaage, 255. 




you Jews deny the authenticity of these passages, I will not start a discussion about them, 
but I will limit the controversy to those passages which you admit as genuine.”15 Here, 
Justin is speaking of the apocryphal books found in the Septuagint translation of the 
Jewish scriptures and which were accepted generally16 by Christians of the time, though 
rejected by most Jews. In this apparent ‘concession’ to his Jewish audience, Justin is 
ensuring that the appeals and citations he has made up to that point, as well as those he 
will make in the continuing argument, will be based on texts both traditions share and 
agree on mutually. In other words, Justin is working to ensure that he is not speaking in a 
language that could be misunderstood by his audience; this serves rhetorically to offer 
fewer points for contention with Justin’s overall argument and again to ensure that the 
discourse undertaken comes from a mutually spoken language. Indeed, looking 
comprehensively over the document, it seems that Justin’s efforts towards his various 
philosophical and theological proofs in the Dialogue come out of appeals to the Jewish 
scriptures,17 and with obvious good reason: his intended audience here is one which is 
learned in those particular texts and will present Justin with arguments based upon them. 
                                                          
15 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, trans. Thomas B. Falls (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948), 
Ch. 71. 
16 This phrasing is used rather than any discussion of Biblical canon in order to underline the position of 
Christianity at the time. The general variety of what we today might define as Christian sects accepted 
different texts as canonical or not; arguably the most significant figure in the development and 
declaration of an official canon was Marcion, whose canon was largely skeptical of the Old Testament as a 
whole, and whose legacy proved to be a catalyst for the ‘orthodox’ Church developing its own Biblical 
canon for both Old and New Testament scripture. For a fairly introductory, though competent treatment 
of this issue, see Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, Vol 1. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1987), 137-141 & 148-9. 
17 This is not to say that Justin speaks from the Jewish Scriptures to the total exclusion of any appeals to 
New Testament writings. Indeed, even a cursory glance over the references Justin includes will show 
Justin appealing to Matthew and Luke as well as a few other New Testament texts. 




This strategy is all the more evident when contrasted with apologetic works aimed 
at pagan audiences. While Justin, Tertullian, and Athenagoras all make appeals to 
Scriptural sources which would be outside the cultural sphere of their audience, we find a 
significant amount of discussion of material unique to a pagan Greco-Roman audience. 
Tertullian makes appeals to Roman history, citing Suetonius’ Life of Augustus,18 poets 
like Cassius Dio,19 and references to the Aeneid.20 Justin does likewise, making numerous 
references to the myths regarding the sons of Jupiter (cf. Heracles, Perseus, Mercury, 
Bacchus, etc.) as well as beliefs such as the apotheosis of the emperor.21 Finally, we find 
allusions to Euripides22 in Athenagoras, to say nothing of whole swaths of text cut from 
the Iliad.23 Additionally, each apologist discusses philosophical schools prevalent in the 
culture of the time,24 though by and large, Tertullian’s treatment of these texts is much 
more scathing than Justin or Athenagoras.25 However, the aim of all of the examples 
employed by the apologists is to establish Christianity in the language of the audience 
with respect to concepts and beliefs already held by or at least familiar to the audience. 
                                                          
18 Tertullian, Apology, Ch. 34 
19 Ibid, Ch. 25 
20 Ibid, Ch. 14 
21 Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, Chs. 21, 22, 33, 54. 
22 Athenagoras, Plea For Christians, found in Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Writings of 
the Fathers, Vol. II Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, ed. James Donaldson and Rev. Alexander Roberts. trans 
Rev. Marcus Dods, Rev. B. P. Pratten, and Rev. George Reith. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1874), Chs. 5 & 25 
23 Athenagoras, Plea, Ch 21. 
24 See Tertullian, Apology, Chs. 38, 46, 47; Justin 1 Apology Chs. 4, 10, 20; Athenagoras Plea Chs. 6, 19 & 
31. 
25 Though we will examine this complex relationship between Christianity and philosophy in more detail in 
the second phase of this chapter, suffice it to say for the present that Justin and Athenagoras’ sympathies 
likely owe to the fact that their logical processes came out of Greek philosophical training prior to 
conversion and what one could argue as being Platonist tendencies. 




As demonstrated by Justin, Tertullian, and Athenagoras, a key part of the task of the 
apologist is to frame and phrase the discussion in the language amenable to the audience.  
Let us step back a moment in order to reinforce this point by examining a figure 
of central significance in both Justin’s apology to a Jewish audience and his defenses to a 
pagan audience: Moses. We have already touched on the role Moses plays in arguments 
to the pagans, namely that the invocation of Moses and the prophets provides a needed 
sense of antiquity to the Christian project. Yet in the Dialogue, we see Justin giving 
Moses a much different treatment than what we find in the Apologies, stemming from the 
shift in the role Moses needs to occupy in the space of the argument. Gone is any rhetoric 
dealing with Moses as a figure of antiquity; this is due to the fact that the Jewish case 
against Christianity at the time did not really concern itself with the relative newness of 
the religion. Rather, the point of contention shifts to an argument over interpretation of 
the Jewish scripture claimed by both traditions. Therefore for Justin, Moses becomes a 
figure who gives the Law in response to what he describes as a hardness of heart among 
the Jews and goes on to say that the Jews are so stubborn that they do not even follow26 
nor understand27 the Law that they have been given. Moses in this context stands as an 
authority whose legacy is interpreted differently by the Christian and Jewish traditions, 
thus forcing Justin to move the apologetic battleground to deal with these issues rather 
than the ones of antiquity valued by his pagan audience. One can certainly argue that the 
mutability of Justin’s application is indeed valuable, though as it exists in the Dialogue it 
is perhaps an extreme which would lose rather than gain traction with a modern audience. 
                                                          
26 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, Ch. 19 
27 Ibid, Ch. 12 




It is important to keep in mind that the aim of the whole enterprise in the 
apologies, at least on a socio-political level, seems to be an attempt to set up Christianity 
as something which is not dissimilar from the other religious practices and beliefs present 
in the Roman Empire. From a civil viewpoint, the apologists worked to both refute the 
claims of impiety, sedition, and licentiousness made against the Christian communities.28 
Essentially, the goal of early Christian apologetics is to make Christians seem normal and 
less scary to those who are perturbed by their practices and to demonstrate that they are, 
in fact, good members of society.  
This method stands over and against another potential form of apologetics which 
leans much more heavily on the assertion of a singular truth via the strength and beauty 
of that truth; while can certainly see this method present in the second century apologists 
to some extent, for example in their assertions against polytheism and for belief in God 
and Christ, we tend to find that such claims function as explanatory elements rather than 
as theological or philosophical demands; and all of this operating within an overall 
apologetic articulating tolerance and legitimacy in a plural society. A significant factor in 
establishing this tolerance and legitimacy in the second century is the normalization of 
Christians, and it is to an investigation of this particular task that we now turn. 
 
Section 2.3 – The Christians and the Apologists as Citizens of the Empire 
The main interest here, aside from attempting to end the persecution of the 
Christian faithful on what the apologists believe to be groundless charges, is to 
demonstrate that Christians are law abiding citizens who pose no threat to the Roman 
                                                          
28 See Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, Ch. 26 and Tertullian, Apology, Ch. 7 




imperial establishment. This is a key part of the apologetic project as one must remember 
that a great deal of the suspicion levied against Christians comes from the perceived 
belief that Christians pose a threat to the unity and stability of the empire.29 Indeed, the 
efforts of Justin, Tertullian, and Athenagoras to make Christianity respectable puts 
forward the case that Christians are not only good citizens, but as ideal ones. 
Athenagoras places this topic very near to the start of his Plea, to counter the 
allegations brought against the Christian community. He happily submits Christians to 
Roman trial, and claims that “If, indeed, anyone can convict us of a crime… [we] are 
prepared to undergo the sharpest and most merciless inflictions,”30 but notes that one can 
only come to such a conclusion by the genuine examination of the life of the accused, and 
not by a simple nomen ipsum judgment. He encourages “inquiry concerning our life, our 
opinions, our loyalty and obedience to you and your house and government,”31 and seems 
quite confident that such an investigation will discover only loyalty and obedience to the 
will and laws of the emperor. 
Tertullian’s efforts on this topic are neatly phrased when he asserts that “We pray 
for the welfare of the emperors to the eternal God,”32 and going on to chastise those 
persecuting Christians, saying “Carry on good officials! Torture the soul which is 
beseeching God on behalf of the emperor!”33 Rhetorically, Tertullian is arguing that 
                                                          
29 Again, see Fredriksen and Polybius in the previous chapter. 
30 Athenagoras, Plea, Ch. 2. 
31 Ibid, Ch. 3 
32 Tertullian, Apology, Ch. 30, NB that Tertullian devotes a full ten chapters (30-39) to the refutation of the 
idea that Christians are somehow opposed to the empire; though I believe the citation provided is enough 
evidence to support the current question, it is worth being aware that scope of his argument is far 
broader than what can be presented here. 
33 Ibid, Ch. 30 




Christians are showing true civic duty by not only praying for the well-being of the 
emperor, but doing so to the one true God, whereas pagans pray to idols of their own 
devising who have no power to help or harm anyone or anything. In Tertullian’s mind 
and in his argument, Christians are anything but insidious agents working against the 
stability of the empire, rather they are the unsung guarantors preserving it. 
Justin’s efforts to assure the pagans of Christian fidelity to the security of the 
empire centers on the New Testament rhetoric of Jesus saying “Give to Caesar what 
belongs to Caesar.”34 For Justin, there is nothing which prevents the Christian from living 
as a good subject of the empire or from living in obedience to the will of the emperor. 
Justin states that “Wherefore, only God do we worship, but in other things we joyfully 
obey you, acknowledging you as the kings and rulers of men, and praying that you may 
be found to have, besides royal power, sound judgment.”35 The case made here is that the 
Christian is obligated to obey the civil authorities in all things concerning this world, but 
that the emperor’s power stops when it infringes on what God requires of the Christians; 
while this might seem a fairly open ended defense with room to justify a good deal of 
civil dissent on the part of the Christians, the subsequent arguments Justin puts forward in 
the rest of the Apology can be read as an outlining of what a Christian is required to do 
and why. From there one can see the potential argument for Justin that if it isn’t dealt 
with in the Apology as belonging to a Christian obligation to God, then a Christian is 
obligated by the teachings of Christ to obey the civil authorities.  
                                                          
34 Mark 12:17, Matt. 22:21, and Luke 20:25. 
35 Justin Martyr, 1 Apology, Ch. 17 




Finally, with respect to the direct analysis of the contents of the apologies, it 
merits examining the kind of tone each apologist took with his respective audience. 
Indeed, the tenor of the defense being articulated may well be something of value for 
determining the tenor modern apologists should likewise adopt. Each author seems to 
make an effort to address particular comments to their addressee within the broader scope 
of presenting their case, and the relative tone and characterization of these comments is 
perhaps one of the great points of discussion in the differentiation of each apologist. The 
scope of this examination is going to be kept as near to the introductions of the apologies 
as possible, examining how the audience is addressed, and what statements and 
assumptions were made by the apologist concerning the addressing of his audience, 
though certainly there is a great deal to be mined from a larger more detailed examination 
of the rhetorical tone of each apologist. 
Both Athenagoras and Justin have similar styles in their initial address to their 
audience, and generally take a more congenial tone in how they entreat their respective 
addressees. Athenagoras begins the Embassy with a level of deference that borders on 
coming off as either servile or fulsome. His address to the co-emperors of Marcus 
Aurelius and Commodus acknowledges them as emperors and conquerors, but also, as 
Athenagoras points out particularly, as “most importantly of all, philosophers.”36 It is to 
this point, and with this assumption in mind, that Athenagoras presents the rest of his 
apology, reiterating his belief that his audience will “not, like the multitude, be led astray 
by hearsay,”37 and repeatedly throughout appealing to their sense of intellect, 
                                                          
36 Athenagoras, Plea, Ch. 1. 
37 Ibid. 




beneficence, and most of all, justice. Likewise, Justin addresses his 1 Apology to the 
emperor whom he calls “a lover of learning,”38 and to a Senate he characterizes as “pious 
and philosophers, guardians of justice and lovers of learning,” Then he counsels both the 
emperor and Senate to “Give good heed, and hearken to my address; and if you are 
indeed such, it will be manifested.”39 Though Justin is perhaps a little more conditional 
than Athenagoras in his appeal to the just and philosophical nature of his audience, it is 
still readily apparent that he also believes his audience is one which can be properly 
reasoned with by virtue of that nature. 
In contrast to the two eastern philosopher-apologists, Tertullian’s approach is 
certainly the more biting, aggressive, and sarcastic of the three. Whereas one might find 
semi-conciliatory tones in the writings of Athenagoras and Justin, there are few if any 
such elements to be found in Tertullian’s text; yet he is at least somewhat indirect in his 
attacks on the officials to whom he directs his apology, preferring to work through 
sarcasm or through insinuation rather than an explicit assault on his audience. His 
opening words are demonstrative of this. He refers to the officials he addresses as a “lofty 
tribunal,” but the compliment rings hollow and sarcastic when in the next sentence he 
implies that they “are afraid or ashamed to exercise [their] authority in making public 
inquiry with the carefulness which becomes justice.”40 Further into his initial comments, 
he uses the suggestive pairing of ignorance and injustice no fewer than eight times to 
describe those who persecute and hate the Christians whom he represents; it does not 
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seem in the least farfetched to think that just maybe Tertullian is referring to his present 
audience, rather than some hypothetical other officials who are similarly persecuting the 
Christians. Indeed, while Tertullian’s tactics are quite different from those of his 
counterparts, the whole discussion to some extent begs the question of the best manner in 
which to entreat one’s target audience. 
Having now dealt with the specific trends present in the apologetic works, namely 
that each apologist in his own way seems to utilize similar tools in creating a defense of 
the Christian faith. The tools dealt with in this thesis have been: an appeal to 
Christianity’s claim on antiquity, the commonality of the Christian ethnicity, 
contextualizing Christianity within the Greco-Roman vernacular, and the rhetorical tone 
used to address one’s audience. Given this analysis of the content and structure of second 
century apologies, we then turn to the second phase of this chapter which seeks to 
investigate how the second century apologists attempted to deal with the philosophies and 
modes of thought and prevalent in their time. This section will continue to deal directly 
with the apologetic texts, but will also seek to include commentaries and analyses from 
scholars who have investigated the explicit and implicit connections between the 
Christian apologists and the pagan philosophical schools. Our aim here is to address and 
answer the extent to which the second-century apologists dialogued with, compromised 
with, and/or defended against the prevailing zeitgeist of the time, rather than against the 








Section 2.4 – Apology and Ambient Philosophy 
In framing this part of the discussion, it is worth looking at the relationship 
between theology and philosophy from the perspective of one of the larger challenges 
prevalent in the field of apologetics and which provides a kind of spectrum upon which 
we can place the voices which we have heard. A significant challenge for an apologist, 
both in the second century and in the present day, is the potential charge that an apologist 
might be too much entwined in the spirit of the age, somehow catering to it rather than to 
the Gospel message, or that they are otherwise in bed with philosophical forces that are 
essentially corrosive to the message they are ostensibly preaching. In many ways, 
addressing this challenge is central to any analysis of apologetics, and it will be no 
different in the present thesis. Therefore I will attempt frame the following analysis so as 
to outline the nature of this problem as it affected the second century apologists. 
Without a doubt the prevailing cultural mode of thought extant in the second 
century was that of the various Greek philosophical schools. Justin himself recounts the 
several schools he was a part of at one point in his life or another,41 Tertullian seems to 
have working knowledge of various philosophical currents if not outright education in 
these modes of thought,42 and Athenagoras’ writings in the Embassy show him to be 
competently aware of pagan writings and conversant in their application.43 Yet central to 
the early Church was the question of the extent to which it was permissible to have these 
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‘secular’ philosophical currents running through the Church, especially as the early 
Christians sought to establish their belief system and structures in the face of suspicion 
and persecution. Each of the Fathers we have discussed previously seems to take a 
slightly different stance concerning the permissibility of any dialogue between the 
philosophical schools and the growing ecclesiastical community of early Christianity.  
 Anchoring one of the poles of this argument, in support of such a blending of 
theology and philosophy, we find the figure of Athenagoras. While it is possible that he 
might have been a more prolific writer than what his surviving works might suggest, and 
that elsewhere he might have had different theological nuances, given what we do have 
of Athenagoras’ writings, we find a figure who seems to find a great deal of support for 
the Christian cause in the writings of pagan philosophers and poets. Joseph Hugh Crehan, 
S.J. says of Athenagoras in the introduction to his translation of the Embassy that 
“Athenagoras is perhaps distinguished among the apologists in his gentlemanly tone and 
by his coming closer to grips with Greek religion and philosophy than was usual in a 
Christian.”44 This certainly seems to be the case when we consider Athenagoras’ style 
and the texts he brings to bear in his arguments. 
 Athenagoras draws heavily on the writings of Greco-Roman classical antiquity as 
authoritative voices to help his case, while having comparatively few citations of what 
would later become the Christian Biblical canon. The Embassy contains fewer than ten 
citations to either Old or New Testament writings, citations which were largely brought 
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in via the New Testament establishing the rigor of Christian morality,45 and the Old 
Testament establishing the oneness and creative nature of God.46 Athenagoras’ use of 
these specific Old Testament texts seems to be in aid of underlining and giving divine 
clarification to the words of Greek philosophers and poets. His quotation of pagan 
sources is more than three times the number of scriptural citations, and his apology 
utilizes appeals to a whole range of figures, from the aforementioned Euripides and 
Homer, to figures like Pythagoras, Herodotus and most importantly Plato.  Indeed, 
Athenagoras’ philosophical leanings take heavily from the Platonic school, and his 
arguments in defense of Christianity seem to lean more on arguing from a Platonic image 
of God and the world than on Christ being a fulfillment of scriptural prophecy. 
Before proceeding with this point, I do want to be clear here that my intent is not 
to paint Athenagoras as somehow subordinating Christianity to the various ‘secular’ 
schools of thought. Rather, my point is that he has a keen knowledge of such sources and 
is adamant in wedding the two together. He admits that the while Greek philosophers 
tried to “find out and apprehend the truth; but they have not been found competent fully 
to apprehend it”47 and that it was “prophets, who, lifted in ecstasy above 
the natural operations of their minds by the impulses of the Divine Spirit, uttered the 
things with which they were inspired.”48 In these passages we see that Athenagoras 
would not agree that Greek philosophy is sufficient unto itself for the purpose of speaking 
about God, because it did not know God in the fullness of revelation, but instead worked 
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only within what the intellect of man could touch. Athenagoras seems to view the 
revelation of God through Christ as the unifying point by which any other thought or 
philosophy must be judged, but this in turn then implies that there should be a 
communication of ideas between those which arise from Christians and those which 
come from the ‘secular’. 
As previously mentioned, Platonism is rampant throughout Athenagoras’ 
writings, arguably more so than his reliance on any specifically Christian texts. Crehan 
observes that “there can be little doubt in the mind of anyone who reads through 
Athenagoras that he was well versed in Platonism,”49 and lays much of the Platonic and 
classical influences found in later writers such as Clement of Alexandria, at the feet of 
Athenagoras’ writings. His observation is not in the least wrong and it seems that the 
Platonic notion of divinity is one of the primary engines at the heart of Athenagoras’ 
apology, powering the rhetoric and arguments he uses throughout. For example, during 
Chapter 6 of the Embassy, in discussing the nature of the Christian God in contrast to 
pagan polytheism, he calls on Plato’s depiction of “one uncreated God, the Framer of the 
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Universe.”50 Shortly thereafter in Chapter 9,  he applies a text from Isaiah51 concerning 
the oneness of God seemingly more to underline the commonality between Christian 
belief and that of Platonic philosophy over some attempt to let Isaiah stand on its own 
merits. While I, again, would not say he’s subordinating Christian texts to ‘secular’ ones, 
he is certainly leaning the two upon each other so that one helps support the other. He 
continues his use of Platonic thought throughout much of the apology, perhaps most 
notably in his dismantling of pagan polytheism in pursuit of Christian monotheism. His 
primary argument here draws on Plato’s sense of the divine as uncreated and 
immutable,52 but that the various polytheistic gods are either created by the poets,53 or 
else were men who were later declared gods.54 Athenagoras’ logic here, indebted to 
Platonism, is that if the gods have any point of creation, no matter how far back it may 
reach, then they cannot be divine, for that which is divine has no creation point. 
One might perhaps have room to question if Athenagoras employed philosophy to 
the extent that he did because he was attempting to reach his audience, e.g. the 
philosopher emperor Marcus Aurelius, on terms that might be both appealing and 
appeasing. Perhaps his zealous use of pagan examples over those of a suspect new 
religious movement was simply a tactic he felt he had to resort to in order to make his 
case to the emperor and to any other educated persons who might happen to read it. 
Anders-Christian Jacobsen observes that part of Athenagoras’ apologetic strategy were 
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“attempts to create strategic alliances with various involved parties,”55 and notes that by 
bringing in Platonism he might have had hopes to sway figures like the emperor. It is 
impossible to know for sure whether Athenagoras himself was pleased with such a 
blending of philosophy and theology, however, the evidence we have does seem to 
suggest an amiability towards such a coming-together, if not an outright eagerness to 
demonstrate agreeability between the two. Whatever Athenagoras might have thought or 
felt personally though, what is quite certain is that his works do bring the two together in 
such a way as to make the connection between them seem, if not inevitable, then at least 
quite natural and logical. 
 Standing opposite Athenagoras on the other end of the spectrum, and advocating a 
much more distinct separation between anything of pagan philosophical origin and that of 
Christianity is Tertullian. William Placher points out that not all of the Church was 
content with the alliance between Christianity and the Greek thought, and names 
Tertullian as “the most eloquent spokesman”56 of the protest against such a path. Rather, 
we find in Tertullian not only a voice in favour of a kind of cloistering defense of 
Christian principles but also one who is an advocate in defense of some of the then-
contemporary controversies over elements of Church tradition. Eric Osborn describes in 
Tertullian someone who held “that it is only within a tradition that originality is 
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possible,”57 contrasting Marcion as a deviant for rejecting apostolic tradition, while 
upholding Jesus as original for working within the context of the Mosaic law and 
transforming it. One could potentially argue from such a standpoint that in Tertullian’s 
mind the addition of outside philosophical elements then, does not represent originality of 
some kind, but rather a deviancy from the tradition which has come from Christ. 
Tertullian was inherently suspicious of anything which attempted to relate the 
radicalism of the Gospel and the purity of its message to anything outside of that which 
has Christian foundations alone. His classic idiom of “What has Athens to do with 
Jerusalem?”58 could hardly be a more direct and Tertullian-esque choice of words to 
describe his sentiments. Even in the apology treated in this thesis, we find evidence that 
Tertullian does not look highly or favorably on the philosophical schools of his day, 
saying “the speculations of philosophers have perverted the older Scriptures. Some of 
their brood, with their opinions, even adulterated our new-given Christian revelation, and 
corrupted it into a system of philosophic doctrines.”59 Tertullian’s use of terms such as 
‘corruption’ and ‘adulteration’ seem quite a far cry from any unabashedly positive use of 
philosophy and philosophical terms.  
Certainly not one for mincing his words, we find in Tertullian little shortage of ire 
for those who would seek to introduce philosophical thinking into the Christian faith. Yet 
at the same time, as we have seen previously, Tertullian does not seem to flinch in 
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wielding Christianity as a perceived philosophy if it will help his apology to identify 
inconsistencies in the Roman persecution of the faith. The likes of Plato and his ilk are 
brought up more often than not to demonstrate Roman equivocation with respect to their 
treatment of the truth of the Christian religion and the philosophers who profess similar, 
though much more imperfect ideas.60 In some cases as well, the language Tertullian uses 
is decidedly more patronizing than what one might expect as well, contrasting Christian 
“affirmation” or “profession” with the Greeks’ “admitting” or “acknowledging”; tonally 
Tertullian likes to make the philosophers and poets sound almost begrudging as regards 
the points where Christians and the ‘secular’ agree.  
Given this characterization of philosophers and their ‘opinions’, it is perhaps 
wholly unsurprising that that Tertullian draws the greatest proofs of his argument from 
the Christian lifestyle. While he makes some use of the Scriptures at points, and Osborn 
observes that “Tertullian's defence of Old Testament laws and history is excessive and 
unreasonable… [Because] Tertullian will not abandon the good creator and defends every 
part of the creator's story,”61 Tertullian’s apologetic bread and butter to his pagan 
counterparts seems to rest within identifying the superior morality of the Christian 
lifestyle62 as something that does not line up with the charges leveled against them by 
their pagan persecutors.63 The Christian must ultimately answer to Christ for their 
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lifestyle, and not to the ephemeral and mercurial standards of the time. Given this, it 
seems only natural to indeed ask what Athens could possibly add to Jerusalem. Osborn, 
in reflecting on this dichotomy, summarizes Tertullian saying that “The divine economy 
moves in one direction. It is as foolish to try to improve the gospel with philosophy as it 
was for the Galatians to improve it with the Mosaic Law.”64  
However, modern scholarship on Tertullian has identified him as within his own 
philosophical arc, with Osborn noting that “As a Stoic, he prized Heraclitus as much as 
did the Platonist Clement of Alexandria,”65 and Pap Levente contextualizing Tertullian’s 
discussion of patience, while obviously not treated in this thesis, as having “based his 
reasoning on Stoic ideas which he used to conceptualize the Christian virtue, so he was in 
favor of the pagan philosophical thinking instead of the Christian one.”66 If, indeed, these 
two scholars are correct in their genealogy of Tertullian’s underlying philosophy, then it 
appears that even one who is as avid in his defense of the faith from outside elements as 
Tertullian seemed to be, is still not immune from contracting and then employing such 
elements from the ambient culture that surrounds them. Simply by living in the milieu of 
such ideas, even an avid opponent of the same seems fertile ground for ideological self-
replication via whatever that individual might produce. 
Synthesizing, or perhaps even generalizing the works and overall attitude of 
Tertullian, Placher describes Tertullian’s case as “a powerful warning against all those 
who want to modify Christian faith because it fails to fit somebody’s theory of what a 
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reasonable or up-to-date religion ought to be,”67 though as we have seen, Tertullian might 
not have been as efficacious as he’d have hoped to this end. In providing such a 
description, Placher perhaps goes slightly too far in making Tertullian a poster-child for 
unyielding devotion to a particular permutation of religion, but at the same time, one 
could hardly disagree that Tertullian is vehement in his opposition to the potential 
changes that outside philosophies could bring. Furthermore, it seems to correctly define 
Tertullian as one for whom (at least overt) compromise with the outside is distasteful to 
say the least; Tertullian’s Christian message is not something which should seek to make 
itself more palatable, but instead requires a defense of itself as the only path to be 
followed, regardless of whatever clamours might result externally as a result. 
With Athenagoras on one hand and Tertullian on the other, we find, seemingly 
bizarrely, our final apologist, Justin Martyr, caught somewhere between them. On the one 
hand, one would certainly be hard pressed to make any claim that Justin is somehow 
against the dialogue between philosophy and Christianity. Yet on the other hand, there is 
some subtlety in Justin’s apologies that demonstrate a keenness to prioritize Christian 
texts and beliefs in a way that someone like Athenagoras does not appear to demonstrate. 
In analysis of Justin on this point, the goal here is to demonstrate how Justin, while 
certainly empathetic towards the potential connections between Christianity and ‘secular’ 
philosophies, nuances and in some ways couches his statements, pushing him more 
towards the center of the debate than one might suspect at first glance. 
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As mentioned above, it is not necessarily hard to demonstrate that Justin is keen 
to bring philosophy into dialogue with Christian revelation. Again, simply reading Justin 
and taking him at his word, would seem to place him squarely in league with the likes of 
Athenagoras. Indeed, in some cases we find Justin going beyond merely advocating for 
the blending of Christian beliefs with Greek philosophies, and actually drawing specific 
connections between the Platonic creation of the world and the Stoic conflagration at the 
end times68 and their relevant counterparts in the Christian tradition. And if one widens 
the analysis to his general treatment of philosophers and philosophy in general, his 
expressions do seem to carry a markedly positive nature, considering philosophical 
pursuits as consistent with acting in alignment with reason69 while at the same time 
acknowledging that pagan philosophers did not quite fully understand the realities they 
were grasping at because they did not as yet have the full revelation of God through 
Christ.70 Finally, on a personal level, Justin identifies himself without compunction as a 
philosopher in the opening chapter of the Dialogue71 and in discussing his conversion, 
identifies Christianity as “the only sure and useful philosophy.”72 In this understanding of 
Justin we might feel quite confident in categorizing Justin as one for whom the 
Hellenization of Christianity did not pose enough of a threat to prompt worry or concern 
that the initial and core teachings would be somehow lost; such a position is something 
which would surely make the likes of Tertullian either blanch or fly into a diatribe of 
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some description. A fundamental point of Justin's theology and apology though, whatever 
Tertullian might think of it, seems to be that pagan philosophies are inspired by the same 
Logos which is fully realized in Christ, and therefore that such philosophies are 
precursors and ultimately cooperative with the Christian doctrine and Gospel. 
However, conceptualizing the philosophies of his day as somehow preparatory for 
Christianity carries with it an important realization. C.J. de Vogel observes this key 
realization in Justin’s works, that “both Plato and Christ in their teachings were 
concerned with the same things: with God and making men find the way to Him.”73 Yet 
de Vogel also is quick to note that Justin also does not see Platonism and Christian 
teaching as somehow equivalent or on equal authoritative and metaphysical footing:  
The relation between philosophy and Christianity in Justin's view is not such that 
Christian faith just adds some complementary 'teachings' to the true but partial 
insights of philosophy; there are also certain 'pagan errors', and Christianity with 
relation to philosophy is not only supplementary but corrective… True, [pagan] 
intellect partakes of the Logos, and therefore may attain to a certain amount of 
true insight. But Christians have more than that: they have the disposal of sources 
which, as a special revelation of God, were known and open to them only.74 
 
De Vogel recognizes in Justin's writings a primacy of Christian doctrine which seems to 
be much more vocal and pervasive than that of Athenagoras, and as such places distance 
between the two apologists via the emphases present in their respective works.  
 Further distancing Justin from Athenagoras’ apologetic style and the theological 
implications therein is their relative use (or not) of ‘secular’ and Christian texts to support 
their positions. Again, Athenagoras seems to prioritize the use of ‘secular’ texts over 
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scriptural ones by a ratio of nearly three-to-one. Again, this is not to call into question 
whether Athenagoras is more a philosopher than a Christian, but merely to demonstrate in 
his apology that he feels it necessary to draw on ‘secular’ texts and allusions and 
construct arguments based upon their content and rhetoric, rather than embracing a more 
scripturally based approach. However, as de Vogel observes of Justin, and as a glance 
over the footnotes or citations in any translation of his works would corroborate, Justin's 
“Christianity is based on the Scriptures… Platonism was by no means a preparation for 
the Gospel in the same sense and with the same force as the Old Testament was.”75 Even 
in his apologies to pagan audiences (that is to say, not in the Dialogue, where a reliance 
on Old Testament citation might well be expected) Justin frames his arguments from the 
implications of a fulfillment of the Old Testament, rather than leaning on arguing from 
‘secular’ notions of what God or religion should look like. 
While it would be false to say that Justin makes no allusions or citations of 
Platonic texts (one need not look further than the second chapter of 1 Apology before 
finding a reference to Plato’s Republic), the structure and progression of Justin's 
argument draws much more heavily on Old Testament texts and prophets as the 
authoritative sources than on anything written by Greek poets and philosophers. In other 
words, unlike Athenagoras’ style, which focuses on demonstrating how Christianity is 
able to deal in concert with ideas extant in Platonism, Justin's tactics center more on an 
assumed and demonstrated authority of the Scriptural texts, and how Christ and the 
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Christians are the fulfillment and inheritors of that. In this way, he is forced somewhat 
away from his Greek compatriot and edged towards a more central point in the debate. 
While Justin's approach to apologetics differentiates him from Athenagoras, one 
should acknowledge that, like Athenagoras, his aim is very much the same: forging an 
alliance with the ‘secular’ parties of his day, both academic and governmental. William 
Placher identifies this ‘alliance with philosophy’ as remarkable and intellectually daring, 
but also as a compromise with the prevailing culture. While Placher seems to use 
‘compromise’ as a non-pejorative term, its use also seems to indicate a belief that runs 
contrary to the notion that Christianity is a kind of perfection or fulfillment of already 
existing ideas that needed a fully revealed and cohesive framework to properly work; a 
suggestion, as we have seen, which may not be as readily applicable to the likes of Justin 
as Placher suggests. Placher points out that pagan philosophical themes, specifically 
those in Platonic and Stoic thought “attracted many Christians”, but also observes that the 
discrepancies between Christian doctrine and pagan philosophy “could lead to some 
changes in what Christians believed;”76 it is with this statement in mind that Placher goes 
on to discuss the likes of Tertullian and those who might protect against such changes.  
Treating Justin specifically concerning his infusion of philosophy into 
Christianity, Placher states that “Justin has faced attacks from both sides. Philosophers 
say he oversimplified Platonism; Christians have accused him of modifying faith to suit 
philosophy. Both charges contain an element of truth, but Justin did try to think about 
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Christianity in terms of the best ideas of his time.”77 Placher’s analysis of Justin here is a 
point worth developing and seems to, as is our present goal, situate Justin in a kind of 
middle ground, not basing his arguments on the philosophic elements of his pre-
conversion education, but also seeing fit to introduce those elements into Christianity 
when he saw benefit in doing so. Placher suggests rather strongly that in Justin’s 
contemplation of Christianity through the lens of his contemporary philosophies, Justin 
was able to understand and present Christianity in a new light, one which was able to 
illuminate Christianity’s truth and significance not only for those already following the 
Christian message, but also for those who might not otherwise have come to know it. 
The marked distinction between Tertullian’s jeremiad against the blending of 
Christian doctrine and pagan philosophy, and Athenagoras’ contentedness with and even 
excitement at such a marriage is certainly worth noting, to say nothing of Justin finding 
himself somewhere in between these two poles. Identifying this distinction present in the 
voices of second century apologists translates to understanding a significant and 
longstanding trend within the body of the Church. There is no doubt that some of the 
difficulties inherent in the dialogue between the Christian and the ‘secular’ have the 
potential to exacerbate the challenge posed at the beginning of this section and the 
scenario that worried Tertullian in Prescription Against Heretics: that through the 
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dialogue process, elements that are corrosive to Christianity are able to find their way in 
or that Christians might find themselves tethered to such elements rather than to the 
Gospel. It is not an inconsiderable concern, and Tertullian is right to worry about it.  
Yet, the opposite venture, of somehow making sure that no such elements come 
anywhere close to the Christian message seems, at best impossible, and at worst counter-
productive towards the end of both evangelization and apologetics. As Jörg Ulrich 
observed of the apologetic project: 
If the task of theology is to express Christianity in the contemporary forms of 
thought for any given social context, which the theologian also unavoidably 
belongs to, one should recognize that the theological endeavors of early Christian 
apologists were not only necessary, but also theologically legitimate, meaningful, 
and genuinely Christian, and hence avoid… accusations of heresy78 
 
Ulrich’s point here is an astute one, recognizing a common thread running throughout all 
of the apologies. Inherent in each of their works is an implicit recognition that the 
philosophy of the day must be dealt with in some manner. Likewise, as this chapter has 
shown, each apologist does this in his own way. However, to a greater or lesser extent 
across the board, each apologist also finds himself ‘unavoidably belonging’ to the 
philosophical system of his time and is in some ways forced to use ‘secular’ philosophic 
language to describe Christian principles. Addressing the ‘secular’ on its own terms 
seems to be an inescapable premise in some ways.  
 It is worth keeping in mind that the struggle today between establishing 
MacIntyre-Benedictine Church which stands observationally in the world and against 
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adoption of prevailing philosophical currents versus a Pecknold-Dominican one which 
seems to desire an active engagement, adoption, and ‘Christianization’ of such 
philosophies, is a struggle which seems to have been with the Church nearly from its 
inception. Admittedly there is a great deal separating the modern philosophical climate 
from that of the second century, as well as separating our earliest apologist (Justin) from 
the latest (Tertullian). Indeed, as Eric Osborn remarked of the distinctions within the field 
of apologetics: “Apologetic takes its targets separately so that argument against one target 
may not fit easily with argument against another. This is still evident in modern times 
where writers may exhibit great diversity in responding to objections within one culture, 
let alone venturing outside that culture”79 Osborn’s words identify the way in which such 
figures, despite or perhaps because of their circumstances, navigate the challenge of 
relating their contemporary philosophy to theology and its contemporary needs.  
While the philosophic atmosphere of the second century had elements which 
proved to be helpful to the definition and propagation of the Christian Gospel (think here 
of Athenagoras’ use of Plato), the nature of the apologetic project also demonstrates that 
there were significant issues it presented as well; such a project would not have taken the 
forms it did if there was perfect agreement between the beliefs of the ‘secular’ and those 
of the Christian. Undeniably it is anachronistic to apply MacIntyre or Pecknold labels to a 
discussion of second century figures; however, it can prove somewhat helpful as well, as 
it recognizes as active at the core of this long conversation similar trends and issues, 
present both now and in the Church of the second century. This connection has the 
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potential to allow the works and methods of the second century apologists to reach 
forward to the present day and provide us with tools and strategies for the continual 
defense and promotion of the Christian Gospel message.
 
  




Chapter Three: Lessons from the Second Century 
 As we begin the third and final chapter of this thesis, it is at first helpful to 
summarize the major points established in the previous two chapters. By understanding 
the preceding points relevant to the following discussion, my hope is that the conclusions 
to be drawn will be both cognitively and organizationally easier to grasp with this 
information readily accessible. Therefore, in order to provide the reader with a clear 
understanding of the key points articulated thus far, it seems prudent to have a brief 
summation at the head of the chapter before introducing the themes and ideas to be 
explored more fully in the chapter at hand 
 The contextualization process carried out in chapter one first served to set up the 
necessary cultural understandings for the apologetic discourses in chapter two, but also to 
establish areas of similarity and difference between the second century and the modern 
age which would allow for our analysis to translate certain aspects of the second century 
apologetic discourse into the present day. To this end it was established that the ancient 
and modern contexts shared the similarities of (1) a culture of religious pluralism, (2) 
philosophical complications and contentions with the age in which they existed, thus 
creating a culture of suspicion around the Church, (3) a generally established national or 
civic religion (cult) which preached a gospel whose demands run into conflict with the 
demands of the Christian Gospel, and (4) a developing need for individuals and 
ecclesiastical institutions to articulate the Christian position in ways accessible to the 
uninitiated. While this list is not exhaustive of the subject in general, nor of all the 
similarities between the two epochs which will be explored in this chapter, it nonetheless 




represents the four core contextual correspondences which, up to this point in the thesis 
have been highlighted and discussed. 
 Conversely the contextualization process of the first chapter also demonstrated 
that there were distinct and key differences between the modern age and the second 
century. The first chapter advocated that there was a substantial difference between the 
ways in which each respective time (1) provided the means and/or incentive for religious 
pluralism to encourage or discourage a client/firm relationship in a general religious 
marketplace, (2) provided or failed to provide an authoritative monarchical/oligarchical 
audience to which the apologist(s) could appeal, (3) the shifting attitudes towards 
antiquity vs. novelty, with the ancients valuing antiquity and moderns valuing novelty, 
and finally (4) the establishment of a distinctly religious/secular sphere of life via the 
rational agent and a dichotomy of private vs public space. These differences in some 
ways complicate the process by which the present thesis seeks to translate the wisdom of 
the second century apologists to the modern day, but at the same time, the restrictions 
these difficulties pose in some ways more sharply clarify the course(s) that must be 
charted in order to strengthen the apologetic effort of the modern Church. And ultimately 
it is with each of these differences and their various implications that this third and final 
chapter will have to first contend in order to define the terrain for its subsequent 
arguments and conclusions. 
 Additionally at this pre-introductory stage, I also want to provide a brief synopsis 
of the second century apologetic tactics and tools discussed previously in chapter two. 
While each apologist tailored his use of each rhetorical stratagem to the context and 
audience he was addressing, a fact worth remembering in its own right, there were 




certainly common threads running throughout the various apologetic arguments which 
the previous chapter identified. Special attention was placed on (1) demonstrating 
Christianity as possessing and participating in a tradition of ancient heritage, (2) 
establishing Christianity as a kind of ethnic group unto itself, (3) utilization and 
contextualization of Christianity within the greater sphere of Greco-Roman culture, (4) 
the adoption of specific tones of voice and speech when addressing one’s audience, and 
finally (5) the interplay between the adoption and/or rejection of Greco-Roman 
philosophical currents into what would later become Christian philosophy, theology, and 
doctrine. Each of these major points articulated in chapter two will serve as primary areas 
of interest as we seek to bring these figures forward to apologize in a modern context. 
 Having so revisited these previously defined topics and their applicability in their 
own time and context, it serves us now to turn to a proper introduction of the themes and 
areas to be covered and discussed in the final chapters of this thesis. The final aim of this 
chapter is to define the extent to which the early apologists can speak to the present 
context and outline what apologetic path their wisdom suggests the modern Church 
should follow. The work of the previous two chapters will be continually referred to and 
built on in the course of this process, and many of the scholars and sources who were 
brought to bear in the earlier sections of this thesis will again be revisited and re-
interrogated in the interests of providing a conclusive synthesis to the question posed by 
this thesis. The process and end result of this final chapter will be to state what the 
apologetic project of the present day might look like if we allow it to be informed by the 
methods and tools utilized by the first Christian apologists, and as such we must keep in 
mind that in the midst of the broader field of apologetics, the conclusions, directions and 




suggestions drawn by this thesis are done in the light of the works of Justin, Tertullian 
and Athenagoras. This task of understanding and the analyses inherent within it will be 
broken down into four major sections within this chapter, and will function as follows. 
 The first section will attempt to treat with the problematic nature of defining and 
claiming legitimacy as a religious institution in the modern world. This section will 
address questions concerning the nature of the modern public sphere and what ultimately 
qualifies one to be a voice within it; this question is especially important concerning 
institutional structures, particularly religious ones, which have become something of 
suspect entities in the modern world. This section will also question the extent to which 
the modes of rhetoric of the second century apologist can speak to a system where 
legitimacy is defined in a markedly different way from antiquity. This questioning will be 
put into conversation with scholars like Gary Wills who offers a fairly generalizable 
definition of the shape and scope of the modernist critique of the present day Church, and 
Tim Muldoon who provides suggestions for the way in which the Church can establish 
and bolster its claim to legitimacy in the world. 
 The second section will investigate the extent to which the methods for apology 
used by the Church risk carrying forward the very thing(s) the Church is trying to defend 
itself against. Working in tandem with the discussion in the second half of the second 
chapter, this section investigates what the balance point should be between the integration 
and rejection of modes of thought and being which come from outside the Church. A 
considerable amount of focus will be placed upon understanding how the Church of the 
second century operated within the public sphere and how the present day Church 
likewise strives to do so. We will cross-reference the subalternity of the early Church 




with the present day Church to understand the challenges present in attempting to 
legitimize religious entities which are inherently suspect, and begs the question of the 
efficacy and the risks inherent in speaking via a modern language. 
The third section of this chapter will analyze this question via the criticisms of 
blending with the prevailing culture articulated by Adolf von Harnack vis-à-vis the early 
apologists and Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modern Kantian ethics. The concerns 
levied by these two figures are certainly worthy of consideration and seem figures with 
which the current thesis must grapple on some level, simply because they serve as ballast 
against overzealous and uncritical integration of modernity with the Church. We may see 
in this section some shades of the questions raised by Vaage in the previous chapter, and 
ask whether speaking in such a voice out of rebellion inherently carries forward the 
elements it is rebelling against. This section concludes by placing the thesis on ground 
wherein we can begin to definitively identify an apologetic plan informed by the writings 
and challenges overcome by the second century apologists. 
 The final section seeks to, in the light of the previous three sections, as well as in 
the light of the entire thesis up to that point, fully synthesize and understand the extent to 
which the methods, rhetoric, skill and wisdom of Justin, Tertullian and Athenagoras can 
be brought to bear on the modern context. The work of Muldoon and Wills will be 
reprised in this section to some extent, and the notions of theological illiteracy in the 
modern age and the postcolonial notion of hybridity will also feature prominently in this 
section as unique ways in which the second century can continue to advise the present. 
The section will conclude with a general outline for modern apologetics as dictated by the 
second century advice which can be brought forward. 




Section 3.1 – The Problematic Nature of Legitimization Concerning the Modern Age 
and Second Century Apologetic Rhetoric 
 
In dialoguing between the modern needs of the Church and the arguments and 
rhetoric of the second century, it is first necessary to articulate the intellectual terrain over 
which such discussions must move. In defining this terrain it is perhaps most beneficial to 
define how and where the rhetoric and tools of the early apologists seem to emphatically 
clash with or otherwise fail to meet the needs of a modern society and Church. This 
section in some ways provides certain parameters within which we may be able to apply 
the tools of the early apologists; this is accomplished by a necessary discarding of certain 
approaches because their difference from the modern age would likely be too steep a cost 
for a modern individual to countenance. It should be noted here as well that this section 
will largely avoid any discussion of similarities between the respective time periods in 
the interest of broaching such topics later in the chapter as the direction for apologetic 
discourse takes a more complete shape. 
 Perhaps one of the most prime examples wherein the rhetoric of the second 
century apologists would put it at odds with modern sensibilities is in the attempts of the 
second century apologists to, in some cases, have their cake and eat it too. By this I mean 
that we find, with respect to the apologists describing Christianity’s relationship with the 
Jews as well as with pagan philosophers, an attempt to identify with these groups and lay 
claim to the traditions they represent, while at the same time claiming to be something 
distinct from them. The apologists cited the voices of key figures significant to the 
Greco-Roman culture, or from the Jewish tradition, though in such a way as to praise 
these figures in one instance as forerunner elements to the supreme truth of Christianity, 




only to cut them down shortly thereafter for whatever crimes, contradictions, or 
indecencies occurred in their lives and teachings.  
The rhetoric Justin uses against Trypho for example,1 is something which would 
certainly be considered anti-Semitic by any modern standards. Justin's tone and oratory 
seems keen to distance Christianity from the Jews, and demonstrate that Christianity has 
little to do with Judaism aside from converting erroneous Jews to the true faith in Jesus 
Christ. Yet at the same time, Justin's argument to the pagan leadership, as we saw in the 
last chapter, seems to hinge on placing Christianity within the heritage which belongs to 
Judaism. While some would say Justin's arguments accomplish this feat of intellectual 
and theological finesse, one also has to admit that such rhetoric could seem to smack of 
equivocation or pandering if it was utilized in a more or less verbatim sense today. 
As additional support to this we might turn to a figure who voices such a critique 
of equivocation. While admittedly the Greek philosopher Celsus is outside the key 
figures under investigation by this thesis, he is nevertheless a relative contemporary of 
the early apologists and his work On the True Doctrine provides a contemporary pagan 
retort to the apologetic arguments. While his actual text is no longer extant, R. Joseph 
Hoffman’s work in amalgamating and translating what we do have of Celsus via figures 
like Origen yields this criticism of the Christian rhetoric of his day.  
You hypocrites…When you Christians find things made difficult for you by the 
Jews, you come around and say that you worship the same God as they do! What is 
to be believed? For when your master, Jesus, lays down laws contrary to those laid 
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down by Moses, in whom the Jews put their faith, you immediately undertake to 
find another God.2  
 
It is worth pointing out that in the context surrounding this passage Celsus is, to some 
extent, mixing up the beliefs of Christian groups like the Marcionites with that of what 
would eventually become orthodox Christianity. However, even with an understanding of 
Celsus’ confusing one Christian group with another, it is also clear that from an outside 
perspective there is some amount of perceived hypocrisy and equivocation going on in 
the Christian community.  
As a kind of modern example and point of comparison to this argument, I would 
like to examine Gary Wills’ work which provides an analysis of a distinctly American 
Catholicism in his text Why I am a Catholic, which outlines, defines, and in some cases 
defends the peculiarities of modern U.S. Catholicism. In many ways problems such as 
those perceived by Celsus exist as much now as they did in the second century. The 
apologists’ use of and appeals to certain bodies of authority when it suits them and their 
disavowal when it does not, seems a tactic that modern individuals would have little 
patience for. Wills makes a similar observation with respect to the then-Cardinal 
Ratzinger’s stance on the place of bishops’ conferences within the Church’s magisterial 
and decision making processes. Wills cites a 1965 essay in Concilium written by 
Ratzinger calling such conferences “the best means of concrete plurality and unity.”3 
However immediately following this quote, Wills goes on to cite a 1985 interview with 
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Ratzinger where the cardinal stated “We must not forget that the episcopal conferences 
have no theological basis, they do not belong to the structure of the Church as willed by 
Christ.”4 Wills seems to feel himself left to ask in a seemingly Celsusian manner ‘What is 
to be believed?’ 
The conclusion drawn by Wills at this point is that Ratzinger was perfectly fine 
with some amount of equivocation on a given point depending on which stance would 
best support his position. Given this admittedly singular example, it would serve us at this 
point to interject that whether Wills’ conclusion is right or not, it is a likely conclusion I 
suspect many modern Westerners might come to after looking over the same information 
and quotations. It is also worth pointing out as well, that Wills’ concern with such 
intellectual and theological gymnastics is coming from within the tradition, rather than 
from outside as we saw with Celsus. Though even from such a position, for the purpose 
of the present discussion, it does not matter if such a conclusion is right or wrong, only 
that it is perceived, and therefore provides an impediment to furthering the dialogue 
between the Church and the world. Such perceived equivocation is likely to be harmful to 
the overall perception of Church legitimacy and authority by both members of the Church 
body and from outsiders. Part of the question that must then be asked is how this ‘popular 
legitimacy’ affects the Church’s voice through such perceptions. 
Before addressing this particular difference however, that is, before addressing the 
ways in which the notion of popular legitimacy necessarily affects the apologetic 
mission, we must first understand the social divorce which creates such a situation. The 
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separation, officially or unofficially, of the state from religious authority as well as the 
converse separation of religion from state influence, is a fundamentally important 
difference between the culture of the ancient world and that of today. In many ways, as 
we will see in the subsequent discussions in this section, this separation serves as the 
grounding which allows for many of the other complications concerning a bringing 
forward of the second century apologists into the modern age.   
Let us first attempt to understand the shape and extent to which this divorce has 
taken place. To varying extents throughout the Western world, there is still some measure 
of civic religion and various days of worship for it (e.g. the Fourth of July, Canada Day, 
Bank Holidays, Memorial/Remembrance Day, etc.). Additionally, as our discussion of 
Charles Taylor in chapter one demonstrated, this divorcing process between the secular 
and religious is thanks in large part to a (re)conceptualization of what belongs in the 
private vs. public spheres, with religious belief, as commonly conceptualized, being 
assigned to a private role. This is a marked contrast from the second century culture 
where religion generally permeated the entirety of life. In short, the development of a 
secular entity at all is a striking departure from the world of Justin, Tertullian, or 
Athenagoras. It’s important to note that the works of these apologists did not really have 
to argue for religion being a voice of influence in society and a public factor in the way 
the empire was run; indeed, such a situation was already the case in their time.  
 An inherent difficulty between the second century and the present lies in the 
dichotomy between the ancient world’s inherently public religion and the modern era’s 
insistence on its privatization. While it is possible to argue that vestiges of religious 
expression via inherently public media such as festivals, public holidays, and temple 




worship practices continue to exist in worship rituals such as those mentioned at the 
beginning of the previous paragraph (cf. Hobsbawm), it is ultimately the case that 
colloquially ‘religious’ celebrations are private affairs, even if done in communities of 
faith. As such, it is worth being aware of the fact that the religious climate the apologists 
had to contend with was one with markedly different fundamental assumptions to our 
own. The Enlightenment values explored in chapter one dictate that each individual 
rational agent is given the purview to choose a religious outlook for him/herself, and it is 
the diffusion of religious responsibility in this pluralist manner that seems in part to fuel 
the contentions individuals may have with the Church or religion as a whole. Any 
apologetic attempt in the modern era must acknowledge this situation, and to some extent 
deal with it on its own terms; unfortunately it is a situation whose differences from the 
second century make it difficult for the early apologists to speak directly to. 
This discussion then brings us into our next major area of difference between the 
ancient and modern contexts, which likewise seems to stem from the creation of and split 
between a distinctly religious sphere and a distinctly secular one. In identifying areas of 
contrast with the modern age we must take into account how the apologetic discourse is 
sculpted and changed when legitimacy is found in many respects either via some form of 
popular assent, or through an interplay between the idea in question and that of the 
rational agent; this method is set over and against authority derived, as it largely was in 
the ancient context, through a singular person or a select body of people. This question 
and distinction is a somewhat broad one, so it serves us to attempt to break it down into 
sections which are more manageable thematically. We will first look at in terms of its 




make up, then assess what the situation therefore calls for from a modern apologist 
attempting to navigate this aspect of the religious-cultural landscape. 
In examining the composite make-up of the foundations of this problem, it is 
worth remembering, as mentioned in chapter two, that the apologetic arguments of the 
second century seem to have been mostly targeted at entities with monolithic forms of 
power, such as the Roman Senate and the emperor; likewise it is worth being aware of 
the relative lack of figures like these in the present day. There does not seem to be one 
person or body which exists presently or as part of a longer tradition to which one might 
direct ones appeals for such a purpose. Institutions like these seem to have been 
dismantled to some extent. It is of such a situation that Muldoon observes: “the difficulty 
is this: the postmodern world is one in which all communities begin, in some sense, on a 
level playing field.”5 As a result of this, even if such a body were present, institutional 
forms of authority seem weak at best in convincing modern people that a given idea or 
way of being is Truthful. The difficulty in targeting one single source of authority with an 
apologetic message in the hopes of creating some kind of Christianized change in the 
fabric of society is one which has become something of a pipe dream as a result of this 
breakdown of authoritative institutional sources for Truth. Muldoon likewise observes 
this, saying that “In this world, individual conscience becomes the locus of authority.”6 
This shift in the locus of authority obviously necessitates a change of address for 
the apologetic mission. One could certainly argue that a would-be apologist could attempt 
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to address a body like the U.S. Congress, the U.N. or any given head of state in an effort 
to mimic the efforts of the earlier apologists. However, such institutions are no longer 
capable socially, or in some cases even legally, able to affect the kind of change or way 
of life the would-be apologist might hope for. If the locus of authority has shifted to the 
extent that Muldoon suggests it does (and one could also appeal to the chapter one 
discussion of Taylor and Shah for further suggestions of this) then the apologetic efforts 
of the second century find another stumbling block in their ability to treat with the 
problems of the modern age in a meaningful way. 
Without the kind of figures that serve as authoritative addressees who have 
genuine power to affect the kind social change requested by the apologists, the apologetic 
project must target its appeals differently than it has in the past. While perhaps certain 
positions or venues do allow for the convincing of or defense to greater numbers of 
people, the modern West is by and large in a society where each individual person is 
considered as his/her own rational agent, and one must work apologetically to such a 
situation. Furthermore, decisions in such a society are made either via the court of public 
opinion, by convincing (rationally or otherwise) a sufficient number of individuals, or 
otherwise demonstrating the validity of an idea in some form of populist language. 
Arguments could be made that something like this exists in a few examples from the 
second century apologetic works,7 it also seems that the apologetic arguments under 
discussion did not seek to give themselves an actively populist voice in asserting their 
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claims. In a society centered on the community (e.g. that of the second century Roman 
Empire), it may be difficult to isolate and utilize instances of such language to the extent 
that a modern apologist may require in order to prevail in a society where individual 
conscience is the primary arbiter. 
Wills again provides us with a voice articulating modern challenges an apologist 
would necessarily have to overcome. Wills delves into the cultural preference towards 
individual conscience by providing key examples and insights into how and why such 
conclusions occur. His focus rests especially with respect to the Catholicism of the Baby 
Boomers generation, as something which often “ignore[s] or reject[s] teachings that are 
urged on them as authoritative, essential to their faith, and of great moral significance.”8 
In making this claim, Wills cites the ban on contraception as a significant break with 
Vatican and ecclesiastical authority, though he also notes that there is significant 
controversy for U.S. Catholics in support for abortion, gay unions, divorce and 
remarriage, and others as well. We can see as operative in this statement an articulated 
lack of deference to any singular source of authority, as well as a moral and intellectual 
primacy placed on what the individual may perceive as the morally correct choice.  
In a similar vein to describing the role of individual rational agents and primacy 
on individual conscience, Wills also defines the shape of the Church’s occasionally 
clumsy and occasionally optimistic approach towards dealing with key elements of 
modernity which have become prevalent in Western culture. He frames what he considers 
initial and substantial difficulties of the Church to deal with democratic thought and 
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governance, using the language of E.L. Woodward and saying that “No machinery 
existed whereby this power [of temporal and territorial authority] could be surrendered 
[to democratic movements].”9 In framing the difficulties this way, Wills is then free to 
draw attention to the corollary difficulty the machinery of the Church had in dealing with 
“a pluralist and secular society like that of America.”10 In the end, while Wills observes 
that ultimately the Church through Vatican II provides “a bold defense of freedom of 
conscience and its call for a confident co-operation with the world,”11 it is clear from his 
tone and content that he is frustrated by the Church’s (and the papacy’s) lack of eagerness 
to adapt to a more modern and Enlightened way of conceptualizing the world. 
Whether or not one agrees with Wills, who seems to push very hard against 
Papal/ecclesiastical authority in certain places, he is a voice which seems well able to 
articulate the problems a modern rational individual may have with the institutional 
Church. What is perhaps even more significant is that Wills is a scholar and possesses 
seemingly a great deal of theological literacy, or at the very least a scholarly and holistic 
knowledge of the trends in the Catholic tradition which led to various situations over the 
course of its 2000 year history; this obviously includes modes of thought extant in the 
Church which led up to the modern day situation of the Church (again, especially as it 
relates to the distinct reality of U.S. Catholicism). This is so significant because Wills is 
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perhaps better able to articulate his criticisms of modern Church apologetics12 and 
practices than a typical lay person might be able to.  
While it would be perhaps presumptive to assume Wills’ arguments speak for all 
who have like-minded criticisms of the Church, his articulation of these things must be 
dealt with in some sense, because he is able to articulate it. He has the literacy to bring 
the problems to the forefront and demand in some way that an account be offered for 
them, which is something that again, many other lay Catholics might struggle to do, even 
if they have the same fundamental issues. Therefore, Wills serves as this thesis’ devil’s 
advocate in many places, providing a voice which brings to light some of the problems, 
both practical and philosophical, the Church must address in its modern apologetic 
mission. Wills’ own logic and arguments are not really on trial here, because for the 
purposes of this thesis, it matters more that what he says is, in fact, being articulated, and 
less so whether or not it is perfectly internally consistent or otherwise adheres directly 
with the teachings of the Church. Wills’ perspective and directionality of thought seems 
to be sufficiently representative of modern modes of thought and the Baby Boomer locus 
of power, interpreting the Catholic Tradition through this lens more so than he seems to 
interpret the culture through the lens of Church Tradition; we may therefore use Wills as 
a legitimate voice espousing these views from a place within the Church itself.  
                                                          
12 I use the term apologetics because Wills’ tone and the probing questions and statements he puts 
forward in his book seem to be crying out for some kind of accountability or defense if one can be 
provided. Wills himself seems to have a prevailing argument that certain aspects of the Church are 
indefensible in many ways, or that the present defenses offered (vis-à-vis things like female ordination, 
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Wills, in a key way, is emblematic of the final major difference we will discuss 
between the modern age and the second century: the directionality by which one looks at 
culture or society on one hand and religion on the other. I would like to say first and 
foremost that, even if the language I have utilized suggests it, I do not in any way intend 
to make a strict binary between culture and religion, nor do I wish to portray them as 
constantly and inevitably at odds with one another. The focus in this final examination of 
difference is on the directionality by which these two spheres interact rather than on the 
assumption of their opposition to one another.  
That said, Wills seems in many ways to be emblematic of a key observation 
Muldoon has regarding the Vatican II and post-Vatican II generations (of which Wills is 
very much a member). Of such cohorts Muldoon suggests that “their formation has been 
more profoundly influenced by popular culture than by Catholicism, and so they are 
likely to see the terms of their faith through the lens of culture rather than vice versa.”13 It 
is a directionality of this nature that provides a key challenge to the modern apologist that 
those of the second century did not have to face. Again, this situation owes itself largely 
to there being no real distinction in the minds of people between discrete entities of 
society and culture on one side and religion on the other. The two were intrinsic parts of 
each other which, while they might vary in practice and belief from location to location, 
were on the whole inseparable entities. While the apologists of the second century tried to 
articulate the importance and relevance of Christianity in a culture which had difficulty 
processing it, there was never really a question about how one could or should blend 
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culture and religion in an amicable way; again, such was already the state of affairs. This 
is a key difference to note, in that its modern iteration adds another layer of complexity to 
the apologetic mission which was not really present in the world of the second century.  
It seems then that the fundamental areas of difficulty in translating forward the 
works of second century apologists take on a few distinct forms and raise a few very 
crucial issues. In the first place, we have seen how there is room for at least a perceived 
element of hypocrisy in some apologetic rhetoric, with a perceived allowance for 
equivocation when it suits the apologist. This problem seems to have existed to some 
extent in the work of second century apologists like Justin, and if Wills is to be believed, 
still seems to be problematic as regards certain areas of Church teaching. Following from 
this, we have several problematic effects relevant to the separation of the religious sphere 
from that of the society as a whole. Primary among these effects were (1) the overall lack 
of a singular voice or body of authority which could be addressed, (2) the significance 
value of the rational individual and subsequent need for an apologetic suited to a more or 
less populist vocabulary, and (3) the establishment of a directionality when viewing 
religion through culture or culture through religion. Each of these areas represents not 
only a challenge for modern apologists but also a problem for the voice of second century 
apologists we are attempting to bring forward in the course of this thesis. 
It is important to note that in calling these aspects problematic, I am not at all 
attempting to suggest they are somehow bad or should be overturned or abandoned. My 
interest in using this term is strictly with respect to the main objective of this thesis to 
discern the extent to which the second century apologists can speak to the cultural and 
societal context of the twenty first century. These aspects are problematic then in the 




sense that they complicate the apologists’ ability to do that by drastically changing the 
playing field to terrain which the likes of Justin, Tertullian and Athenagoras would 
ultimately find uncomfortable and difficult to understand, let alone difficult to navigate 
given their own individual cultural contexts.  
 The challenges outlined in the preceding section have in some way at least, 
provided us then with a map of the landscape that modern apologetics must navigate. In 
doing this as well, it has given some more decisive answers to us as concerns areas where 
the second century apologists might be applicable voices of wisdom. Some avenues of 
the apologetic project once open to the early Fathers of the Church seem to have been lost 
and walled over as more or less impassable routes for the defense of the faith and the 
persuasion of the unconvinced. However, this information is still quite useful as it 
narrows the parameters wherein the apologetic mission must operate and what its goals 
must eventually be. It, in some ways, helps to spell out the direction the Church must go 
if it desires to engage its audience. As the Church is directed towards a specified form of 
contact with society, we now turn our attention to addressing these topics concerning the 
space of operation for the apologetic mission and the goals to be achieved. 
 
Section 3.2 -- Challenges to Apologetic Engagement and Legitimization in Secular 
Society 
 
 Despite the challenges articulated in the previous section, it serves us at this point 
to remember the two major tasks of the apologetic project, and then subsequently to 
examine what implications the challenges discussed in the previous section and the 
similarities discussed in chapter one can come together in order to advise the course of 
modern apologetics. This section will act in the interests of doing just that, first 




articulating the two major and general objectives of what apologetics14 strives to do: (1) 
to legitimize the Church to the community or society it inhabits, and (2) to speak in a 
language which is best able to communicate the message and defense of the Church in a 
way that is both comprehensible and palatable to the given audience. These are the 
objectives which stem out of our analysis of the second century apologists and which 
certainly seem to have traction in the modern context as well. In this section we will look 
at each objective in detail to understand how the aforementioned similarities and 
differences directly affect each objective. Finally, this section will then attempt to spell 
out what consequences and lessons emerge when we attempt a comparison of this nature.  
 Let us turn to the first aim of apologetics: the legitimization of Church in the eyes 
of the surrounding society. The task of doing this in the present day, as we have seen in 
the challenges described above, is one which is in many ways a marked departure from 
the task of doing so almost two millennia ago. To this end we must first discuss the 
methodology available to modern apologists by which the Church is able to ensure that it 
has a voice which is seen to be one of legitimacy and authority in the world, and 
following this, come to an understanding of what ground this puts the Church on with 
respect to entering into discourse with the secular world. 
 As observed in the first section of this chapter, a key component of the modern 
world, and one which distinguishes it from the second century, is the general prevalence 
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of individuals serving as the primary arbiters of individual truth. This has created a public 
space which is both pluralistic and, in most instances, decentralized and necessitates a 
stratagem for legitimacy that respects this situation. Christianity has been placed on the 
same level as any other institution or faith, and would have difficulty appealing to its 
history or tradition in any sort of emphatic way to demonstrate its authority to speak on 
matters of public concern. It is then worth pointing out that such a condition, when 
viewed and framed as a state of institutional levelling and suspicion of tradition and 
heritage, is one with which the apologetic fathers were familiar, and one to which they 
might be able to speak authoritatively. 
Indeed, the manner in which the Church becomes legitimized to participate in 
public discourse was of particular concern to the second century apologists. While it 
would certainly be anachronistic to identify in the second century anything like a discrete 
‘public sphere’ in the modern sense of the term, the apologetic fathers certainly lived in a 
culture which facilitated discourse and response on various issues of the day. The 
apologetic writing style itself seems sufficient to illustrate this point, as by its very nature, 
it connotes a society and a culture wherein an individual or social perspective might be 
put forward and defended in the realm of public debate. This even seems the case in the 
Dialogue, as Justin is engaged by Trypho to speak on matters of philosophy concerning 
the Christian faith openly, literally in the public forum.15  
However, we should take care to nuance our conception of where and how such 
discourses take place, especially as they concern the terrain of modern apologetics. It is 
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an oversimplification to assume that the public sphere is some kind of singular entity 
which can be targeted en masse by any would-be apologist. The dissolution of any 
singular overarching target or audience, as was discussed in the previous section, carries 
with it the consequence of there being a general sphere which we might call ‘public’ but 
which is certainly not a centralized entity in its own right. In an age where argument is 
expressed via social media campaigns, 24-hour news cycles, journals and magazines, and 
we might even include various forms of demagoguery, we might better speak of a 
numerous assortment of public spheres which one participates in, each of which might 
have individuated rules or standards built from the framework of what the overarching 
society would consider to be appropriate or not. It is also worth clarifying here that the 
term ‘public sphere’ used here is defined in a relational sense to that of a ‘private sphere,’ 
the contents of which are expected to be kept personal to each individual and which 
should be as divorced as possible from the public sphere. Objects of the private sphere 
are not something the society should dictate to a person, and conversely a person should 
not dictate societal norms out of things contained in this sphere. 
This injection of the Church into the sometimes ambient and sometimes 
cacophonic interchange of the public sphere(s) and the Church’s subsequent articulation 
and defense of the Christian vision is something that is certainly recognizable in the 
writings of the apologetic Fathers. Concerning this point, Jörg Ulrich in In Defence of 
Christianity argues that while the apologetic effort may not have succeeded in stopping 
Christian persecution at the hands of the Romans, it nevertheless had an impact: 
“Christian evangelism was thus very successful during the first three centuries and the 
apologists played a role in this process, inasmuch as their texts kick-started the debate 




with Christianity in certain intellectual, academic circles in the Roman Empire, thereby 
provoking responses.”16 Ulrich’s statement here defines the early apologetic movement 
as one to be judged not by its efficacy in appealing for the legality of Christianity, but 
rather as a method of engagement which elicits discussion, forcing the public sphere, 
such as it was in the second century, to at least make reply to the claims of Christianity. 
Following this point, one could also argue that because it did elicit a response, 
Christianity did, on some level, legitimize itself via the apologists.   
 However, this task of entering into the discourse, both then and now, necessitates 
some kind of presentation of credentials in order to be legitimized as a voice worth 
listening to. In other words, we must ask by what authority and legitimization the Church 
says what it desires to say, and additionally, if it is given that the Church is able to 
legitimize itself as a voice within the public sphere, how then does it tangle with the 
contemporary forces which in some cases, supersede its authority in the minds of the 
people. This is all the more apparent when coupled with Muldoon’s observation that the 
majority of lay U.S. Catholics post-Vatican II “emphasized individual conscience over 
obedience to authority.”17 It is from this individual conscience that authority is derived, 
and the advice of the second century apologists seems to suggest that Church would do 
well to work within it.  
The situation at its root in both eras seems to be that the Church has to grapple 
with a society wherein the locus of public power and legitimate authority is derived from 
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a place outside of the Church and the Gospel. We find in the ancient context leading up to 
the second century apologists, a culture wherein the public good (cf. the pax deorum), 
with the will of Rome and the Emperor as guiding lights, seemed to undergird a great 
deal of what constituted authoritative teaching.. This structure of authority also works in 
tandem with the structures identified in earlier sections of this thesis, such as the 
authority of antiquity and ethnicity, and the authority of great figures of philosophy, etc.  
From this perspective, we can soon identify some ways the early Christian Church 
successfully worked within these memes and tropes, producing a communal language of 
the Body of Christ which we see in Paul,18 and even to some extent in Tertullian’s 
apology19 as well. We may read into these passages then, an attempt to work within the 
legitimizing structures of the age, and from this understanding consider how such a task 
might inform the modern Church. 
The present day Church has to work within a society which places a premium on 
freedom of conscience in a way the Church does not. While I do not at all mean to say 
that the Catholic Church is opposed to the individual conscience, it also asks for a certain 
and specific formation of that conscience, defined by the Gospel and the Church 
Tradition.20 The Church presents a new locus of exercising this conscience through the 
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by unity of discipline, and by the bond of a common hope. We meet together as an assembly and 
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supplications.” While it is important to note that Tertullian’s language does not identify the Church 
specifically as the Body of Christ in the Pauline sense, he still employs and describes the actions of the 
Christian communities as that of a singular body operating under divine patronage. 
20 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Part III, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 6, 1783-1785. 




active and radical encounter of individuals with Christ and subsequent conversion of the 
individual life of the person to that which is in conformity with the Gospel and the 
teachings of the Church. In many ways, this is much the same as how the second century 
memes within Christianity interacted with the primarily communal nature of the society 
of the time, reconstituting it in language of “the Body of Christ”. However, these changes 
and re-conceptions and recapitulations in both eras, allow for the Church to be viewed as 
a suspicious entity, and one which, even if it speaks in a language like that of the culture 
around it, still needs to legitimize itself as a valid figure in the public sphere able to wield 
its unique use of that language. Framing the discussion once again with an eye towards 
allowing the second century apologists to come forward, I would argue this leads the 
Church into two concurrent and comingling apologetic situations. 
Firstly, the situation both then and now sets up the Church institutionally as 
something of a subaltern entity within such societies. Admittedly, it might seem odd at 
first to suggest that one of the world’s largest, longest-lived, and linguistically prolific 
institutions is in fact on par with people relegated as voiceless and un-hearable in their 
own language. However understanding the Church in this context helps us both to 
understand the present situation in a new light, and allows us a unique avenue by which 
we might again connect the ancient and modern worlds.  
We may say that a significant part of the apologetic efforts in the second century 
is that in the attempt to present Christianity to a wider and (certainly in the times of the 
writers relevant to this thesis) hostile world. Justin, Tertullian, and Athenagoras were 
converts to Christianity and seemed to occupy some not-inconsequential social status 




within the Roman Empire, however, they would all qualify as subalterns21 by the 
definition offered by Ranajit Guha, given that at best they seem to be in the same strata as 
low-level gentry or upper-middle-class peasants.22 Furthermore by adopting Christianity, 
these men became arguably even more subaltern, abandoning the safeties afforded them 
as ‘typical’ subalterns and moving into a more suspect class of persons. Persons placed in 
this group are those who are certainly suspect under the societal elite, and as such are 
considered to be somehow untrustworthy and therefore unable to represent themselves; 
they may be able to speak commonly among themselves, but they do not have a voice 
which goes beyond that. The irony is that despite the prolific writings of these Fathers, 
they still ultimately are living in this social stratum of the un-hearable persons, and one 
could certainly infer the extraordinary effect beginning in such a place might have for the 
nascent Christian movement. 
To what extent then can we see the modern context aligning to this image of the 
early Church, and to what extent does it resist such classification. Extrapolating from one 
of the writings of most authoritative scholars on the subject, Gayatri Spivak, if we 
                                                          
21 It is worth recognizing the danger the use of this term brings to the discussion. In some sense, if we 
view the apologists as subalterns, as this thesis has done, it risks necessarily making them into 
collaborators with the ‘secular’ rulers. This is a concern not unlike that expressed by Vaage in the previous 
chapter that Christianity might ultimately become what it seeks legitimacy from. It also shadows the 
concerns expressed by Adolf von Harnack in his History of Dogma concerning the Hellenization of 
Christianity and the incorporation of external elements as foundational elements alongside the Gospel 
and Creed. While the use of subaltern is perhaps dangerous in this way, it highlights the risk inherent in 
apologetic cooperation with the modes of prevailing culture: that ultimately those modes integrate 
themselves into the rhetoric and modus operandi of Christianity itself. It is indeed not an inconsiderable 
risk and one which must be taken seriously and with due caution. While my use of subaltern language and 
discussion here necessitates this aside in the footnotes, we will attempt to handle the questions raised by 
these dangers later in this chapter via a direct discussion of Harnack’s critique of Hellenization. 
22 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, eds. Patrick 
Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 79. 




understand the subaltern as one who is both unhearable unless he/she participates in the 
broader hegemonic project and voiceless because of the broader paradigms which govern 
it, then we might be able to see the modern Church as something of a subaltern entity. 
The public/private dichotomy tends to suggest that the Church should not be heard in the 
public spaces because its proclamations are a matter of individual conscience rather than 
a public decision; its claims to any kind of truth, defined via a theistic belief cannot be 
articulated because they do not fit in with the rational ethic. We might here refer back to 
Habermas and suggest that in some way, the means of entering the debate are controlled 
and gated by certain prerequisite qualities, accessible only by speaking within very 
specific parameters, which consequentially means that the Church is not able to speak in 
its own language. This societal understanding coupled with the term ‘subaltern’ recreates 
the Church as a kind of modern subaltern institution, able to speak only within itself. 
The second concurrent apologetic situation stems from the fact that, even if it is a 
subaltern class, the mission of the Church is still one of preaching and evangelization. As 
a result, even being a suspect class in some ways, the Church must still seek to develop 
itself with a form of legitimacy which seeks to mesh with the modern arbiter: the dictates 
of individual conscience. In doing so we must again be aware that most such consciences 
are more often than not formed via the culture looking at faith rather than faith speaking 
to culture, and so it then behooves us to understand just what the cultural perception of 
Christians is and how the Church needs to address such perceptions in order to 
demonstrate its own legitimate authority. 
Both modern and ancient peoples seem to have a kind of image in their heads of 
what Christians of any stripe should mostly look like, and for various reasons (namely the 




relative newness of the Church in the second century, and the deconstruction of Church 
authority and decrease in Church attendance in the present day) there is also a kind of 
theological illiteracy23 which sometimes complicates and sometimes oversimplifies how 
the Church is perceived. This an area of experience in the second century Church though, 
where the apologists had to push back, fighting against slanders of incest, cannibalism 
and atheism in a cultural climate which did not know or understand the developing 
theology underpinning the arguments the apologists were making. Thus the Christian use 
of familial terms is viewed as incestuous, the consumption of the Body of Christ at the 
Eucharistic feast is a cannibalistic act, and the refusal to honor the gods of Rome and/or 
the general culture becomes a form of atheism. As this section will show, the lesson the 
modern Church can learn from the early apologists is the order and manner in which one 
must attempt to deal with these cultural and religious sticking points.  
The results of research conducted in these areas of study have suggested results 
that are at once discouraging and encouraging. A study conducted by Brad Vermurlen of 
the University of Notre Dame found that of 1,000 the unchurched and dechurched 
participants,24 that “The respondents tended to understand Christianity as mostly about 
acceptance, tolerance, and the Golden Rule.”25 Such a perception was then clarified by 
Vermurlen’s participants: “And they criticized Christians for not living in accordance 
with those values.” A similar study conducted by LifeWay, an American faith-based 
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25 Brad Vermurlen, "Perceptions of and Objections to Christianity among Unchurched and Dechurched 
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organization designed to provide resources to Christian ministries, found similar results, 
with 72% of 1,400 unchurched participants saying that the Church is full of hypocrites, 
but with 71% of that same 1,400 considering Jesus to be a positive influence in a person’s 
life.26 These results suggest that in some ways that it is not Christian doctrine27 that is on 
trial, rather it is the lived action of Christians.28 Muldoon observes that for younger 
Catholics “Church is a place where midlife suburbanites go to be comforted, to be told 
that their lives really need not change”29 and that such a perception is incongruous with a 
Gospel they understand as challenging and life-changing.  
Again, I would suspect that many of the participants whose replies made up the 
data in the previous paragraph probably do not possess the kind of theological literacy to 
delve into the particulars of Church doctrine or into its history to come to an 
understanding of how and why the Church teaches what it does.30 Pope Francis states in 
Evangelii Gaudium “We need to be realistic and not assume that our audience 
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Accessed July 5, 2016. http://www.lifeway.com/Article/LifeWay-Research-finds-unchurched-Americans-
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28 One might argue that the interpretations of the life of Christ given by such individuals is likely quite 
erroneous, but in an age wherein the individual conscience is as entrenched as it is, such interpretations 
must still be dealt with in a way which cooperates with that conscience, rather than attempting to disarm 
it straightaway. The task of apologetic instruction is greatly, and I might say unnecessarily, complicated 
when these interpretations are set aside or dismissed because they are wrong or out of line with Church 
teaching. Such an approach would likely be interpreted as overriding the individual conscience of the 
individual in question, and probably would result in turning them off from learning the literacy of 
interpretation they are presumed to be lacking.  
29 Muldoon, 29. 
30 This, again, is one reason why Wills contributions in this thesis are valuable, because in many ways they 
articulate contrary positions with the literacy background which gives them more credence than what 
most lay Christians could probably describe. 




understands the full background to what we are saying, or is capable of relating what we 
say to the very heart of the Gospel which gives it meaning, beauty, and attractiveness,”31 
and Francis himself serves as a primary example of attempting to live out this statement, 
at once offering the opportunity to belay charges of hypocrisy and invigorate, by 
‘attractiveness,’ a world which makes determinations based on individual conscience.  
The visibility of a figure like Francis seems a precedent setting event in the 
history of the Church. He seems in many ways to be a figure who practices what he 
preaches and importantly, is viewed as someone who does so as well. The popular image 
of Francis as a pope who would sneak out of the Vatican to feed and be with the 
homeless,32 who would make a special effort to kiss and bless a disfigured man33 and a 
disabled child,34 and as a figure who would allow a young boy to sit in his chair while he 
was giving an address,35 are images which resonate in the modern mind as representative 
of a genuine Christian. Whether or not all of these stories are factual (though I have 
attempted to source each instance in the footnotes below), they are stories which seem to 
resonate with the popular perception of what a Christian should be and fit the pope into 
that schema. The pope’s actions, at least as documented in many forms of mass media, 
comport with the image of a man who is humble and Christ-like in the minds of those 
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who consume that media, and in this, the savvy of Francis lends legitimacy to 
Catholicism-at-large. 
The general believability and virality of these stories should not be dismissed 
either, especially in an age where some might feel a kind of information and news 
overload in the sheer amount of headlines vying for attention in one’s Facebook, Twitter 
or other RSS feeds. The themes of these stories seem demonstrative of the prevailing 
knowledge of Truth possessed by most people and expected of those who claim to preach 
it. Their virality resonates from the knowledge that Christianity is something that is 
rooted more in inspired actions which sculpt one’s life rather than being a list of doctrines 
and dogmas to be learned and adhered to. It is this kind of authenticity that Francis 
speaks of as being a task for clergy and lay persons alike and as being the attractive 
element in Christianity. But therein lies the rub and so to lies the job of the apologist 
outlined by the second century apologetic Fathers. In attempting to follow their example 
and ultimately speak with a language and a legitimacy respected by the surrounding 
culture, there is a simultaneous urgency and cautiousness necessary.  
On one hand, we can make a keen argument for founding Church legitimacy on 
this kind of apologetics of action as a means of genuinely reaching people who are 
suspicious of the Church, but at the same time, there must be a cautiousness to ensure that 
the Church does not simply become a self-help group or a community outreach. While 
such outreaches are perhaps elements of the lived ministry of the Church, perhaps even 
vital ones, they should not be viewed as ends in themselves. Smith and Denton have a 
similar caution, stating that “Making [social goods] into religion’s key legitimating focus 
easily degenerates into a church-is-good-because-it-will-help-keep-my-kid-off-drugs-




and-increase-their-seatbelt-use mentality. This obviously undermines larger and deeper 
questions of truth, tradition, discipleship, and peoplehood that matter to communities of 
faith.”36 This thesis is not advocating such a trajectory and is certainly wary of the risks 
that such a direction would pose to the health of what truly makes the Church what it is. 
Rather, what I am suggesting is the aforementioned need to appeal to the individual 
conscience requires the apologist to be aware of what seems to drain legitimacy out of the 
Church before one can focus on ensuring there is some in it. These challenges posed by a 
world governed by individual conscience are worthy of consideration regardless of 
whether the Church is acting as an institution or as constituent members. Little can be 
done verbally to advance the apologetic effort as a whole if by its actions the Church is 
hemorrhaging legitimacy by being or appearing hypocritical. It must be visibly able to 
support its good faith with good works. 
Here again the second century apologists prove instructive to the modern Church. 
Each apologist discussed in this thesis begins his apology with a claim to justice, and an 
assurance that Christians are innocent of the charges against them, if only the judging 
parties would deign to truly investigate the Church. To that end, we must be prepared to 
issue the same challenge Athenagoras does in his apology, stating “If, indeed, anyone can 
convict us of a crime, be it small or great, we do not ask to be excused from punishment, 
but are prepared to undergo the sharpest and most merciless inflictions. But if the 
accusation relates merely to our name [let such an accusation be dismissed for the sake of 
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what is right.]”37 The study of the second century apologists demands a modern response 
of openness and even invitation to external examination of the Church itself. While we 
must not be so naïve as to think that the modern meta-narratives (e.g. liberal vs. 
conservative, religion vs. science, etc.) will not be applied to whatever is found in such 
investigations, at the same time it seems a counterproductive step to bar inquiry that does 
not necessarily share the same language and narratives of the Church. The institutional 
Church and individual Christians cannot be squeamish about inviting investigation into 
the life of the Church, for if the Church is meant to be attractive it must be secure enough 
to be inviting to those outside of it. It is also telling that only once the second century 
apologists had issued such an invitation (or challenge, depending on the tone one 
interprets from the given work) could they then have the space to offer verbal apologetics 
for what that investigation might reveal to a culture inherently suspicious of it.  
 
Section 3.3 – The Potential Pitfalls of Apologetic Language 
It is with this pattern in mind that we now turn to the second major task of the 
apologist: the ability to speak in a language understood by the audience. It should be 
observed straightaway that there is an inherent challenge in this task, as there exists some 
fundamental differences in the ethos governing the secular sphere versus that of the 
Church; this challenge poses the danger of potentially selling out the Church in order to 
make it palatable or elsewise allowing elements which could prove corrosive to the 
Gospel to seep into the Church and do so. However, without the theological skill and 
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courage to be able to translate, articulate, and defend the Gospel message in terms which 
are accessible to those who are not versed in such a discussion, we are only left with a 
Church that is an echo chamber unto itself. Preaching to the choir may be the way to get 
them to sing, but all one is left with in such a situation is a concert, not a liturgy. This 
penultimate stretch of the chapter will attempt to grapple with these issues, and again 
continually ask where the wisdom and skill of the second century apologists might again 
support the task of the present day Church. 
In addressing this apologetic task, let us first attempt to understand some of the 
areas of concern surrounding this aspect of the apologetic mission. The question here 
largely boils down to variant concerns on the common theme of the extent to which the 
Church’s use and/or appropriation of external language provides a means of ingress for 
the surrounding culture to somehow distort the Gospel and the Church’s teaching. While 
there are certainly numerous voices, scholarly and plebian, lay and religious, who have 
brought forward concerns of this nature to the discussion, in the interests of specificity, 
this thesis will focus on two which seem to stand out in the field. We will first look at 
Adolf von Harnack’s criticism of the early apologetic efforts for introducing a 
Hellenizing element into the at-the-time pure Christian faith. While Harnack is certainly a 
figure of some academic controversy and many have contested his claims and their 
implications, what he articulates in this vein is, if not wholly correct, at least wholly 
vocative of the concern in question. The second figure will be Alasdair MacIntyre, 
primarily through his work After Virtue. Through this, MacIntyre provides a criticism of 
the Kantian ethic that religion can be fit into society by reason and moral action, and in 
his criticism provides us with a more modern voice articulating concern for the 




implications of a Christianity attempting to interact with such an ethic on opposing 
ground, or conceding ground to such an ethic.  
Harnack’s criticism of the early apologists seems to point to a concern that 
Christianity’s growing entanglement with the philosophical systems of ancient Greece 
and Rome over the course of the apologetic period ultimately created a system which 
diminished the Gospel and put dogma on center stage within the Church. Harnack’s 
painting of dogma seems to suggest that it develops out of a need for philosophical 
consistency and argument rather than out of the natural consequences of living and apply 
the message of Christ. While Harnack’s Protestant heritage should not be forgotten in the 
structure of his argument and his academic suspicion of the dogmatics of the (Catholic) 
Church, his criticisms seem broad enough and close enough to the roots of Christianity 
that we can attempt to understand his criticisms independently of this and focus on these 
parts of the apologetic discourse. Harnack writes in his History of Dogma: 
Dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil 
of the Gospel… It became the instrument by which the Church conquered the 
ancient world and educated the modern nations…. But a third element has been 
thrust into the history of this religion, viz., dogma, that is, the philosophical means 
which were used in early times for the purpose of making the Gospel intelligible 
have been fused with the contents of the Gospel and raised to dogma. This dogma, 
next to the Church, has become a real world power, the pivot in the history of the 
Christian religion. The transformation of the Christian faith into dogma is indeed 
no accident, but has its reason is in spiritual character of the Christian religion, 
which at all times will feel the need of a scientific apologetic.38 
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We may cite here in Harnack’s words an admiration for the way in which Greek forms 
entered into the voice of the Church, coupled with misgivings about their ingress as well. 
Harnack acknowledges the end-game effectiveness of this blending between Greek and 
‘pure’-Christian thought, and its overall role in the broader context of its day. However, 
one can little miss Harnack’s ostracizing of these aspects of early Christianity,39 viewing 
them as ‘third elements’ which had been brought into the Church in the interest of the 
apologetic argument. His language paints these philosophical means, which were brought 
in to support early apologetics, with a fairly negative, almost idolatrous brush; he asserts 
that it was these elements, rather than the Gospel message, which became ‘the real world 
power’ around which the religion pivoted, and ultimately insinuates that they are a 
detriment to the Christian faith as a whole. Such often remains Harnack’s tone throughout 
much of the History, prompting Jörg Ulrich to cite him as primary among the more recent 
voices supporting the notion that “the apologists [can be] accused of ‘Hellenizing’ 
Christianity,”40 and in so doing, calling into question the theological legitimacy of such a 
mixing of the Gospel with what might be perceived as external elements. 
 The assessment and treatment of Harnack given thus far leads to more or less the 
same conclusions that William V. Rowe comes to in “Adolf von Harnack and the 
Concept of Hellenization.” However, Rowe’s nuancing of what exactly is meant by 
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Hellenization offers a more fine-tuned understanding of Harnack’s use of that term and 
bears inclusion here. Rowe’s overall conclusion of Harnack’s reading vis-à-vis 
Hellenization and the apologists is that “If Harnack does not approve [of the imbued 
philosophical spirit], at least he appreciated the labor of Hellenization for [enabling the 
Church to overcome its rivals].”41 However, Rowe defines Harnack’s Hellenization 
dualistically; first he addresses a positive Hellenism “in which a certain element in 
Hellenistic culture was posited as something Christian,”42 as a primary tool used by the 
apologists in their arguments. By and large, this is a description which the present thesis 
agrees with wholeheartedly, reinterpreting aspects of Greco-Roman culture and 
philosophy via a Christian hermeneutical lens. But Rowe also defines a negative 
Hellenism within the current of Harnack’s thought which exists, in Rowe’s words, 
“through the Church’s negation of a movement external to itself.”43 Rowe cites 
Harnack’s treatment of Gnosticism as emblematic of this kind of Hellenism and 
ultimately suggests that Harnack believes Christianity’s attempt to refute the Hellenizing 
influence of Gnosticism only created a more deeply Hellenized Church as such a Church 
needed to adopt more and more strict doctrines and dogmas, necessitating a deepening 
current of Hellenized thought within the growing Christian movement. Rowe’s nuance 
then, leaves us with Harnack offering two concerns regarding apologetic interaction and 
translation in culture: (1) the appropriation of external (Hellenized) language is, while 
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effective, still something which threatens to usurp the primary language of the Gospel, 
and (2) by trying to negate a given movement, one risks adopting part of that movement 
into the corpus as a whole.  
 With this nuanced and qualified understanding of Harnack’s criticisms set forth, 
let us turn to the more contemporarily focused Alasdair MacIntyre and his assessment of 
similar challenges as they face the modern apologist. The thrust of MacIntyre’s argument 
is that the methods adopted by the Enlightenment vis-à-vis religion operate more or less 
solely as a vehicle for determining what is or is not moral; this has left both (religious) 
belief and morality in a very tenuous position. Recognizing in the present day a culture 
which has acclimatized itself towards secularism, necessitating a departure from the 
beliefs and modes of believing which had previously governed humanity for a good deal 
of its history, MacIntyre observes that “It is not surprising that key questions arose about 
the justification of belief, and most of all about the justification of moral belief”.44 In 
raising the question of how one justifies one’s beliefs and specifically moral belief, 
MacIntyre brings Kantian ethics into the discussion, viewing them as almost paternal in 
providing the vocabulary and philosophy for morality in the Enlightenment.  
MacIntyre’s use of Kantian ethics is fairly thorough and primarily critical. 
MacIntyre outlines Kant’s argument, especially with respect to morality as defined by 
God, as being redundant; MacIntyre’s argument goes that if God had ordered us to do 
something and we knew we ought to do it because God said so, then we would have to 
have sufficient capacity to reason justly and morally to begin with in order to know that 
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we ought to do what God commands.45 MacIntyre summarizes Kantian ethics on this 
point, stating that “it is the essence of reason that it lays down principles which are 
universal, categorical, and internally consistent. Hence a rational morality will lay down 
principles which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of circumstances 
and conditions, and which could be consistently obeyed by every rational agent on every 
occasion.”46 It is at this point that MacIntyre critiques Kant for too broad a brush with 
respect to applying moral thinking, and observes that ridiculous situations can pass 
Kant’s universalizing test, while actions which are certainly moral sometimes struggle.  
MacIntyre believes fervently in the failure of the Enlightenment project to 
produce a suitable and internally consistent philosophical morality. In MacIntyre’s mind, 
this failure results from divorcing morality from God,47 or at the very least, from an 
Aristotelian notion of “man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos.”48 MacIntyre feels 
that if this process were to some extent reversed, and if Aristotelian notions of ethics 
were again allowed priority over those of Kant, one could once again speak of a moral 
philosophy present in the modern age. He observes in its totality the problem and solution 
in the conclusion to After Virtue, stating that: 
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My own conclusion is very clear; it is that on the one hand we still, in spite of the 
efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any 
coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view; 
and that, on the other hand, the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that 
restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
commitments.49 
 
Positing a world philosophically armed with moral philosophical consistency, MacIntyre 
believes that many of the difficulties plaguing claims to moral authority, whether from 
the over-empowered individual or from institutions like the Church, will ultimately cease 
to trouble us. 
MacIntyre’s argument serves as a key hermeneutical lens supported by Smith and 
Denton’s findings in Soul Searching. A glance at the endnotes for the text reveals that 
MacIntyre’s philosophy played an integral role in the interpretations of their data,50 yet in 
the minds of Smith and Denton, their research seems to yield support for MacIntyre’s 
case. With respect to American teens in the 2000’s, Smith and Denton observe that: 
One of the key teenage assumptions in this religion-morality equation is that right 
and wrong are simply common sense, something everyone just knows…whether 
they choose to live morally or not is simply their individual choice.  Nobody 
therefore needs religion to specify what is right and wrong. The good, the right, 
and the true are not per se defined as the will or word of God.51  
 
This finding directly dovetails with the earlier quotes from MacIntyre’s text. Individuals 
in the modern age operate under the assumption that the rational agent has the capacity to 
choose what is moral, because, being rational, they inherently know it through reason. 
Smith and Denton also include MacIntyre’s presupposition of a teleology, noting that “a 
morally significant universe has a telos, an end, goal, and standard, by which one knows 
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where one is and to where one is headed.”52 All of this is in pursuit of analyzing the data 
they have gathered which seems to indicate that with respect to the 267 interviews with 
U.S. teenagers that makes up their study,53 the teens themselves were speaking in the 
philosophical language and with the philosophical assumptions which MacIntyre 
critiques, without even realizing that they were doing so. 
This observation by Smith and Denton returns us to a previously articulated point 
which helps us better tie together this section. It seems that the kind of apologetic 
discourse needed in the second century and likewise needed now must account for the 
theological illiteracy common to both periods. Muldoon underscores the problem by 
identifying the language in which the Church often speaks as one which “produces 
scholarship accessible only to an intellectual elite… or religious intelligentsia.”54 While 
such discourse is not in the least unimportant, and serves to expound on and extrapolate 
from the central message of the Gospel, it often does not serve the apologetic needs of 
those who exist outside such intellectual spheres and even more so does not serve those 
who live outside the Church itself. The prevailing level of theological (il)literacy evident 
in the world requires a different approach in such a culture. 
When the secular presupposition is that one does not necessarily need God or 
religion in order to discern right from wrong, and when the internal logic of the Church is 
inextricably based in such a claim, one seems to be at an impasse. Put succinctly and 
colloquially, attempts to translate the discourse on Truth inherent to the Church via a 
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language and rationale of “Because God said so” is suspect and non-operative in many 
modern day discourses. This makes arguing for legitimization and apologetics via such 
language difficult, or at best, presumptive that such a rationale would be acceptable to the 
society in which it operates. Likewise, such an assumption seems antithetical to the 
virtues and values of a modern secular society. Charles Taylor might argue that the way 
clear rests in the Enlightenment virtue to analyze an idea based on its rational merits, 
rather than on its motives, and then discern the proper course from there,55 but one 
suspects that MacIntyre might find this approach philosophically inconsistent, even 
though it may also be temporally pragmatic.  
The position that these two thinkers, Harnack and MacIntyre, leave us with is one 
which could be seen as precarious. One needs must be truly sensitive to the concerns 
expressed in Harnack and MacIntyre, but also aware of the necessity for the apologists to 
speak in a language understood by the audience, all but assuring some level of mixing. 
The relative level of theological literacy dictates such an approach, as the apologist must 
know the extent to which they can rely on the knowledge of their audience, and then 
address it accordingly. Harnack’s concern over a foreign element bleeding into the purity 
of the Gospel and changing it or the direction of the Church is a valid one; likewise, 
MacIntyre’s ultimate conclusion that an ethic based on a telos, such as that contained 
within Christianity, must be protected from the meddling of outside barbarians who 
would seek to force it to mold to ‘rationality’ is a likewise understandable and necessary 
concern for the apologetic project. In short, these are voices and risks which need to be 
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discerned and carefully thought over in the process of defining the mission of the Church 
in a modern culture. One must be careful not to abandon the eternal for the temporal, but 
it is my sense that Harnack and MacIntyre posit more literacy than what seems to be the 
case, and likewise assume that if only that literacy was capitalized on in different ways, 
the risks of external interaction would be somehow lessened.  
However, these premises and suppositions do not seem to be the case on a number 
of different levels. Internal to the Church, the work of Smith and Denton showed that 
their interviewees were inculcated with a heuristic assuming that right and wrong are 
common sense, knowable through reason; expressing theological and ethical values 
without the more heady language typically used to do so. Muldoon also points out a 
similar case with the post-Vatican II generation may not be able to “articulate what 
[Vatican II] teachings are, or that they came from the Council, or that there even was a 
notable Church council during the 1960s… [However] young-adult Catholics have 
internalized what the Council wrote about.”56 And external to the Church, Vermurlen’s 
work seems to suggest that the questions being articulated by the unchurched are ones 
which do have answers, but those answers seem to prove unsatisfactory to the 
sensibilities of such individuals. However, the situation defined as such points us once 
again towards the second century apologists. 
The primary lesson of the second century to this end, is demonstrative of a need 
for blending. This can be intuited from the second century apologists’ efforts to couch 
things in the language of Greco-Roman myth and philosophy and culture, while in many 
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ways avoiding the deeper questions of faith that become relevant usually only after one 
accepts Christianity as legitimate. Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, even 
the more vocal anti-philosopher Tertullian, was never the less couched in, given to, and 
portrayed as related to the self-same trend he was ostensibly rebelling against; and 
arguably such currents were part of the reason for his ability to address the concerns of 
his time. One might even cite or point to Harnack’s own words acknowledging that 
Christianity’s success to some extent hinged on its ability to Hellenize, and though he is 
critical of such additions, it is also telling that Harnack recognizes the strength of doing 
so. The culture rooted in a Kantian ethic and upon the individual conscience must be seen 
as the Hellenization force to which the Church must speak. 
 
Section 3.4 – The Course for Modern Apologetics as Assisted by the Second Century  
          Apologists 
 
The modern apologetic effort has many pitfalls to avoid. The first section of this 
chapter defined the problems of modernity via a discussion of how the Church could best 
attempt to legitimize itself. These challenges posed by the prevailing dominance of the 
individual conscience and a general suspicion of institutions allowed the second section 
of this chapter to bring the apologetic fathers forward and suggest a course of open 
invitation to examine Church life, placing the onus for staving off hypocrisy in the lived 
consistency of the Church’s claims. The third section voiced the concerns for the manner 
in which the Church might choose to engage with the external and secular world via 
Harnack’s criticism of the Hellenization of the early Church and MacIntyre’s criticism of 
the end-game or lack thereof of a society run under Kantian ethic. The engine driving the 
criticisms of these scholars seem to be a concern for the incompatibility of ethos and a 




suspicion of corruption of ideals in a process of mixing and dialogue. Furthermore, an 
additional conclusion drawn by this thesis framed the concerns of these scholars within a 
setting of theological (il)literacy, calling into question the viability of the trajectory 
suggested by their criticisms, and leaning on the apologetic work of the second century to 
support the counter-claim of the necessity of some kind of ‘Hellenization.’ 
However, we must now turn to the more verbal part of the apologetic discourse, 
and understand what kind of actual dialogue needs to take place. As much as the 
preceding section of this chapter advocates a legitimacy and invitation via social action, it 
also needs to be followed up on by a verbal component which seeks to develop the kind 
of theological literacy from the illiteracy which prioritizes social action as the starting 
point. There must be a component which becomes the subsequent support for the work of 
the action. The second century apologists demonstrate this by, following their initial 
invitation for external investigation of the Church, spending more or less the entirety of 
the subsequent chapters in their respective works elaborating on the significance and the 
beliefs undergirding what such an investigation would necessarily find. In this section we 
must understand the key interplay of three major concepts, all of which are demonstrated 
in the second century apologists. We will first look at the notion of hybridity vis-à-vis the 
postcolonial school of thought, then we will attempt to understand the tenuous distinction 
between apologetic and evangelization, and finally we will touch on the role of the 
evidence provided in the discussions of both the second century and today. 
The notion of hybridity is key in how the apologists seem to operate. While we 
did define the term in chapter one, and made some use of it in chapter two, it is important 
to remember that the notion of hybrid stems from the individual who has something of 




two natures to him/herself. Not theological natures of human and divine, but cultural ones 
which in many ways allow the individual to serve as a go-between or a “native informant 
for the first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other”57 and Bhabha’s 
description of the person inhabiting the in-between spaces.58 As even Harnack 
recognizes, a great deal of the apologetic success came from the ability to couch the 
Gospel in Hellenic (or otherwise amenable) terms. The apologists of the second century 
were uniquely placed as converts who have undertaken to define the shape of that which 
they converted to, and in doing so provide an articulation as Christians to the prevailing 
Greco-Roman culture because of the in-between space they occupied. As much as one 
might consider Paul, as Ronald Charles does, an example of this same schema playing 
out qua Christianity and Judaism, the rhetorical success of the second century apologists 
owes a great deal to the hybrid nature they were able to tap into and utilize. By 
demonstrating a key knowledge of the figures and currents which shaped the society in 
which they lived, an understanding of what constituted the voices of authority and the 
language that could articulate Christian belief in terms intelligible to outsiders, they leave 
us asking the extent to which their experience in these matters might relate to ours. 
Translating them forward, we should investigate what hybridity might look like in 
the present day Church, and if it exists, how can it aid in the apologetic mission. It 
behooves us here to return to Gary Wills, a figure who seems to be thoroughly modern in 
his outlook, and very much an individual shaped by the culture which surrounds him. Yet 
despite this, and despite the fact that his critiques of the Church cited in this paper must 
                                                          
57 Spivak, 79. 
58 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Rutledge Classics, 2004), 19. 




be viewed as modern criticisms, Wills nevertheless professes adherence to that body, and 
in the final part of his book, offers a defense of Christianity via the Creed. Wills is 
perhaps most telling of his apology when he says “[The teachings of the Church] form a 
penumbra (sometimes a dark one) around the core beliefs always affirmed, those best 
summarized in the Creed.”59 What follows from this introduction is an apology for that 
which Wills considers at the core of the Christian faith, focusing on central tenets of the 
Creed, from the necessity of the personhood of God, the divinity of Christ over and 
against the descriptor of him being simply a supremely good man, and the ultimate 
eschatological arc of Christianity and the subsequent mission and faith that entails.60 In 
many ways Wills’ own modernity which proved troublesome earlier in the text is now his 
ally as it defines the shape of how the arguments must be constructed and the language 
necessary to articulate a defense in the face of challenges to the core tenets of belief.  
My sense is that ultimately Wills is prototypical of a modern apologist and the 
hybridity which can ultimately be channeled in defense of the faith itself, even if it also 
troubles some elements of doctrine. We must not forget that even among the apologetic 
fathers, some of their beliefs would prove inconsistent with the ultimate teachings of the 
Church, whether it is Justin's subordinationism61 or Tertullian’s eventual slide into 
Montanism.62  The defenders themselves may not be in perfect alignment with all aspects 
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of past, present, and future Church teaching, but it is important to remember that even in 
spite of that, the defenses they offer are no less valid, stirring, or genuine expressions of 
faith in the face of adversity. 
This discussion leads us however, into a keen understanding of modern 
apologetics and the line between it and the role of evangelism. If we continue to 
understand the second century as speaking to the present, we must also understand this 
distinction. The second century apologists’ first aim as dictated by their circumstances 
seems to have been a case of defense rather than conversion. While one could cite 
instances requesting the conversion of the target audience,63 by and large the arguments 
offered to the outside world were those of legitimizing and defending Christianity with 
the aim to avoid persecution and the other injustices articulated by the apologists. 
Doubtless they would have been thrilled with the conversion of their addressees, but the 
apologies themselves come off more as a plea for tolerance and justice than as statements 
intended specifically for the conversion of their readers. We might at best call apologetic 
rhetoric ‘preparatory’ for conversion, though likely not a conversion instance itself. 
Taking this direction forward into the present day, one must understand the extent 
to which evangelism and apologetics relate now. It is worth outlining that they still seem 
to be separate schools of practice with distinct individual aims. Apologetics is defense of 
the Church and her teachings, and evangelism is the gathering in of people into the 
Church. Yet they do seem to tread on each other’s toes at times; evangelism without the 
ability to defend the faith is likely just an exercise in frustration, and apologetics that in 
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no way opens doors for potential conversion seems to be superficial and semantic in its 
focus. Gregory Baum and Pope Francis seem to articulate an effective middle-ground 
though, by bringing together the concepts of dialogue, which the apologetic argument 
must participate in, and the element of the Gospel’s attractiveness via witness, which 
serves as the invitation to evangelization. 
Baum in his reflective text Amazing Church, cites Dialogue and Proclamation as 
suggestive that “there are historical situations where the Church’s mission does not 
include proclamation, but consists exclusively of dialogue, co-operation, and witness.”64 
This description is reflective of the ‘ought-to’ aim of modern apologetics; it does not give 
ground or cede claims to the outside world, but exists as a genuine sharing of the position 
of the Church and the larger realities to which it points. Baum goes on to criticize the 
dialogue process which attempts to proselytize, saying that it “would instrumentalize 
dialogue and destroy its profound meaning.”65 Much like the end-goal of the second 
century apologists, dialogue seeks more to present the position of witness and 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the belief and practice which founds it, rather than a 
specific argument for conversion. 
Francis on the other hand articulates the need and practice of evangelism in terms 
not dissimilar to the apologetic argument, but we must remember that evangelism has 
ultimately a different end than simply apologizing. Francis’s goal is to provide a 
framework for a ‘New Evangelization’ to meet the needs of the world today; in many 
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ways this is not unlike the present thesis attempting to articulate an apologetic for the 
same reasons. The attractiveness which Francis preaches is one which is rooted in the 
invitation towards an experience of the love of God66 and must be expressed via the 
practices of the institutional Church and by personal faith.67 
We may therefore suggest that the relationship and the distinction between 
apologetics and evangelism is in the desired telos of the witness. Apologetics in many 
ways acts as the vanguard for the faith, serving in the in-between space with the Church 
on one side and the secular on the other. It is in this space that the apologists might “kick-
start the debate with Christianity in certain intellectual, academic circles… thereby 
provoking responses,”68 in the words of Ulrich, or perhaps the words of Baum and 
suggest that it be a ‘witness’ to the deeper realities which undergird the faith. While there 
may be hope for conversion, as again we see at the end of Justin's Dialogue, conversion 
is not the intent of apologetic writing, whereas it is the core of evangelization. 
The joining point for these two however seems to be the dialogue process. In 
much the same way as the apologetic works of the second century acted in preparatory 
ways, the engagement and articulation of witness is key in establishing a basis for 
evangelization. In deference to Baum we may also say that conversion in such dialogue is 
not the aim, but we may also suggest that it could be a hope in the end. Francis articulates 
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this in discussing the type of person-to person communion which must likewise serve as 
the bedrock of the apologetic argument. He states that: 
In this preaching, which is always respectful and gentle, the first step is personal 
dialogue, when the other person speaks and shares his or her joys, hopes and 
concerns for loved ones, or so many other heartfelt needs. Only afterwards is it 
possible to bring up God’s word… but always keeping in mind the fundamental 
message: the personal love of God who became man, who gave himself up for us, 
who is living and who offers us his salvation and his friendship.69  
 
Francis is keen to reiterate as well the humility with which such dialogue needs to take 
place and the need for genuine listening and understanding between believers and non-
believers, and with respect to the circumstances involved, saying “At times the message 
can be presented directly, at times by way of a personal witness or gesture, or in a way 
which the Holy Spirit may suggest in that particular situation.”70 Both of these statements 
evoke in some ways the lessons and practices demonstrated by the second century 
apologists, but likewise tune them for the modern project of proclamation, while being 
sensitive to the times and places when it is and is not right.  
We are then lead by Francis’ words into the final aspect of the section as we 
interrogate the sources for evidence available to support the claims made by the Church. 
The second century demonstrates to us, and this works in tandem with the first argument 
of this section, that there is clear benefit in the ability to reference the prevailing culture 
accurately and pervasively. However, it is also important to note that the second century 
apologists did not simply make reference and leave it untouched or present it as 
incontrovertible evidence of a given claim. While versed in the philosophies and myths of 
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the day, they considered the argument of Christianity to be one which did not have the 
philosophical gaps which the Greek schools of thought did or the myths concerning the 
pantheon suggested. They offered a form of thinking which was cooperative with the 
culture but did not surrender to it, instead suggesting the improvements Christianity could 
bring to both the workaday and spiritual matters of life. It seems reasonably safe based on 
our analysis in chapter two, to say that the apologists did their utmost to rest their work 
within the context of the scriptural canon and the ecclesiastical teaching and tradition (to 
the extent that both of those existed in the early Church). When the two were not always 
compatible, it seems that the apologists sided with what they saw as Revelation, rather 
than with the prevailing wisdom of the day; we could argue this exists even in 
Athenagoras’ text, and that while he is perhaps the most enthusiastic about relating the 
two, his aim in the end is the defense of the faith and revelation of the Christian Church. 
In setting their foundation in this manner, they were able to articulate themselves in their 
culture and with their culture, but without giving away that which Wills has called 
essential to the Church. 
It is here that we must be exceptionally careful and where the modern landmines 
threaten the situation of the Church. MacIntyre’s arguments challenge the ability for the 
modern Church to behave in this manner because the ethos governing the Church has a 
telos, and even in the second century we could see a culture which assumed a kind of 
telos, even if the ends were pluralistic. In short, we must acknowledge that the world of 
the second century Christianity and prevailing Greek philosophical thought at least both 
had the fundamental language of teleology to speak in, whereas in the present day, 
MacIntyre suggests no such common ground. MacIntyre’s concern is that the self-




presentation of the Church becomes problematic if not impossible in the present owing to 
what he perceives as a lacking in this area, or at least the inability to presume that any 
given individual would accept the notion of a teleological end. In grappling with this 
aspect of the culture, the Church risks sliding into such a state wherein it has to give up 
essentials in order to disseminate its message in the terms of the wider secular culture. 
However, the direction the apologists bring us in I think suggests that with care 
and precision it is ultimately possible to refute MacIntyre’s concerns. The cooperation 
exists via the notions of hybridity and mutual social action previously articulated in this 
chapter. The Church in many ways has common cause with numerous secular 
organizations, and through these connections is perhaps best able to speak invitationally, 
supported by hybrid apologists who are then able to contextualize the action of the 
Church, refusing the potential of Smith and Denton’s worry of the Church existing as 
another self/community assistance organization. The Kantian ethos might attempt to 
reduce the Church acting in this way to such a phenomenon, but in the process of social 
action coupled with dialogue and genuine witness, the Church portrays the attractiveness 
Francis calls upon it to show.  
The refutation of Kant seems to go further by establishing mutual experience via 
social action as a baseline to which all involved can return in the course of the dialogue 
and which allows for further interrogation of the experience. It also serves, in a way 
which might make the second century apologists proud, to cooperate with the prevailing 
culture of individual conscience rather than to attempt a Sisyphean task of dismantling it 
in favor of an ethos more amenable to the history of the Church. The rational agent is 
participant-in rather than external-to the apology framed in this manner, and the 




significance of the experience of cooperating with the Church (whether institutional or 
constituent) is noteworthy here. It is cooperative with the perception of Christianity while 
also allowing the opportunity for a greater literacy to develop regarding of what is meant 
by the use of Christian terminology or Christian use of external terminology; the 
foundation for this rests upon an underpinning cooperative action. 
Cooperative action paired with apologetic dialogue is also reflective of one of the 
greater strengths of Christianity throughout its history. Beck’s treatment of the early 
Church in chapter one71 pointed out that part of Christianity’s success developed out of 
its ability to produce communal goods on a level and of a quality that its competitors 
could not. Muldoon makes a similar observation vis-à-vis modern Christianity, saying 
that the Church provides a kind of oasis of community in a world otherwise devotedly 
driven to a culture of the individual.72 The language of action and dialogue becomes a 
place which allows for Christians to bear witness to their faith in a way which belies and 
often works around a necessary understanding of the more complex theological 
underpinnings of such a given action. Athenagoras made a similar claim in the second 
century, stating “But among us you will find uneducated persons, and artisans and old 
women, who if they are unable in words to prove the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their 
deeds exhibit the benefit arising from their persuasion of its truth.”73 Action allows for 
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the common ground wherein literacy is not a prerequisite, and develops the common 
ground from which the deeper apologetic arguments may stem. 
However, by taking on the example of the second century apologists in this 
manner, that is to say via hybridity and demonstrating that Christianity can be shown to 
be a cooperative element with its culture, doing so should not declaw Christianity and 
remove the radical nature of what ultimately rests at the heart of it. In this method, reason 
is never given unbridled reign in apologetic arguments, but is instead servant to faith in 
the Divine Revelation of Scripture and Church Tradition. While this may be a sticking 
point for the pure rationalist, it still leaves the door wide open for genuine interaction 
between a modern individual and the life of the Church. And in some ways as a placation 
of MacIntyre and Harnack, this approach still keeps the Truth of the Church intact, while 
allowing it, as Francis says, an “awareness that the message is so rich and so deep that it 
always exceeds our grasp.”74 The second century lesson here should be well remembered: 
The Gospel serves as the inspiration still for the apologetic mission, and must be the 
central point around which the whole thing turns. 
We may then conclude this chapter having considered the ways in which the 
second century apologists can inform the modern context. Indeed, it is really only under 
their tutelage that this thesis is able to make the claims that it does, and an attempt to 
understand these conclusions outside of using the apologists as a hermeneutical lens 
would be on admittedly shaky ground. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, these 
figures also seem to be an abundant resource of advice for the modern apologetic effort 
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as well, and an apologetic plan rooted in their lessons could be a valuable tool in the kit 
of modern apologetic discourse. 
Certainly the application of their example is not entirely without some challenges. 
The preceding sections of this chapter identified areas of difficulty for the apologetic 
fathers, where their voices and methods and theology may not translate favorable into a 
modern context. The transition to a secular society and the lack of a singular target for 
apologies seem paramount among these challenges. However, by investigating these 
areas of difficulty we have subsequently found areas where the direction laid out by the 
apologists would serve the modern context well. Most prominently, I would argue, we 
have seen that the climate extant in the modern world can benefit from the second 
century apologists’ focus on speaking to the theologically illiterate and to those whose 
fundamental assumptions are not the same as those of Christianity. 
In addressing this concern we have seen the second century apologists’ work to 
develop a common language and act as go-betweens for the culture and the religion. The 
apologists also utilized the social tools around them to argue for the legitimacy of the 
Christian faith; the second century leaned heavily on Roman respect for antiquity and 
philosophical thought and this thesis has shown that social action focused on social 
justice and cooperation with individual action could and should be considered 
comparable legitimizing elements in the present day. This concept also dovetails with the 
apologists ability to treat with and utilize the public perception of Christians; the second 
century concern stemmed from the various libels and rumors surrounding the new faith 
and in the present day seems to stem from reactions to (perceived or real) hypocrisies in 
what the Church does versus what it teaches.  




Finally, and perhaps most importantly and contentiously, the apologists indicate 
the need and ability to ultimately, despite all the ‘accidental’ concessions to the culture 
they are attempting to address, the apologists seem to do their utmost to root their 
arguments in the scriptures and (burgeoning) tradition of the Church as it existed at the 
time. Their focal point remained Divine revelation over and against giving away the store 
to placate those on the outside. The work of this thesis comes to the conclusion that the 
methods and examples left by the apologetic fathers of the second century still have a 
great deal of advice to offer the efforts of the modern Church and modern apologist 
concerning these areas and we would be wise to consider then the best implementations 
for how these elements of rhetoric and methodology might look in a modern context. 
  





This thesis has attempted to engage with the extent to which the second century 
apologists can inform the needs of the present day. This question has been investigated in 
the interest of furthering the modern apologetic discourse and discerning ways in which 
the modern context might be aided by figures and writings from within the Church’s 
extensive Tradition. It is ultimately the conclusion of this thesis that, while there are some 
areas that the second century apologists have difficulty navigating, Justin Martyr, 
Tertullian, and Athenagoras still serve as figures of significant wisdom for the present 
day their example provides a useful catalogue of apologetic methods and insights for the 
modern apologist. 
In setting up the means for these figures to be brought forward into a modern 
context, we first analyzed the extent to which their original second century context 
mirrored our own. Our analysis presented us with noteworthy areas of similarity worth 
investigation, such as the general suspicion of Christianity, a culture of religious 
pluralism with some degree of permeability for outsiders, a public space governed by 
entry requirements unamenable to the Church, and a somewhat entrenched form of civic 
religion which demands priority over any additional beliefs or traditions a person may 
wish to also participate in. However, noteworthy differences also emerged in the form of 
a definitive separation of the religious from the secular, as well as in the general locus of 
power and authority in the modern age shifting into the individual conscience. These 
aspects of modern society were elements the second century apologists did not really 
have to consider in writing their apologies, and which occasionally problematize any 
attempt to bring their work forward as this thesis has labored to do. 




In examining the specific aspects of the second century apologetic argument, we 
found a number of key concerns and tactics running throughout the works of Justin 
Martyr, Tertullian, and Athenagoras. First and foremost, we identified in the apologists 
an effort in their apologies to make use of the cultural norms of their day; this created 
various apologetic arguments which argued that Christians possessed a common ethnicity 
and were the inheritors of an ancient tradition. It also continued into forms of apology 
which at times aligned Christianity with respectable figures from the Greco-Roman 
culture and at other times places a considerable degree of distance between the new 
religion and those same figures. Additionally, the apologists also attempted to walk a fine 
line between establishing Christians as good and loyal citizens, but also defended 
Christian refusal to oblige Roman orders which conflicted with their faith. Finally, the 
second chapter also followed the philosophical strands of the apologetic arguments and 
came to the conclusion that even when the apologists attempted to resist certain elements 
of the ambient philosophy of its day, they still voiced their rebellion in terms that 
operated within the parameters set by those philosophies. 
The third and final chapter of this thesis investigated and spelled out the areas and 
the extent to which the apologetic tools and styles of the second century could inform the 
present. While navigating the changes in terrain between the second century and the 
present, it was demonstrated that the apologists were able to outline a course of action 
based upon their writings and the circumstances of modernity. The works of the second 
century apologists seem to recommend an active engagement with the modern world on 
terms that it can understand; the common language for this method seems to be at first 
social action directed towards the common good, followed by dialogue and education 




which explores the theological underpinnings of Christian social action. This approach 
takes into account the second century apologists’ keenness to appeal to their audience in 
mutually intelligible language, as well as the concerns of some within the tradition that in 
trying to engage in this manner, the Church is risking contamination by outside sources. 
The methods of the second century apologists attempt to walk that line by ensuring the 
centrality of the Gospel in their language, while at the same time conforming that 
language to whatever the norms of the day happen to be. 
These conclusions, which again have been informed by the writings of Justin, 
Tertullian and Athenagoras, serve to define for the Church at present a tenable option in 
the field of apologetics. While perhaps the varying voices and contributions within it 
preclude any title such as a Justinian Option or Tertullian Option, my opinion is that it 
attempts to find a middle ground between the options put forward by MacIntyre and 
Pecknold. Whereas the Benedict Option risks a cloistering movement, and where the 
Dominic Option risks almost a kind of dilution, I think that the Second Century Option 
marries the concerns of both in a satisfactory way. Its intellectual focus on the centrality 
of the Gospel and the Tradition of the Church helps to defend it against wanton external 
influence, whereas its demands of social action as an invitational starting point demands 
an engaged approach which goes out into the world. The internal polemic nature of the 
Second Century Option helps to serve as a regulatory check and balance within the 
system itself. Undeniably, this approach only works under the guidance and the 
instruction of the second century apologists, but I also think that the wisdom of these 
figures and their demonstrated relatability to the modern context is sufficient and credible 
enough of a foundation. 




Admittedly, as with a great deal of scholarship, there are aspects merely touched 
upon in this thesis which are fruitful areas of research in their own right. Perhaps one of 
the most significant areas for future study is rooted in the differences between the modern 
age and the early Church. Future study should investigate further areas where Church has 
potentially carried forward unhelpful apologetic tools. It was demonstrated in chapter 
three that some of the apologetic methods used by the second century fathers are ones 
which would prove to be at least unhelpful in a modern context if not actively 
counterproductive; from this suggestion I do not think it at all unreasonable to surmise 
that there are a few elements of the Church’s apologetic discourse which are no longer 
able to reach the hearts and minds of those who hear them, and an investigation of 
whether or not this is the case would prove to be a useful piece of information. 
Likewise it would be worth investigating if apology is a dialect spoken only by 
those who consider themselves the underdogs, or as we have used the term previously, 
somehow subaltern. This thesis portrayed both the ancient and modern Church as figures 
of some kind of subalternity in their respective cultures, and highlighted the ways in 
which that social standing would necessarily have to affect the apologetic argument. But 
it is worth asking the question if apology is only relegated to a real or a self-imagined 
sense of being the one under attack or otherwise some kind of lesser figure in the grand 
context of things. 
Finally I might suggest that one of the areas entirely untouched by this thesis is 
apology to heretics, or what we might perhaps more generously call ecumenical apology. 
While perhaps another corollary of individual conscience dictating religious action, we 
live in a world of numerous faiths and numerous denominations within those faiths. 




While the likes of those such as Tertullian and Augustine wrote prolifically against 
heretical sects, it would seem unconscionable for such a thing to happen today; certainly 
there would be an uproar or at least bafflement if a Catholic bishop denounced a 
Protestant minister on the grounds of heresy or vice versa. It could certainly be worth an 
examination in much the same vein as the present thesis to see if the apologetic rhetoric 
of the second century qua heretical sects has any insight to offer at all on ecumenism and 
interfaith relations in the present day, to say nothing of its ability to inform the Church 
against schools of modern heresy rooted in economic doctrines, ethical doctrines, or 
defections of thought that run counter to the Gospel.   
One of the great riches of the Church is its heritage and its Tradition. Pecknold 
and MacIntyre’s appeal to the titular saints of the Benedict and Dominic Options 
underscores the significance of looking within these riches to find solutions and 
methodologies appropriate to current day issues. Pope Francis’ choice of his papal name 
is similarly participant in this process, calling back to the labors and ministry of St. 
Francis of Assisi as an example to be ever before his eyes. The great precedent within the 
Catholic Church of utilizing various aspects of the Tradition to navigate through difficult 
challenges also undergirds the work undertaken by this thesis. The writers of the second 
century lived and worked within one of the most tenuous and difficult periods in the 
history of the Church, and yet their legacy and their attempt to address the problems of 
their time can still today serve as an example of an apology focused simultaneously on 
defending the radical message of Jesus while engaging the world in a manner reflective 
of a genuine acceptance of Christ’s message.  
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